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The classical-Christian model of friendship has operated for many centuries from oral 
traditions and through the age of print. However, technological developments in 
communication and media rearrange mindscapes. Consequently, values, or, those things 
that give meaning, can change, such as perceptions of friendship. If one accepts that 
communication is vital to human relationships, the paradigm for the classical-Christian 
friendship should operate according to the new vocabulary of expanding communication 
and media possibilities. This work examines literature and philosophical thought within 
their historical contexts in order to gauge the operation of the classical-Christian 
friendship model from the beginning of Western literature to Western literature at the 









































Classical-Christian Friendship Operating in Western Literature:  
From Oral Traditions to the Apex of Print Culture 
 
 
This project began as a question about how technological developments in 
communication had operated upon the essential human relationship that is friendship. To 
answer such a question is like trying to put the galaxy in a bottle. For one thing, people 
define friendship differently. For another, people have been writing about friendship and 
all its aspects for centuries. Therefore, it was decided to use a well-established friendship 
paradigm that the early theorists fashioned as the best possible, and that the inquiry 
would be limited to Western civilization. This model is named the classical-Christian 
friendship. The field of referential possibility is immense; so the spade is driven into the 
garden of Western fiction literature, for the first thinkers to be curious about friendship 
often refer to the narratives in their mythology and legends for the grandest friendship 
examples. An investigation of legendary, mythical or imagined friendships from the 
beginning to the present should be indicative of the manner in which the classical 
prototype of the best kind of friendship has operated as it has encountered changing 
modes of communication and new communication media. An examination of friendships 
starting with Gilgamesh and Enkidu into the 20th century with particular emphasis on 
friendship from the days of oral communication to the apex of print culture is the final 
reduction of this work. The question is formulated as follows: How has communication 
media operated on the classical-Christian concept of Western friendship both directly 
through personal communication and indirectly through the societal or cultural changes 
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agitated by new media? When speaking of friendship, one should again remember that, in 
answering this question, the classical-Christian paradigm serves as the friendship 
template that is laid across historical landscapes from the beginning of literature to the 
early 20th century. 
 It is necessary, first, to explain the framework of this extraordinary friendship. 
The discourse begins with Plato (1993) and ends with Montaigne (1965, 1993). 
Significant additions are made to the model when the early Christian theologians begin 
handling it. The first chapter, therefore, is a familiar compilation of friendship rhetoric. 
Brought into the foundational conversations are two other subtopics and an important 
juxtaposition. The topic of solitude has significance as a counterpoint to friendship. 
Aelred's ideas (2010) about friendship between men and women receive some attention. 
The classicists discounted women in their friendship possibilities and most tended to 
separate marriage from friendship without even a comparison. The other has to do with 
physical proximity. It is an important quality of the classical friendship, and it rates 
considerable attention because writing permits friends to communicate at greater 
distances. Aristotle (1980) thought that one ultimately wanted to always be with or near 
his friend in the best kind of friendship. The early Celtic Saints were exceptions, and in 
these early friendships written communication was unlikely. Although great friendships 
were established, as missionaries and evangelists the friends were often forced to travel 
great distances and to spend long periods of time away from each other. These special 
friendships, however, remained intact. The Celtic saint friends tried to be present when 
one or the other was dying in order to facilitate the transition from the physical to the 
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spiritual world. These friendships are very briefly discussed although they warrant greater 
attention. 
 With something of a rubric for friendship in hand, one must discuss the 
importance of communication in all human activity and therefore its impact on 
friendship. The discourse must, necessarily, emphasize language and how it works, for 
language is the fundamental platform upon which all communication media are based. 
Chomsky's work, as expressed by Pinker (1994) and others, in language construction and 
acquisition is comparable to important scientific breakthroughs in other areas by people 
like Newton and Einstein; however, there are also the more subtle and intangible 
elements of language, about which philosophers like Rorty (1989), Foucault (1970) and 
White (2014) can be helpful. Simply, it is emphasized that language is the vehicle by 
which the human being expresses his or her thoughts most profoundly. The cause and 
effect relationship between language and thought becomes a point of contention as some 
writers do not accept its linearity and believe that the connection can instead be dynamic, 
or circular. Language also represents culture. Cultural and social influence cannot be 
excluded from the friendship discussion, for to many thinkers they are the walls within 
which the superior kind of friendship must operate. 
 The influence of language and the growing ways in which it can be conveyed 
require reference points as one sails through the centuries analyzing friendship stories. 
Marshall Poe's Push Theory of Media Effects (2011) is a useful template that is applied to 
five specific media eras. This theory, however, is not the definitive answer and is only 
used as one instrument to analyze the potential influence of media on friendship. At this 
juncture, one should conclude that since media can determine the way that people use 
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their minds, media might also rearrange and alter the operation of the classical-Christian 
friendship. 
 Equipped with the classical-Christian friendship paradigm and to a lesser degree 
Poe's method of evaluating media effects, the first expedition travels through the 
relatively well-mapped trails in the park of classical friendship narrative and epic poetry 
to study how the friends fulfill the criteria as model friends. The context is oral 
communication, for the earliest tales are born out of oral traditions. Divine intervention, 
spirituality, solitude, virtue, the deficient friend, the friend as a catalyst for action; 
reciprocity, sacrifice, and subordination are some of the questions that are framed and 
examined. The friendship tales range from Gilgamesh (1999) to the Song of Roland 
(1999). The friendships within this range are often the original substance of the classical 
friendship model. Poe's system enables a workable connection to oral culture and 
tradition. Much emerges from this visit. For one thing, women are largely excluded from 
the early friendship narrative. For another, solitude is something to be abhorred. Finally, 
the friends themselves are invariably extraordinary people, mostly heroic; some are 
demigods, figure in God’s or the gods’ plans, and hear directly from God or the gods.  
 Without the manuscript era and the development of written language, this 
undertaking would be impossible, yet it is essential to review how radically written 
communication has restructured societies and perceptions of the world and also to be 
grateful that the marvelous friendships of the past, born from oral tradition, were 
recorded. The grand invention is, of course, the alphabet, but learning the abstract code is 
not a process that comes naturally to human beings while oral communication is like 
learning how to walk. The human brain, according to most language experts, is pre-wired 
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for speech communication. The human hardware, in other words, comes with preset 
programming that has hardly been modified through evolution. Stanislas Dehaene in, 
Reading in the Brain: the New Science of How We Read (2009) provides a thorough 
analysis of how the brain functions in this regard, and he explains the acquisition of 
literacy in simple neurological terms. This friendship study proposes that if there is hard 
wiring, or pre-programming, or memory in the organic sense, one could reason that, for 
instance, ethics and values might also, to a degree, be innately transferable. One could 
even suggest that there is a friendship instinct. Even if a pattern for abstract thinking or 
one for values of the heart, as it were, might seem improbable, the human brain and its 
storage possibilities still contain enigma. It can be claimed, however, that the human 
being, or the human brain, has a penchant for patterns, and the more times that certain 
patterns are traced, the more engrained those patterns are likely to become. This 
hypothesis could hold for the transfer of a friendship template through many generations; 
maybe a friendship paradigm owes its formation to the primordial need for survival. The 
lone individual, in a primitive setting, is almost surely doomed. Herein lays one of the 
reasons that this exploration also probes into the changing perceptions of solitude as part 
of the friendship discourse. 
 The deep investigation of reading and the manuscript era are also for the purpose 
of showing that the brain has to adjust in order to acquire literacy. The learning process is 
artificial. Reading and writing take years to master. One has to work at it. Thus, the 
question arises of whether the organic adaptations coincide with changing views about 
friendship. Certainly, from the print era forward there is a new kind of truth based upon 
real experience, growing scientific knowledge, and technical progress that can all be 
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easily documented and widely disseminated.  The world has become more cynical and 
practical although churches and monarchies at first remain elite and powerful entities. 
Between 1500 and 1700, new friendship narratives and arguments are steadily emerging 
from a growing educated class, and these new writings are handily multiplied by the use 
of the printing press. The heroic idealism of the past hero friendship encounters the 
practical notion of being pragmatic. Alceste, in Molière's Le Misanthrope (2006) is made 
to look the fool for his dogmatism. Although Philinte seems to be well intentioned and 
regards himself as Alceste's friend, Alceste refuses his friendship. Alemán, a Spanish 
novelist, in his story Guzmán de Alfarach (1987) develops a main character who yearns 
for a superior friendship but who finds it impossible to attain. Both stories, however, 
highlight the importance of communication between friends. Women enter the friendship 
forum as well, leading to a profitable discourse about friendship between women, 
marriage, and the Platonic friendship. Katherine Philips (Llewellyn 2002) stands in center 
ring with her poetry and letters. 
 The possibility of the best kind of friendship with key elements of the classical 
friendship model is seemingly reintroduced in the eighteenth century as the door is 
opened to outstanding friendships between people of different origins and classes. 
Surprising contributors to the friendship narratives are Voltaire (1972) and Diderot 
(1936). Candide becomes best friends with his valet Cacambo who is of mixed origin. 
Diderot in “Les deux amis de Bourbonnes” reminds the reader that in a material age, the 
superior friendship as one where the friendship itself is the greatest fortune that each 
friend can possess. With literacy and the print era, however, comes a new kind of 
isolation and solitude. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2012) withdraws from society, and Mary 
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Shelley (1976) suggests that science and technology can create sentient creatures that are 
no longer human. She probes into what it is to be utterly and totally friendless. The story 
of Goethe's Werther (1962) is largely told through Werther's writing to his friend, 
William. A discussion of physical proximity in friendship ensues; and potential 
difficulties of friendship between the sexes becomes part of the story perhaps without the 
author's realizing it, when one or the other is drawn to his friend beyond the Platonic 
sense in a desire for absolute completeness. The question of nature, too, as solace for the 
lonely and solitary, receives attention as Rousseau presents ideas about the goodness of 
nature and the natural good in humanity. Although Rousseau is not specific about 
friendship with God, there is the thought that one through nature can experience God's 
presence and consequently not feel alone. Labor and action are also part of friendship. 
The best kinds of friendship occur when friends are engaged together in some labor or 
activity just as the classical hero friends might be fighting together in war or on a journey 
to slay some mythical monster.  
 The 19th and early 20th centuries are extensions of the print era. The 19th century 
in particular takes firm hold of many of the concepts that sprout from the 18th century. 
Emerson (1993) and C. S. Lewis (2012) restore and expand the classical-Christian 
friendship in the belief that such an outstanding relationship between two people can still 
exist by keeping the principal parts of the original model intact, such as the need for 
individual integrity and right thinking but without the naivety of an Alceste or Candide. 
In the new world, Huck, an adolescent boy, can develop a friendship with an adult slave, 
Jim (Twain 1993), but it is society that perhaps corrupts this friendship and prevents it 
from enduring. Ishmael and his "bosom friend" Queequeg, born a cannibal in the South 
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Seas, exhibit the best kind of friendship devotion (Melville 1993). While Thoreau (1960, 
1991) relishes nature and solitude without excluding friendship, Bartleby experiences 
utter aloneness (Melville 2015). Set in the 19th century but written in the 20th, Willa 
Cather (1990) writes the story of the missionary priest Father Latour and his boyhood 
friend Father Vaillant who together are sent to restore the Catholic Church in the New 
Mexico territory after it is annexed by the United States. Latour is to become the 
territorial bishop, and Vaillant is indeed Latour's right hand and comfort. Theirs is no less 
a story of friendship and challenge than that of Ishmael and Queequeg in Moby Dick 
(Melville 1993). In the friendship stories there is a return of the spiritual element. At 
times, an invisible hand seems to help and guide the characters and allows the friends 
their opportunities to serve each other.  There is a question of whether the capacity for the 
best kind of friendship can exist without faith and Sartre’s solitary Roquentin in La 
nausée (1938) struggles without purpose and meaning. Finally, Carver's short story 
"Cathedral" (2015) includes friendship communication media without print, in fact, 
almost without sight. It links this work to the next step, which would be to examine the 
effects of audiovisual media on friendship. Audiocassette tapes, two-way amateur radio, 
and television are all part of the friendship experience, and a Platonic friendship between 
two friends of the opposite sex is portrayed as a long standing, potentially lifelong bond. 
The sightlessness of one friend is an important consideration in the analysis of this story.  
 The investigation includes Merton's concise point-by-point enumeration and 
explanation of the revised classical-Christian friendship model as it has emerged in the 
20th century (1955). One discovers that the rules have not fundamentally changed as 
humanity confronts new communication media. The conclusion introduces possible 
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avenues in the friendship discourse as they might be reflected in contemporary fiction, 
particularly in film and contemporary drama. The conversation ends hopefully, for 
friendship and its possibilities have progressed positively through the print era. 
Friendship has become far less discriminatory in the sense that it can develop between the 
most unlikely pair and without social criticism; yet the essential arches established by the 
ancients and the early Christian writers are still operating. 
 
Review of Literature 
 
There are many friendship treatises, and several researchers probe the area of the 
connection between friendship and communication. Few, however, look at how 
communication technologies could have altered friendship throughout history or used 
specific devices for studying the effects. Furthermore, there is little attempt to identify 
friendship as it is depicted in literature in connection to the prevalent media of specific 
historical periods although Ronald Sharp’s Friendship and Literature: Spirit and Form 
(1968) is referenced in the some contemporary works on friendship that regard literature 
but is not reviewed here. Two of the more recent books that parallel the interests of this 
investigation are Sandra Lynch’s Philosophy and Friendship (2005) and A. C. Grayling’s 
Friendship (2013). These two works, however, have not and shall not be consulted for 
the purpose of this research project. The analyses of the philosophical perspectives that 
are conveyed in this project shall rely heavily on the original works and most of the 
analysis that attempts to define the nature of friendship is that of this author. Although the 
reader will quip that the wheel may have been reinvented, it is also hoped that some new 
insight might emerge from fresh analyses of the original texts without the encumbrances 
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and prejudices of other scholarly inferences. Nevertheless, these two works, Philosophy 
and Friendship (2005) and Grayling’s Friendship (2013) appear to be excellent texts and 
demand review. A third book, Gregory Jusdanis’s A Tremendous Thing: Friendship from 
the Iliad to the Internet (2014), must be reviewed, for it is an outstanding work that most 
closely resembles the friendship examination that follows this review.  
One of the first things Lynch (2005) claims in her preface is that, “The mobility, 
urban dislocation, time constraints, transience and heterogeneity that characterise modern 
life might be expected to disrupt conceptions of friendship constructed within the context 
of life in more homogeneous societies” (ix). Lynch will anchor her work upon the 
Aristotelian view of friendship and how it has been processed by other friendship 
philosophers both past and modern such as Cicero and Derrida. Lynch, in Philosophy and 
Friendship (2005) attempts to present the changing philosophical viewpoints of 
friendship and to thus arrive at a more realistic than idealistic definition that better 
encompasses a contemporary scenario. Essentially, Lynch (2005) strives to convince the 
reader that the friendship model is not and should not be a fixed one: “If we acknowledge 
friendship as a dynamic relation between individuals we can apply the force of these 
comments to friends” (xi).  Lynch (2005) includes many of the most important friendship 
themes which she labels “self-understanding,” the “ethical relationship” after she builds 
an understanding of what she calls “the Aristotelian Taxonomy” and “the Kantian 
Taxonomy” (v-vi). 
Grayling’s effort towards defining and understanding friendship entitled, simply, 
Friendship (2013), builds an extensive yet highly accessible summary of early friendship 
ideas from Plato through the enlightenment. Accordingly, he lays the groundwork for 
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parts titled “Legends” and “Experiences.” In “Legends” many of the most familiar 
friendship narratives, such as those of Achilles and Patroclus, and David and Jonathan are 
contextualized. Grayling (2013) grounds his discussion almost entirely on classical 
definitions and examples in these first two parts (“Ideas” and “Legends”) of his work. In 
other words, he stays largely within the parameters of philosophical thought and 
friendship narratives beginning with Plato’s Lysis and Symposium and ending with the 
Enlightenment, which he suggests is a return to the friendship models of the Roman 
Republic (95). Grayling’s part III, “Experiences,” is briefest and presents much of 
Grayling’s perspective on friendship. One of the main points that Grayling wishes to 
emphasize about the nature of friendship is that it knows no boundaries as regards 
gender, age, or family bond; and people will be happy if they are able to achieve it:  
In the end, though, it is a personal friendship which is the central point of this 
discussion. I repeat what I said at the outset: we regard it as a success if we 
become friends with our parents when we grow up, our children when they grow 
up, or lovers, spouses and workmates—for in every case a bond comes to exist, 
and can be relied on, which transcends the other reasons we entered into 
association with the people in question. (Grayling 2013, 202) 
 
Grayling’s perspective follows a more classical bent. He is less pragmatic than Lynch and 
seems to approach the concept of friendship as something more static than dynamic 
although the idea of with whom one might become a friend is broadened into 
contemporary terms.  
This work and research concurs with Grayling’s in much of his analysis; but this 
investigation will scrutinize a version of the classical model of friendship through the 
lenses of technological innovation, particularly in the way that human beings are able to 
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communicate with each other and in the way that they communicate culture to one 
another through media.  
Jusdanis’s A Tremendous Thing: Friendship from the Iliad to the Internet (2014), 
which is not consulted for this work, is remarkably similar, nevertheless, in its use of 
philosophical references and particularly in its analyses of the great narratives like 
Gilgamesh (1999) The Song of Roland (1999) and even The Adventures of Huckleberry 
Finn (1993) to name a handful. It is a highly integrated work that does not strictly label 
friendship, for instance, as classical, although a paradigm emerges thematically according 
to chapter: “The Politics of Friendship,” “Mourning Becomes Friendship,” “Duty and 
Desire,” and “Friends and Lovers.” In other words, the structure of Jusdansis’s book is 
not so much historical or chronological as it is thematic. One will also find a balanced, 
reliance on secondary sources for theoretical verification and literary analysis. 
Jusdanis ventures past the printing press. For instance, he examines audiovisual 
friendships in films such as Zorba the Greek (1964). He also treads into the arena of 
erotic love and friendship, confronting classical thinking through an analysis of Plato’s 
and of Aristotle’s friendship ideas while touching briefly upon Christian concepts. This 
author, however, disagrees with some of Jusdanis’s speculation, particularly when he 
suggests that Ishmael and Queequeg may have shared more than an acceptable male 
intimacy according to classical-Christian standards (Jusdanis 2014, 135-139). Jusdanis 
also gives less attention to the idea of solitude as juxtaposition to friendship than one 
shall find in this examination. Finally, Jusdanis broaches “Digital Friendship” in an 
afterword, which well exceeds the range of this endeavor.  
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In short, Jusdanis’s book is a much better synthesis of friendship from the 
beginning of Western civilization to the present than this investigator has seen, 
particularly in regards to a paradigm that compares greatly to the classical-Christian 
model framed by in this writing. A Tremendous Thing: Friendship from the Iliad to the 
Internet (2014) is not, however, a direct focus on the media element of friendship so 
much as it is an effort to connect philosophical thinking to the friendship narratives and 
even to their authors. Jasdanis also shows more interest in the biographies of the 
friendship authors themselves to make his assertions. Frankly, if Jusdanis’s text had come 
into this author’s hands sooner, it would have forced considerable reevaluation and 
revision of the investigation that follows this review. However, a closer scrutiny of 
Jasdanis’s work might show areas of real disagreement, particularly in places where 
Jasdanis accepts contemporary historical analysis as factual.  
This project must also consider the efforts of other theorists and scientists who 
wish to discover the extent to which communication technologies and media operate on 
friendship. Much of the current social and psychological analysis of friendship 
communication seems to have omitted philosophy and literature or, at minimum, failed to 
establish an adequate definition of that which is friendship. In this century, there have 
been several areas of interest in friendship and communication, and this dissertation will 
make limited use of them, especially the empirical work, which, because of its shear 
volume as well as its specialization, does not easily align itself to fiction literature. 
Although some of these studies are narrow in focus, they might help verify some of the 
theories on friendship communication that may develop. Some in-depth social research 
into this question involves the study of adolescents with language impairments referred to 
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as “significant language impairments” or “SLI” (Wadman, Durkin and Conti-Ramsden 
2011, 42). These studies generally acknowledge that, “Children and adolescents without 
friends, or with poor friendship quality, are at risk of loneliness, stress, and concomitant 
developmental psychopathologies” (Durkin and Conti-Ramsden 2007, 1441). Although 
most of the research concerns adolescents, other studies have reported that adults with 
significant language impairments, or SLI, have issues “in respect to forming and 
maintaining close relationships” (Wadman, Durkin and Conti-Ramsden 2011, 43).  
 There have also been studies conducted in the relatively new field of 
cyberpsychology to measure, “the effects of text, audio, video, and in-person 
communication on bonding between friends” (Sherman, Michikyan and Greenfield 
2013). The particular study in question, however, has a rather limited sample size “of 58 
female university students aged 18-21 years” (Ibid.). The findings are, nevertheless, 
relevant to today and include the use of the latest communication technologies. 
 A most interesting problem is raised in regards to language and cultural 
differences, suggesting that those differences can foster a different communication 
dynamic between friends and in that which might constitute a superior friendship. Again, 
the sample size of the research is quite small and gender specific, having to do only with 
Finnish men (Virtanen and Isotalus 2013, 133). 
 One of the more theoretical works, and one that is closer to this dissertation, is 
reflected in an attempt to link “the phenomenology of friendship” to a socio-historical 
analysis (Dreher 2010, 401). Dreher calls his piece a “parallel action” to the friendship 
phenomena in which “the perspective of social science focuses on concrete socio-
historical constructions of friendship in different time periods” (Ibid.). Dreher’s effort 
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seems particularly relevant, for he is performing an historical study, and he uses the 
philosophical base in what he describes as “subjective ‘constitution processes’” (2010, 
402). The sociological aspect is this “parallel action” is referred to as the “socio-historic 
‘construction’ of the phenomenon” (Ibid.). The inquiry into current research has not been 























Fundamentals of the Classical-Christian Friendship 
 
 
“If they are friends of ours, invite them in,” [Agathon] said, “but if not, say that the 





The earliest recorded friendship in Western Literature, the story of Gilgamesh and 
Enkidu (1999), predates the early philosophers; however, discussions of friendship theory 
in Western thought begin with the Greeks and their friendship stories. There is the 
famous friendship of Achilles and Patroclus in Homer’s Iliad (1993, 1999) and later that 
of Aeschylus’s trilogy, Oresteia, between Orestes and Pylades. The Greek philosophers 
will draw on these stories and others in their mythology and legends to help them make 
their cases for what friendship is and ought to be, and their theoretical discourse shall 
undergo little modification despite the infusion of Judeo-Christian doctrine during the 
Dark Ages. In fact, one might propose that friendship theory comes full circle prior to the 
printing press as love is always from the beginning a central theme in that which 
comprises friendship, and the best, truest kind of love, even the capacity for love, is 
highly dependent on the virtuousness of the lovers. Love and virtue, then, are at the core 
of the friendship discussion, but these concepts are of themselves two extremely complex 
things. Aristotle (1980) simplifies through synthesis by calling love a virtue as it regards 
friendship: 
Now since friendship depends more on loving, and it is those who love their 
friends that are praised, loving seems to be the characteristic virtue of friends, so 
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that it is only those in whom this is found in due measure that are lasting friends, 
and only their friendship that endures. (Aristotle 1980, 205-206) 
 
By providing examples of what true friendship is not, one might arrive a bit quicker at 
how virtue and love are perceived by the ancients and how these qualities are essential to 
friendship; but a comprehensive discussion of the top friendship qualities along with 
some of the bolder, more spiritual theories is inescapable. 
 An interesting aspect of friendship that traverses the centuries is that of the 
yearning of two souls, or the quest for one’s soul-mate. Therefore, this quest-of-souls 
supposition shall receive some attention. The soul-friendship concept is expressed in 
Plato’s Symposium (1993) when Aristophanes speaks of how the original human was a 
combination of three entities that Zeus thought to divide for fear that the humans would 
become too powerful and overwhelm the gods. Henceforth, these separate parts never 
cease to seek each other out. Aristophanes also, in keeping with the idea of love as an 
integral part of friendship, calls the god, Love, “the best friend of men” (Plato 1993, 157-
158). Cicero (1967), too, from the Roman perspective, claims that the friend should be 
loved as a second self. The seeking and the blending with the second self is something 
natural (Cicero 1967, 36). Aristotle (1980) has already discussed the need for connection: 
“The essence of friendship is living together” (246). Celtic beliefs are blended with those 
of the early Christian monastic communities, and there are obvious links to other 
Christian writers of The Middle Ages (Sellner 1995, 1). Sellner tells the narratives of the 
Irish saints and their relationships, referring to their friendships with each other. One 
narrative examines the relationship between Saint Patrick and Saint Brigit (Sellner 1995, 
2). This friendship is outside the norm, for it is a friendship between a man and a woman 
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and also a distance relationship. Aquinas (1993) writes, “The lover stands in relation to 
that which he loves as though it were himself or part of himself” (735). Aelred, writing in 
the early 12th century, asks, rhetorically, “And what is more delightful than so to unite 
spirit to spirit and so to make one out of two?” (Aelred, quoted in Dutton 2010, 45). 
 If one is to love this second self in friendship, one has to love oneself, so a 
prerequisite for friendship is that the individual who loves a friend loves him or herself. It 
is even suggested that the truest friendship can be, arguably, self-interested because the 
person hopes that the strength of his or her virtuous actions for the friend would survive 
immortally among the living. Friendship is action (Cicero 1967, 10). Diotima, in the 
discourse retold by Socrates, asks him, “Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to 
save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus...if they had not imagined that the memory 
of their virtues, which still survives among us, would be immortal?” And, she, Socrates’ 
teacher, continues, “I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the 
more they do them, in the hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue” (Plato 1993, 
166). Aristotle (1980) seems to confirm this idea, writing that “man” still wishes the 
greatest good for himself, but there are many measurements and senses of this idea. For 
the good and virtuous man, it is honor that he seeks for himself (205). Aristotle (1980) 
will oppose this sort of selfishness with the selfless love of a mother for her child. She 
expects nothing in return: “So long as they [mothers] know their [children’s] fate they 
love them and do not seek to be loved in return” (205). It is not the same in the love of 
friendship where reciprocity is a requirement since one loves the friend as he or she 
would himself. Friendship, nevertheless, has as one basis love of self. Perhaps it is better 
to use the term self-esteem in this case, as love of self can also be taken as arrogance or 
  19 
vanity—as hubris. Aristotle refers to an intrinsic, intellectual good for which people do 
things that benefit themselves in terms of being virtuous and good. This good and 
virtuous man is often defined:  
He wishes for himself what is good and what seems so, and does it (for it is 
characteristic of the good man to work out the good), and does so for his own 
sake (for he does it for the sake of the intellectual element in him, which is 
thought to be the man himself). (Aristotle 1980, 227) 
 
The individual is anxious for himself to act justly, temperately, and as virtuously as 
possible, yet for his own sake (Aristotle 1980, 236). Aelred acknowledges, eight hundred 
years later, that love of oneself enables one to love one’s friend; friendship is ultimately 
love of self since the friend is the second self (Dutton 2010, 46). For Aelred and his 
fellow Christians, the love of self is not a negative kind of selfishness since each person 
is God’s child.  
 First, in consideration of what friendship is not, and the physical aspect of living 
seems quite important to the ancients generally, love in friendship is split from physical 
love: 
The Love who is the offspring of the common Aphrodite is essentially 
common...and is of the body rather than the soul—the most foolish beings are the 
objects of this love which desires only to gain an end, but never thinks of 
accomplishing the end nobly, and therefore does good and evil quite 
indiscriminately. (Plato 1993, 153) 
 
Love of the body, in fact, is called evil, and this belief will be fortified within Christian 
doctrine during The Middle Ages. “Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather 
than the soul” (Plato 1993, 154). As the prime example, Socrates, when afforded the 
opportunity to sleep with a young, attractive person, reacts accordingly: 
He was so superior to my solicitations, so contemptuous and derisive and 
disdainful of my beauty...hear, O judges; for judges you shall be of the haughty 
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virtue of Socrates—nothing more happened, but in the morning when I 
[Alcibiades] awoke...I arose as from the couch of a father or an elder brother. 
(Plato 1993, 171) 
 
Aristotle (1980) continues this thread, surmising that friendship based on pleasure, which 
is in reference to physical or external attributes, is unlikely to survive once the pleasure 
stops. “Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved...for if one party is no longer pleasant 
or useful the other ceases to love him” (195).  
 Physical things are never everlasting; they are perishable. The physical senses 
themselves are limited in range and perception (Augustine 2002, 55-56). Augustine 
distances himself conclusively from carnal love and distinguishes it from the purity 
ascribed to the best kind of friendship: 
To love and to be loved was sweet to me, and all the more when I gained the 
enjoyment of the body of the person I loved. Thus, I polluted the spring of 
friendship with the filth of concupiscence and I dimmed its luster with the slime 
of lust. (Augustine 2002, 31)  
 
Even the kiss itself, as a sign of affection, is accompanied by specific rules for the 
Christian thinkers of The Middle Ages. Aelred of Rievaulx (2010) instructs his readers 
that a kiss is only to be given for honest reasons such as permitted between husband and 
wife, as a sign of unity, or as a sign of reconciliation. He rejects other types of physical 
kisses and believes that the honest person knows the difference (76.24). In his discussion 
of love and friendship, Aquinas (1993) does not equate love with concupiscence (734.1). 
Love is not a passion but a relation; it denotes the impetus toward union, but it is not the 
movement itself (Aquinas 1993, 735.2). 
 Many of the writers who ponder the friendship questions speak of the loss of a 
dear friend, and often in these discourses are emphasized the everlasting nature of the 
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best kind of friendship. Within this everlasting possibility for friendship, Plato again turns 
away from the carnal possibility regarding the highest form of love; carnal friendship, 
therefore, strays from the truest friendship. Through his character Pausanias, Plato claims 
that to love something of a physical nature is to love something that is unsteady. “When 
the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over, he takes wing and flies away, in spite 
of all his words and promises; whereas the love of the noble disposition is life-long, for it 
becomes one with the everlasting” (Plato 1993, 154). Human beings seek the everlasting. 
Diotima, as has already been noted, tells Socrates that, “All men do all things, and the 
better they are the more they do them, in hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue; 
for they desire the immortal” (Plato 1993, 166). Ultimately, love is “the everlasting 
possession of the good” (Plato 1993, 165). And, both love and virtue, or the good, are the 
two most essential elements necessary for the ultimate in friendship. 
 Cicero’s lecturer, Laelius, at the loss of his friend Scipio, is compelled to discuss 
the nature of friendship with his young visitors, but rather than speak of a metaphysical 
possibility, he keeps the everlasting quality of the best kind of friendship earthbound, as 
something to be cherished that belongs to the memory, and he hopes that the memory of 
his great friendship will be everlasting. He suggests that when a friendship is strong 
enough and of the best kind, it will be known to posterity as well (Cicero 1967, 13). “And 
such a friendship is as, might be expected, permanent” (Aristotle 1980, 197). 
 The ancient theorists are in accord regarding the essential principles of the best 
friendship. Along with love and virtue, there is also friendship’s everlasting nature. Love 
and virtue conducted on an everlasting scale lead Christian thinkers like Aelred to draw 
friendship into a spiritual alignment on the pathway to God (Dutton 2010, 29). Aelred 
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suggests that God created friendship in the beginning. Humans have, therefore, a natural 
“love of companionship” just as insentient creatures do (Aelred 2010, 65-66). Aristotle 
has acknowledged the need for friendship, and he views it as nothing but a reasonable 
desire: 
For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had a all other goods; 
even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are 
thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without 
the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable 
form towards friends? (Aristotle 1980, 192) 
 
Thus, one can understand that, in order to continue living after one’s friends are gone, 
true friendship would indeed need to have some sort of continuance even after the death 
of one’s true friends if he or she were the last one remaining. Cicero (1967) indicates that 
to mourn the loss of a friend is to envy that friend, for that friend has reached heaven 
(12).  
 One’s being alone, then, is unnatural and that which is unnatural is often 
classified as strange, even evil, prior to the technological age. “But it seems strange when 
one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the 
greatest of external goods” (Aristotle 1980, 238). Cicero (1967) adds that, “Nature abhors 
isolation, and even leans upon something as stay and support; and this is found in its most 
pleasing form in our closest friend” (38). Aelred (2010, 66.57) refers to Genesis 2:18 
when God says, “It is not good that man should be alone.” God has given humanity the 
genes for friendship and charity, which God enhances: “Nature [from God] impressed on 
human minds attachment of charity and friendship, which an inner experience of love 
[God] increased with a delightful sweetness” (Aelred 2010, 66.58). Aelred (2010) 
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continues, saying that those who reject friendship harm themselves by rejecting their own 
humanity. People, with no friends or who deny friendship, are beasts (Dutton 2010, 46). 
 Aelred pushes the envelope as far as he can in his belief that friendship is the 
beginning of eternal bliss, which necessitates the connection to God: 
Thus rising from the holy love with which a friend embraces a friend to that 
which friend embraces Christ, one may take the spiritual fruit of friendship fully 
and joyfully into the mouth, while looking forward to all abundance in the life to 
come. (Aelred 2010, 126.134) 
 
For Augustine (2002), the truest friendship between two people cannot occur without 
God: “No friends are true friends unless you, my God bind them fast to one another 
through the love which is sown in our hearts by the Holy Spirit” (4.4.7). For early 
Christian thinkers like Aelred (2010), God must be a part of friendship in order for it to 
be good: “The one who remains in friendship remains in God and God in him” (John 
4:16). Friendship is a step toward the love and knowledge of God, which might seem 
logical even to the Greeks and Romans since the truest and best friendships can only be 
between those who are good, wish to be good, and who seek to practice virtuous behavior 
to the exclusion of vice, or sin. There is nothing dishonest, nothing feigned, and nothing 
pretended.  Friendship should be unforced and genuine, just as charity should be (Aelred 
2010, 74.16-18). Aelred dreams of a great collection of true friends, beginning with the 
individual friendships, and it is God directed as one seeks to become closer to God: 
God himself acts to channel so much friendship and charity between himself and 
the creatures he sustains and between the classes and order he distinguishes, and 
between each and every one he elects that in this way each one may love another 
as himself...Thus the bliss of all individually is the bliss of all collectively, and the 
sum of all individual  beatitudes is the beatitude of all together. (Aelred 2010, 
107.79) 
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The anamchara, or soul friendships of the Irish and Celtic Christians also centered on 
God: “True soul friends do not depend on each other alone, but root their relationship in 
God” (Sellner 1995, 4). 
 The most distinct schism between the classical thinkers and the Christian thinkers 
is perhaps in their view of God’s role in friendship. Again, there is Augustine’s insistence 
that the true friendship involves the Holy Spirit (Augustine 2002, 4.4.7). For Aristotle, 
the divinities are too far removed from humanity:  
But when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of 
friendship ceases. This is in fact the origin of the question of whether friends 
really wish for their  friends the greatest goods, e.g. that of being gods; since in 
that case their friends will not be good things for them (for friends are good 
things). (Aristotle 1980, 204)  
 
 The divinities may not be as involved in friendship for the classical theorists as 
they are for Christian believers, for whom the coming of Christ seems to have made 
friendship something divine; Christ becomes human in order to befriend humanity. He 
breaks Aristotle’s barrier. However, in both cases friendship is everlasting, in more than 
one sense, and the friendship that is not of an everlasting nature is not the truest kind.  
Aristotle (1980) establishes a taxonomy that distinguishes two types of transitory 
friendship apart from the best kind of friendship. There is the utilitarian friendship. This 
friendship is good for someone because it can lead to things like power, wealth, and 
influence. Aristotle also suggests that such a friendship can be on fixed terms that are 
formal and legal. An example might be one of political alliances or business partnerships. 
The second type of friendship has pleasure as its object. The relationship delivers some 
kind of gratification, which could be physical, emotional, or even intellectual. For 
instance, persons may stay together as long as each makes the other laugh, but when one 
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becomes depressed or discouraged, the other looks for better company (Aristotle 1980, 
216). Aelred (2010) calls the pleasure friendship carnal, and he says that it is most 
common among the young, yet with “its trifles and its falsehoods, and if there is in it 
nothing dishonorable, we must tolerate this type of friendship in the hope of some more 
abundant grace” (76.87). Though these friendships are not entirely negative, they are 
easily terminated, incidental friendships that endure only until the ends in question are 
reached or cease to exist (Aristotle 1980, 195).  Aristotle’s predecessors like Cicero and 
later Aelred will use Aristotle’s taxonomy in their dialogues and with only the slightest 
variances. According to Cicero (1967), true friendship should not be a deliberate 
calculation (18). Furthermore, it should not originate out of want and need (19). He adds 
that, “True friendship is very difficult to find among those who engage in politics and the 
contest of office” (30). Aristotle closes his case regarding the inferiority of friendships 
designed by utility or pleasure as follows: 
If these be the objects of friendship, it is dissolved when they do not get the things 
that formed the motives of their love; for each did not love the other person 
himself but the qualities he had, and these were not enduring; that is why the 
friendships also are transient. But the love of characters, as has been said, endures 
because it is self-dependent. (Aristotle 1980, 220) 
 
 One must return, therefore, to the everlasting or permanent nature of true 
friendship. With whom is such a friendship possible? There are some guidelines. The best 
kind of friendship can only occur between two people who are good. Cicero (1967) splits 
goodness from wisdom, as he believes that no mortal has ever attained wisdom (14). 
Thus, he offers his definition of good people: “Those whose actions and lives leave not 
question as to their honour, purity, equity, and liberality; who are free from greed, lust, 
and violence; and who have the courage of their convictions” (Ibid.). In essence, 
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reciprocity must exist between two good people in order for this rare form of friendship 
to be conceived. “Now equality and likeness are friendship, and especially the likeness of 
those who are like in virtue; for being steadfast in themselves they hold fast to each 
other” (Aristotle 1980, 206). 
 What makes the ideal friendship union problematic for the medieval monasteries 
and convents is the rarity of two such people, alike in their love for each other and their 
virtue, to come together. One does not always find his soul-friendships. For Aristotle in 
ancient Greece, there is little possibility of having an extended number of real friends, 
disappointing as his prognosis may be for the Facebook community.  
Love is ideally a sort of excess of friendship, and that can only be felt towards one 
person; therefore, great friendship too can only be felt towards a few people...one 
cannot  have with many people the friendship based on virtue and on the character 
of our friends  themselves, and we must be content if we find even a few such. 
(Aristotle 1980, 244) 
 
This scarcity of compatible individuals, soul-friendships if one wishes to think of them as 
such, is perhaps to some people a part of what makes the truest kind of friendship most 
extraordinary. However, Aelred (2010) is more hopeful that feelings of love and affection 
can encompass the larger community whose members abide by the same moral codes and 
in which each member has love for the other. Aelred (2010) makes the monastery sound 
like a nice place to be: “I marveled as though walking through the pleasures of 
paradise...I found not one brother I did not love, and by whom I did not think I was loved 
in turn” (75.82). Yet Aelred will not concede that all members of his monastic 
community, despite their mutual affection and virtuous qualities, can be admitted into the 
innermost sanctity of friendship. Even for Aelred, from among the members of his 
community, the great friend is difficult to obtain. The needed depth is very remote: 
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“Therefore, how many people do we love to whom it would be unwise to lay open our 
soul and to pour forth our inmost being—I mean those whose age or sensibility or 
judgment is not strong enough to bear the weight of such revelations” (Aelred 2010, 
76.84). Aquinas (1993) adds reason to the equation. For him true love must obey reason, 
and it involves the will (734.1). Aquinas refers to Augustine in this regard: “A right will 
is a good love, and a wrong will is a bad love” (Augustine, quoted in Aquinas 1993, 736). 
Again, there is the intention of the friendship, for a true friendship cannot be externally 
motivated. To have true friendship, however, is a difficult thing that takes time: “One 
must, too, acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar with him, 
and that is very hard” (Aristotle 1980, 201). Says Cicero (1967), “The older the sweeter, 
as in wines that keep well” (32). In his quest to reach the ultimate friendship, Aelred 
describes how friendship must be cultivated over time: 
As devotion grows with the support of spiritual interests, and as with age maturity 
increases and the spiritual senses are illumined, then, with affection purified, such 
friends may mount to higher realms, just as we said yesterday that because of a 
kind of likeness the ascent is easier from human friendship to friendship with God 
himself. (Aelred 2010, 109.87) 
 
One is further reminded by Aristotle (1980) that there is free will: “But mutual love 
involves choice, and choice springs from a state of character” (200). Aelred (2010) 
ascribes four aspects to the superior friendship: love, affection, reassurance, and joy. 
Love involves both service and goodwill. Affection has to do with the increase of one’s 
inner joy or delight. Reassurance means communication of all things to one’s friend, 
without anxiety, fear, or suspicion (99). These qualities are nurtured over time. Of course 
in these things, there must be that reciprocity between friends, which means that the 
friends must bear goodwill towards one another (Aristotle 1980, 194). Yet, as it has been 
  28 
shown, the soul friend is not easily to be found, and there are decisions to be made 
regarding who becomes one’s friend. 
 For the ancients, equality, in many aspects of life and thought, is a prerequisite to 
friendship. Cicero (1967) makes equality one of his golden rules: “Put yourself on a level 
with your friend” (32). Physical and material status, age, and social status all, therefore, 
matter in the possibilities for friendship, especially to the Greeks and Romans, who both 
lived in stratified societies. Perhaps for thinkers like Cicero and Aristotle, it was difficult 
to imagine that the depth of love and virtue necessary for the best friendships could 
transcend class boundaries. Aristotle (1980) talks about the “interval in respect of virtue 
or vice or wealth or anything else between the parties” (204). First, he points out the great 
distance that separates people from the gods and therefore the impossibility of friendship 
between them. Next, he refers to the kings: “For with them, too, men who are much their 
inferiors do not expect to be friends; nor do men of no account expect to be friends with 
the best or wisest men” (Ibid.). It is suggested, then, that democracy may provide the best 
political climate for friendship as there will be less possibility for social division and 
more possibility for justice (Aristotle 1980, 212). It may seem like stating the obvious, 
but the contributions of common upbringing and similarity of age such as exist between 
comrades and brothers are good for friendship (Aristotle 1980, 213). Though Cicero 
(1967) talks about the superiority of birth, he also suggests that blood lines and rank are 
not insurmountable since what always matter most are the virtue and affection that two 
friends share, yet one can elevate his friend: “If any of us have any advantage in personal 
character, intellect or fortune, we should be ready to make our friends sharers and 
partners in it with ourselves” (32). Cicero (1967) is magnanimous in his declaration: “For 
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the advantages of genius and virtue, and in short of every kind of superiority, are never 
realized to their fullest extent until they are bestowed upon our nearest and dearest” (33). 
The soul friend relationship of the Celtic saints breaks the mold, to an extent, although a 
reciprocity exists: “Soul friend relationships are characterized by mutuality: a profound 
respect for each other’s wisdom, despite any age or gender difference” (Sellner 1995, 2). 
Christian thought opens another gate to the possibilities of friendship among the 
poor, though class distinction is maintained: Often the friendships of the poor and needy 
are more reliable than those of the rich, because poverty may so remove the expectation 
of gain that it does not diminish friendship but rather increases love” (Aelred 2010, 
104.70). 
 With this idea of true friendship being between two people who are alike, the 
notion of friendships with the opposite sex hardly figures in the classical discussion. 
When the friends meet at Agathon’s, after the meal the flute-girl is voted out of the room: 
“I move, in the next place, that the flute-girl...be made to go away and play to herself, or, 
if she likes, to the women who are within” (Plato 1993, 151). The men want to have a 
philosophical conversation, and the women are simply not invited; yet in the 
“Symposium” Socrates turns, ironically, to the wise woman Diotima for his tutorial on 
love, and she is not, or is more, than a prostitute: “I will rehearse a tale of love which I 
heard from Diotima of Mantineia, a woman wise in this and in the many other kinds of 
knowledge...She was my instructress in the art of love” (Plato 1993, 163). Certainly, as it 
is told through Socrates’ recollection, Diotima renders the best account of what love is 
according to Plato. Perhaps, therefore, one should distinguish love and friendship at this 
juncture.  
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 Simply because Diotima is wise and mentors Socrates, it does not mean that she 
loves Socrates or that she is his friend. The teacher and student relationship does not 
necessarily meet the requirements for the truest friendship. Although goodwill is required 
for friendship, it must be reciprocal (Aristotle 1980, 192). One can wish goodwill toward 
someone and that wish can be reciprocal, but the desire for companionship must also 
exist (Aristotle 1980, 207). The teacher wishes goodwill toward his students, but he or 
she does not seek out their company after class, nor do the students seek out the teacher, 
although some students may feel goodwill towards the teacher. Goodwill must include 
affection in friendship, says Cicero (1967, 15).  Aelred distinguishes charity from 
goodwill. Goodwill is God’s gift and should always be practiced (Dutton 2010, 27-29). 
And, goodwill awakens the emotion of love (Aelred 2010, 64). Charity is goodwill, but it 
is a quality or affection that should be practiced towards all persons, even towards one’s 
enemies (Dutton 2010, 43). Therefore, goodwill and charity alone are not quite enough to 
cement the best kind of friendship. There is a mother’s love and self-sacrifice for her 
children, too, to which some allusion has already been made, so it is possible to want the 
best for someone and to sacrifice for someone but not to attain what is defined as the 
truest friendship (Aristotle 1980, 205). Relationships with women, then, though they 
possess many qualities, do not appear to fully encompass the total friendship paradigm of 
the ancients. It should also be recalled that mothers and mentors are dissimilar to their 
children and their students; thus, it can be that the equality aspect of friendship is 
somewhat untenable although Augustine raises his mother high: “My mother was also 
with us—in a woman’s garb, but with a man’s faith, with the peacefulness of age and the 
fullness of motherly love and Christian piety” (Augustine 2002, 153).   
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 The carnal element of any relationship consternates Augustine (2002), and it is for 
this reason, with the exception of the mother, that men and women could miss out on 
being true friends (102). As previously discussed, friendship cannot be for the sake of 
pleasure. Augustine talks about losing the mistress with whom he fathered his son, for 
she is seen as an impediment to his marriage, one which it can be inferred is not based on 
love, as he has intended to marry a young girl who cannot be ready for two years. He 
then, by his own admission, mires himself further in vice:  
But I, as unhappy as I was, and weaker than a woman, could not bear the delay of 
two years that should elapse before I could obtain the bride I sought. And so, 
since I was not a lover of wedlock so much as a slave of lust, I procured another 
mistress—not a wife, of course. Thus in bondage to a lasting habit, the disease of 
my soul might be nursed and  kept in its vigor. (Augustine 2002, 102) 
 
Augustine (2002) holds out little hope for the wife of becoming a friend, even when 
referring to his mother, whom he venerates: “She arrived at a marriageable age, and she 
was given to a husband whom she served as her lord” (160). Her role was clear, that of 
wife and mother, and so she possessed many of the necessary qualities for friendship: 
“For she had ‘been the good wife of one man’ [I Tim. 5:9], had honored her parents, had 
guided her house in piety, was highly reputed for good works, and brought up her 
children” (Augustine 2002, 162).  Augustine (2002) and his friends, at one point, wish to 
set up a common household, a place for the pursuit of wisdom, but the thought of wives 
and women make the idea unmanageable: “But when we began to reflect whether this 
would be permitted by our wives...the whole plan, so excellently framed, collapsed in our 
hands and was utterly wrecked and cast aside” (101). Augustine is speaking of women as 
obstacles in his path to God; he shows that women, or even a wife, are encumbrances. In 
order to overcome his being “tightly bound by the love of women,” Augustine (2002) 
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feels compelled to “a married life which bound me hand and foot” (128). Augustine 
never did marry. 
 Total celibacy is affixed as the best way to know God for Augustine (2002), but 
marriage is the next best option: “Thou commandest me to abstain from fornication, and 
as for marriage itself, thou has counseled something better than what thou dost allow” 
(196). One should realize, however, that Augustine is not discussing friendship on earth. 
Aelred’s Spiritual Friendship (2010) instead, has been described as a rewrite of Cicero’s 
treatment of friendship and as an attempt to unite both classical and Judeo-Christian 
thought on friendship as he seeks a pure and holy love (Dutton 2010, 34). Aelred breaks 
most interestingly from his predecessors and deviates from his peers in his inferences 
regarding marriage and the possibilities for equality between men and women. Aelred 
interprets the bible, particularly passages in Genesis, to affirm the equality of Adam and 
Eve (Mayeski 2009, 100). According to Aelred, all humans are equal, so there is no 
hierarchy. A man and a woman, therefore, can be on the same footing (Mayeski 2009, 
100). Aelred, Mayeski (2009) believes, does not exclude the possibility of the marriage 
friendship. If, then, the husband and wife are equal, and according to Augustine and 
Aelred the kiss is pardonable between the spouses, the physical aspect of friendship 
might be allowed to exist as long as all the other qualities are in place. Aristotle, though 
he may not believe in the equality of men and women, leaves room for the possibility of 
true friendship in marriage in his belief that the number of persons one can love as friends 
is limited: “Love is ideally a sort of excess of friendship, and that can only be felt towards 
one person; therefore, great friendship, too, can only be felt towards a few people” 
(Aristotle 1980, 244). He even adds that “friendship is a partnership” (Aristotle 1980, 
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246). The idea of equality between men and women, however, is rather unique to Aelred 
and a small group of medieval theologians:  
Marriage is friendship of the highest order, and everything that Aelred affirms 
about friendship can be attributed to the divinely ordained institution of marriage. 
This is a personalist understanding of marriage, significantly different from the 
thought of other theologians, both prior to and contemporaneous with Aelred. 
(Mayeski, 2009, 99) 
 
Other Christians simply cannot get past the carnal element, the potential concupiscence, 
which marriage might encourage. 
 As it is with friendship, marriage is expected to endure: “For friendship should be 
steadfast, and by being unwearied in affection, it should present an image of eternity” 
(Aelred 2010, 89.6). With this permanence comes reciprocity in the summits of love and 
of goodness. Each friend wishes goodwill toward the other as if to him or herself. And, it 
may be true that one wishes more for his friend than for oneself. Cicero wishes to elevate 
this general idea as he takes issue with a certain set of rules:  
The first, which hold that our regard for ourselves is to be the measure of our 
regard for our friend, is not true; for how many things there are which we would 
never have done for our own sakes, but do for the sake of a friend! (Cicero 1967, 
28) 
 
Such friendships are also almost indissoluble, for the best kinds of friend are carefully 
chosen, the decision mutual, and henceforth the relationship is nurtured over time. 
Friendships of the best kind, furthermore, are tested although “this testing can only be 
made during the actual existence of the friendship” (Cicero 1967, 31). Thus, one enters 
upon the selection of these ultimate friends very carefully, but there is still the possibility 
for rupture. The friendship criteria are understood, and another thought on the matter is 
added: “The true rule is to take care in the selection of our friends as never to enter upon 
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a friendship with a man whom we could under any circumstances come to hate” (Cicero 
1967, 29). There is also a special tolerance for the true friend: 
Where nothing shameful was involved, no confidence betrayed, no virtue blemish 
had to yield to a friend, so I not only tolerated what seemed his transgression but 
also, where his peace of mind was threatened, preferred his will to my own. 
(Aelred 2010, 92.20) 
 
So under what circumstances, then, could a friendship of such strong character be 
dissolved, especially if one has a friend “to whom you can say everything with absolute 
confidence as to yourself?” (Cicero 1967, 15). Thus, trust and tolerance are two principle 
qualities of the good friend; one trusts his friend and is never suspicious of him, and one 
should add above the two, loyalty: “Nothing that lacks loyalty can be stable” (Cicreo 
1967, 31). Loyalty, to Aelred (2010), means that, “Indeed a loyal friend contemplates in a 
friend nothing but his soul” (102.62). Therefore, if the trust is broken and if there is 
disloyalty, there could be just cause to end a true friendship. If one friend, furthermore, 
were to compromise his virtue and also the character of his friend, there might also be 
grounds for termination: “For, seeing that a belief in a man’s virtue is the original cause 
of friendship, friendship can hardly remain if virtue be abandoned” (Cicero 1967, 22). 
Cicero (1967), in relating a story about a man who pleads that he has acted in the interests 
of a friend in committing a treasonable act, arrives at the following rule regarding 
friendship: “Neither ask nor consent to do what is wrong. For the plea ‘for friendship’s 
sake’ is a discreditable one” (22). Aelred (2010) is somewhat more explicit in his reasons, 
through heavy reliance on biblical passages, for the rupture of friendship as he identifies 
“slander, reproach, and pride, the betrayal of secrets, and a treacherous blow” (93.23). 
Friends, then, of the best kind, will break up only because of a friend’s outrageous 
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conduct and offense (Cicero 1967, 34). Simply put, true friends do not wish to cause each 
other pain (Aristotle 1980, 245). It is not to say that good friends will not test each other. 
Patience and tolerance are essential in the best kind of friendship, and friends are willing 
to accept each other’s criticism: “When corrected, the friend may not fret or despise or 
hate the one who corrects him, and he himself may not be ashamed to bear any hardship 
for his friend” (Aelred 2010, 102.61). In his investigation of the Celtic soul friendships, 
Sellner writes: 
Soul friendships...include the ability of each to challenge the other when 
necessary...sometimes the most difficult aspect of any intimate relationship, but 
without it friendship can soon become superficial, stunted, and eventually lost. 
(Sellner 1995, 3) 
 
 Even in dissolution, however, it should not be possible for one to turn against the 
person who had been a true friend.  No enmity should be allowed in dissolution. It is 
discreditable. One can be offended, but he or she should be without rancor (Cicero 1967, 
35). One can never withdraw his love and respect for a former friend despite the offenses 
though one may deny that person the special confidence of friendship: 
You may never withdraw your love from him, refuse him help, or deny him 
counsel. But if in his folly he should burst out even in blasphemies and curses, 
still show such respect for your bond, such respect for charity, that the blame falls 
on the one who inflicts the disgrace and not on the one who suffers it. (Aelred 
2010, 101.57) 
 
Reconciliation is also a possibility among true friends though such a possibility is 
perhaps voiced most explicitly among those people writing after the birth of Christ: “But 
if in anything we should chance to violate the law of friendship, let us avoid pride and 
seek the pardon of our friend through the blessing of humility” (Aelred 2010, 94.26). 
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 A final aspect of this discussion to be broached in the interest of the over all 
purpose of this sally into friendship is that of proximity. It is staunchly affirmed that 
proximity is necessary for the best kind of friendship. Friends must remain in contact 
with each other, and for centuries, the only possibilities for such contact were physical 
proximity. Aristotle is steadfast in his claim because being good and having what is good 
are sought after; therefore, being with a friend is a most desirable thing: 
He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this 
will be realized in their living together and sharing in discussion and thought; for 
this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man. (Aristotle 
1980, 241) 
 
In the same token, it is hardly possible for people to spend all their time together without 
being friends. Aristotle (1980), here, refers to the fixed number of friends that are 
possible, which, as previously stated, he believes is a very limited number: “Further, they 
too must be friends of one another, if they are all to spend their days together” (243). 
Laelius calls such togetherness “the true secret of friendship” (Cicero 1967, 13). He and 
Scipio served, worked and traveled together. They experienced harmony in their pursuits, 
tastes, and sentiments (Cicero 1967, 13). To distance oneself from a true friend, therefore, 
can be problematic: “Distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the 
activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their 
friendship” (Aristotle 1980, 199-200). This distance, as previously discussed, can be 
perceived both literally and figuratively: “But when one party is removed to a great 
distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases” (Aristotle 1980, 204). Yet, 
Christians will affirm that the resurrection of Jesus was not a withdrawal from humanity. 
In fact, one should feel closer to God. In this idea, there are the fascinating stories of the 
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Celtic saints who were often separated from their spiritual friends for great lengths of 
time, and it is a sixth characteristic of the soul-friendship: “It survives geographical 
separation” (Sellner 1995, 4). In his description of the Celtic soul-friendships, there is 
great emphasis placed on their everlasting nature as regards the eventuality of death, and 
there is allowance for solitude as these soul-friends are seeking intimate relationships 
with God. As death approaches, the spiritual friend is sought out so that he can assist with 
the transition from the temporal to the fully spiritual existence: 
Anamcharas, like the desert Christians, appreciate both friendship and solitude as 
resources ultimately for “soulmaking”: the lifelong process of reconciliation, of 
making peace with oneself, with others, and with all of creation in preparation for 
one’s own death. As the stories of Kevin and Ciaran, and of Maedoc and 
Columcille, have already intimated, soul friends help each other make this 
transition, through death, to God. (Sellner 1995, 5) 
 
It is evident that friends need each other; in fact, one could say that the separation of 
friends, were it to be permanent, would not make for much of a friendship unless the 
friendship is purely one of memory or of a metaphysical nature, such as in the separation 
that occurs after the death of one friend. One must ask the question, then, of whether in 
the contemporary world he or she is able to maintain the requisite geographical or 
spiritual proximity to another in order to maintain the truest and best friendship. 
 This discussion of what friendship is to the classical and early Christian thinkers 
can be disconcerting. It might seem impossible to establish and maintain such a 
friendship, let alone any sort of loving and virtuous relationship as described by people 
like Aristotle and Aelred. It certainly leads one to further examine whether with time the 
theories about friendship will change, particularly with the advent of new communication 
and transportation technologies that enable friends to sustain the necessary proximity. It 
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should be discovered, too, whether concepts of virtue and character have undergone 
transformations that would render the classical and medieval definitions of friendship 
obsolete. 
Into the Renaissance 
One might have hoped for some reprieve from the perfection of the best and truest 
kind of friendship as described by the ancients and the Medieval Christians, but in the age 
of exploration, when it has become clear to many people that the world is round and 
revolves around the sun, Renaissance thinker Michel de Montaigne (1965, 1993) 
embraces antiquity and strives to bring friendship to its ultimate perfection, which he 
himself will claim to have known with his friend LaBoétie.  
But knowing how far from common usage and how rare such a friendship is, I do 
not expect to find any good judge of it. For the very discourses that antiquity has 
left us on the subject seem to me weak compared with the feeling I have. 
(Montaigne 1993, 139) 
 
It should be remembered, however, that Montaigne is inarguably synchronized with the 
classical philosophers and poets upon whom he feasts, which include Plato (1993), 
Aristotle (1980), and Cicero (1967). It should be noted that the medieval writers who 
preceded Montaigne, people like Augustine (2002), Aquinas (1993) and Aelred (2010), 
also find their roots in the friendship principles of the ancients. Montaigne, therefore, 
having accumulated plenty of material to go with his own experience, is able to deliver a 
succinct summation of the ancient theory as it refers to the best and truest friendship: 
All associations that are forged and nourished by pleasure or profit, by public or 
private needs, are the less beautiful and noble, and the less friendships, in so far as 
they mix into friendship another cause and object and reward than friendship 
itself. Nor do the four  ancient types—natural, social, hospitable, erotic—come up 
to real friendship, either separately or together. (Montaigne 1993, 135) 
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In rendering his perception of the superior friendship, Montaigne (1965, 1993) ends the 
review of the earliest Western discourses. 
 In Montaigne’s description of friendship, he continuously cites the Greeks and 
Romans, rehashing their most important principles regarding true friendship, but he 
makes a critical concession to the early Christian philosophers in his idea that the 
coincidence of such a friendship as his with LaBoétie is highly improbable. Montaigne, 
one will find, is reluctant to credit God with any special intervention or interest in most 
things. As a Renaissance man, he looks to other explanations and wonders about 
probability: “So many coincidences are needed to build up such a friendship that it is a lot 
if fortune can do it once in three centuries” (Montaigne 1993, 135). The Christians who 
write about friendship, Augustine (2002), Aelred (2010), and Aquinas (1993), assign zero 
possibility for the best and truest kind of friendship without God’s hand being laid upon it 
and the knowledge of God being a part of it, for to these thinkers if friendship is to be 
such a grand exercise of virtue, this infusion of superior virtue is only possible through 
God. “No friends are true friends unless you, my God bind them fast to one another 
through the love which is sown in our hearts by the Holy Spirit” (Augustine 2002, 4.4.7). 
Montaigne (1993) capitulates. The best kind of friendship is too much for chance alone: 
“Beyond all my understanding, beyond what I can say about this in particular, there was I 
know not what inexplicable and fateful force that was the mediator of this union...I think 
it was some ordinance from heaven” (137). 
 Since Montaigne (1965, 1993) falls in step with his predecessors in their 
assessments of friendship, one should look at when Montaigne chooses to develop a new 
thought, to comment on an old one and to expand the scope of an idea. For instance, 
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Montaigne opens a discussion of communication in friendship, and he neatly separates 
other synonymous relationships, such as marriage and brotherhood, from friendship. He 
also explores, staying close to Aristotle (1980) and Aquinas (1993), the idea of free will 
and choice as they pertain to friendship. And, Montaigne seems convinced, perhaps 
beyond even Aristotle and Cicero’s convictions, that there can only be, and not for 
everyone, one so perfect a friend as Montaigne has encountered. 
  Though Montaigne (1965, 1993) suggests that there is reason to believe in divine 
intervention and divine qualities where the truest friendship is concerned, he 
acknowledges the idea of will and willpower as they pertain to friendship. Montaigne 
(1993) defines such a friendship as a “harmony of wills” (135). But, as with the ancients, 
such a thing must be complete in the sense that two become one: “I have no doubt at all 
about my will, and just as little about that of such a friend” (Montaigne 1993, 137). He 
also agrees with his predecessors that friendship, as with all virtue and virtuous behavior, 
“is bred, nourished, and increased only in enjoyment, since it is spiritual, and the soul 
grows refined by practice” (Montaigne 1993, 135-136). It is in splitting friendship from 
brotherhood and marriage that Montaigne (1993) points out that free will is an essential 
quality of friendship: “And our free will has no product more properly its own than 
affection and friendship” (135). Montaigne (1993) reasons that brotherhood and marriage 
are not choices or do either one involve the same kind of choice. The conditions of 
brotherhood and marriage can be circumstantial, forced, driven by duty and obligation. 
When friendship is not a choice, it ceases to be as true and perfect as it can be when it is a 
pure choice: “The more they are friendships which law and natural obligation impose on 
us, the less of our choice and freewill there is in them” (135). Montaigne (1993) reminds 
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people that, “Father and son may be of completely different dispositions, and brothers 
also” (135). He turns to Plutarch, who apparently said, when referring to his brother that 
it didn’t matter whether they had issued from the same mother (Ibid.).  
 Montaigne’s claim is not that brotherhood is an impossible synonym for 
friendship. It is that the best kind of friendship is not automatic because two people 
happen to be in the same circumstances. Aelred (2010), too, in his treatise on friendship, 
separates friendly feelings, charity, and brotherhood from that special kind of friendship 
which is closer to perfection, though as a Christian, one should love all people. Even in 
the monastery where all are Christians and of the same community, not all persons 
qualify as best friends: “Therefore, how many people do we love to whom it would be 
unwise to lay open our soul and to pour forth our inmost being—I mean those whose age 
or sensibility or judgment is not strong enough to bear the weight of such revelations?” 
(Aelred 2010, 76.84).  
 Aelred, as a Christian monk of his time period, is highly liberal and progressive 
when it comes to the possibilities of true friendship in marriage. In fact, he posits that Eve 
is created to be Adam’s friend and companion more than for any other reason. According 
to Aelred, there is nothing that distinguishes one human being from another (Mayeski 
2009, 100). Montaigne (1965, 1993) takes a backseat to Aelred when it comes to gender 
equality, as advanced as Montaigne seems to be in much of his reckoning about many 
social, political and philosophical matters. To contemporary critics, however, his views 
on women and marriage are almost unpalatably chauvinistic, and like his favorite 
philosophers, Montaigne seems to judge the carnal element of any relationship 
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detrimental to superior friendship. He compares the nature of brotherhood and the love of 
a woman to make his point. 
To compare the brotherly affection [as in friendship] with affection for women, 
even though it is the result of our choice—it cannot be done; nor can we put in the 
same category. Its ardor, I confess—[quotes Catullus, “Of us that goddess is not 
unaware[,] Who blends a bitter sweetness with her care”]—is more active, more 
scorching, and more intense. But it is an impetuous and fickle flame, undulating 
and variable, a fever flame, subject to fits and lulls, that holds us only by one 
corner. (Montaigne 1993, 135) 
 
For Montaigne (1993), true friendship is “constant and settled warmth, all gentleness and 
smoothness, with nothing bitter or stinging about it” (135). He claims that, “Enjoyment 
destroys it, as having a fleshy end, subject to satiety” (Ibid.). 
 One might argue that the love one feels for one’s spouse is not so transitory and 
that there is more than one corner to marriage, but Montaigne (1965, 1993) is very 
misogynous in his analysis of the marriage bond and concedes nothing to women as to 
their friendship capacities as compared to those of men. Perhaps Montaigne’s remarks are 
only a reflection of the times in which he lived and encompass only his reading of the 
ancients and his experiences: “It [marriage] is a bargain to which only the entrance is 
free—its continuance being constrained and forced, depending otherwise than on our 
will—and a bargain ordinarily made for other ends” (Montaigne 1993, 136). For 
Montaigne and many of his philosophical forerunners, equality is a prime requisite for the 
ideal friendship, and Montaigne sees no possibility for such a sharing between men and 
women because, he believes, it is not in the nature of women: 
Besides, to tell the truth, the ordinary capacity of women is inadequate for the 
communion and fellowship which is the nurse of this sacred bond; nor does their 
soul seem firm enough to endure the strain of so tight and durable a knot...But this 
sex in no instance has yet succeeded in attaining it, and by the common agreement 
of ancient schools is excluded from it. (Montaigne 1993, 136) 
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 In Montaigne’s declaration about marriage, women, and the impossibility of 
friendship, he opens an intriguing door nevertheless. If women did possess the necessary 
capacity, he posits, the friendship between a man and a woman in such relationship might 
attain the lofty pinnacle of the best kind of friendship with an added dimension: 
If such a relationship, free and voluntary, could be built up, in which not only 
would the souls have this complete enjoyment, but the bodies would also share in 
the alliance, so that the entire man would be engaged, it is certain that the 
resulting friendship would be fuller and more complete. (Montaigne 1993, 136) 
 
The irony of this statement infers that a homosexual male relationship has the full 
potential for the best kind of friendship since men have the capacity for such a 
“communion and fellowship” that women lack. Montaigne, however, would probably 
disapprove of a homosexual relationship, seeing it as a perversion, though it might fit his 
criteria for the excellent kind of friendship he defines. 
 Communication is the prime motive of this entire discourse regarding friendship 
as humanity exploits technology to expand communication options, and Montaigne 1965, 
1993) contributes further to the friendship discussion as he pinpoints the communication 
aspect. For Montaigne (1965), nothing in the course of human interaction can be pleasing 
without communication: “Nul plaisir a gout pour moi sans communication” (91). 
Montaigne (1993) links communication directly to friendship, stating flatly that, 
“Friendship feeds on communication” (135). Equality is a principle of friendship for 
Montaigne and his predecessors. Montaigne does not believe that those who are unequal 
can achieve sufficient communication to foster superior friendship. Equality makes 
possible the communication necessary for friendship. It should be of special interest that 
Montaigne reads his best friend’s work before meeting the man and that it is through the 
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expression of  La Boétie’s ideas in writing that Motaigne is first intrigued by the person. 
Here Montaigne refers to La Boétie’s essay “La Servitude Voluntaire”: 
For it was shown to me long before I had seen him, and gave me my first 
knowledge of  his name, thus starting on its way this friendship which together we 
fostered, as long as God willed, so entire and so perfect that certainly you will 
hardly read of the like, and among men of today you see no trace of it in practice. 
(Montaigne 1993, 134-135) 
 
Montaigne (1965, 1993) is indeed a man of letters, writing in an age of paper and printing 
presses. Such possibilities for reading and writing expand his possibilities for knowing. 
He is not at the point of analyzing how writing might change humanity and relationships, 
but he claims that when speaking of himself his discourse should parallel his actions: “Il 
faut que j’aille de la plume comme des pieds” (Montaigne 1965, 100). This expression 
goes something like, “I must write as I walk.”  
Montaigne (1965, 1993) says some interesting things about writing, and he 
recognizes writing as a signal of the times, claiming that he lives in a time of information 
overload, or simply in a time when a lot is happening: “L’écrivaillerie semble être 
quelque symptôme d’un siècle débordé” (Montaigne 1965, 9). He adds that a society 
produces more writing when it is in trouble, saying that the Romans wrote more when the 
empire was at the point of collapse (Montaigne 1965, 9-10). By trouble he is referring to 
the lack of virtue and the propagation of vice, for which he blames everyone, including 
himself. The written word factors into the discussion, but the question of how or whether 
it can affect friendship is never directly assaulted by Montaigne though it might be 
inferred from Montaigne’s comments that writing can undermine rather than enhance 
personal relations. Nevertheless, he admires his friend La Boétie first through that which 
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his friend has written. Montaigne is still not quite of a time when friendships arise or are 
maintained by continual written correspondence; yet, accelerated by the printing press, 
writing does become an essential medium of communication during the Renaissance. The 
effects of writing on friendship, therefore, merit discussion as literacy and paper 
production increase and transportation technologies shrink the world. Letters are, by the 

















Communication and Friendship 
 
 
The whole world spoke the same language, using the same words.  
—Gen. 11:1 
The Lord came down to see the city and the tower that the men had built. Then the Lord 
said: “If now, while they are one people, all speaking the same language, they have 





After reading Genesis, one might ponder whether the internet has become the 
proverbial Tower of Babel. It allows people to connect with each other in almost every 
corner of the planet through handheld devices. It is not a linear tower but a seemingly 
organic entity; and though the comparison may sound pejorative, the internet’s growth is 
almost cancerous. It spreads uncontrollably with no effort to stop its progression as the 
world, generally, appears to regard it as beneficial to humanity. How then, as a 
communication network, might the internet affect the most important and essential 
human relationships? How have other communication systems impacted human 
intercourse? 
This discourse has tried to establish that friendship is a most important 
relationship. When people become friends, it is reasonable to infer that good 
communication exists, and over the centuries the media of communication have 
expanded. Friendship is different, however, from other close relationships, for friends 
have freely chosen whether to become friends. Friendship may or may not be something 
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into which one is born. Friends experience or perceive things in their friends that can, in 
many ways, surpass that which might be manifested in other human relations. Friendship 
is not obligatory between siblings, comrades, colleagues, teammates, and parents though 
many qualities of friendship are present. A person can love another without being a friend 
and without lots of dialogue. For a mother, complex communication may be unnecessary. 
She needs only know that her children are well: “So long as they [mothers] know their 
[children’s] fate they love them and do not seek to be loved in return” (Aristotle 1980, 
205). In Aelred’s case, not every fellow brother or priest is regarded as a friend. Though 
he feels love and affection for all, he asks, “How many people do we love to whom it 
would be unwise to lay open our soul and to pour forth our inmost being—I mean those 
whose age or sensibility or judgment is not strong enough to bear the weight of such 
revelations?” (Aelred 2010, 76.84). Montaigne refers to Plutarch’s statement: “I don’t 
think anymore of him for having come out of the same hole” (Montaigne 1993, 135). In 
other words, siblings do not all become friends nor is it obligatory. 
 In other relationship possibilities similar to friendship, there might be less need 
for complex communication. It may be enough for a mother to show love and affection 
through action alone. Colleagues and co-workers have a job to do and communicate 
according to their common purpose and, perhaps, following a professional jargon. A 
sibling has a familial obligation or duty, but communication might not be required 
beyond the scope of those commitments. Many relationships can function happily enough 
with little conversation. The shortstop relays the ball to the second baseman who then 
pivots and throws quickly to first base in order to complete the double play. It is a team 
effort with each player knowing and doing his or her job. The players do not have to be 
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friends to turn a double play. They must simply have a common goal in order to work 
efficiently together. 
One should, however, closely investigate the role of communication in the most 
dynamic forms of friendship, for it shall be posited that language and communication are 
among the core elements of complex friendships and that communication media can 
operate indirectly upon friendship through its influence on societal perception. The 
highest forms of communication begin with spoken language.  
 
The Power of Language  
 
Most creatures communicate in some way, and it is generally understood that 
communication is essential to survival: “Communication is defined as the process of 
understanding and sharing meaning” (Pearson and Nelson 1997, 5). Even for the simplest 
animals to reproduce, some communication, or sign, must occur. Communication at the 
human level is more complex and can be cause for radical changes in the ways that 
people live: 
In a broad sense the history of man is the history of communications. Harold A. 
Innis, the Canadian scholar, goes so far as to insist that every major change in the 
methods of communication has been followed by a major change in the structure 
of society. (Fabre 1963, 6) 
 
Communication and changes in the modes of communication, therefore, hold the 
possibility of being shapers of human relationships and, consequently, of friendships: “To 
communicate is to be alive, to be active, in relations with others” (Fabre 1963, 9). 
Language serves, ultimately, as the essential vehicle. 
Discussions about language and its impact on the human condition are highly 
argumentative, particularly as these arguments have to do with the force of language on 
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people’s lives. Certainly, language is inescapable, and it plays a part in almost everything 
that human beings do. 
Language is so built into the way people live that it has become an axiom of being 
human…It is what makes possible much of what we do, and perhaps even what 
we think…And through writing systems or word of mouth we are in touch with 
distant places we will never visit, people we will never meet, a past and a future 
of which we can have no direct experience. Without language we would live in 
isolation from our ancestors and our descendants, condemned to learn only from 
our own experiences and to take our knowledge to the grave.  
(Bolton 1985, 3) 
 
Today, the major debates about language have to do with the connection between 
language and thought. Richard Rorty is wrapped up in this debate; and he has chosen his 
side with his answer about language, which boils down, analogously, to the famous 
question of whether a tree makes noise when it falls if no one is there to hear it: 
Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—
because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but 
descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or 
false. The world on its own— unaided by the describing activities of human 
beings—cannot. (Rorty 1989, 5) 
 
Although a world without language and communication might exist, for anyone who has 
language and is able to communicate, such a condition is almost impossible to imagine. 
Still, one’s thinking of language as simply a biological adaptation would seem to 
diminish its power.  
Once you begin to look at language not as the ineffable essence of human 
uniqueness but as a biological adaptation to communicate information, it is no 
longer as tempting to see language as an insidious shaper of thought, and, we shall 
see, it is not. (Pinker 1994, 19) 
 
Despite Pinker’s reduction of language, he admits that, “Language is so tightly woven 
into human experience that it is scarcely possible to imagine life without it (Pinker 1994, 
17). Today, thinkers like Pinker and Rorty wish to pull away from the idea that 
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something might be fixed metaphysically or even that language can determine thought as 
Aldous Huxley (1940) suggests: 
The old idea that words possess magical powers is false; but its falsity is the 
distortion of a very important truth. Words do have a magical effect—but not in 
the way that the magicians supposed, and not on the objects they were trying to 
influence. Words are  magical in the way they affect the minds of those who use 
them. (Huxley, quoted in Hayakawa 1972, 4) 
 
Pinker (1994) is convinced of the physical aspects of language and appears to take a 
utilitarian view. He is fascinated by the neurological mechanism that enables language. 
Rorty speaks less about the physical apparatus necessary for language. He is more 
concerned with showing that language is in a perpetual state of flux: “Truth is a property 
of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, and 
since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths” (Rorty 1989, 21). As 
vocabularies might change or be different, then, so it seems might truth itself become 
dependent on language. Hayden White (2014) in Metahistory: The Historical 
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, analyzes the ways in which historians have 
used written language to convey their truth impressions:  
Historiography was first, necessarily, and most obviously writing, which is to say, 
inscription, of words or signs incised or laid upon a medium and which, by that 
process of inscription, are endowed with a power both material and spiritual, a 
power to at once “fix” things in time and seemingly reveal their meaning for their 
own time and for our own. (White 2014, xxvi) 
 
Truth’s dependence on language is an important consideration when studying the link 
between friendship and communication. In the discussion of language and its importance, 
it is difficult to dismiss, as Pinker might, language’s power to persuade people and to 
influence their beliefs, and consequently, their decisions:  
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This emphasis that Georgias and other Sophists placed on rhetoric was not just 
related  to swaying political opinion. It came from a realization that the 
relationship between  speech and “truth” is far from simple. Speech is not just a 
matter of presenting the facts, since considerable reorganization of the “facts” is 
involved in the way they are selected and sequenced. (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 
77) 
 
 One must return to the question, therefore, of friendship itself, since in this work 
is presented the possibility of the friendship concept being a constant thing in human 
existence, a long-enduring, perpetuated human attribute. Whether the outstanding 
friendship is something metaphysical or created by humanity remains and may forever 
remain arguable, but it might be a bit easier to make a stand on whether an identifiable 
friendship paradigm is something that operates through time, though it might undergo 
some modification, depending on other aspects of human existence, such as the way in 
which people transmit language. Specifically, do changes in people’s vocabulary and in 
their use of communication technologies, which are intertwined, operate significantly on 
people’s understanding of friendship? Language, thus, must be discussed in terms of how 
it relates to friendship. One might suggest that, within this preliminary discussion, in 
contemporary Western societies the language of friendship and the communication 
technologies by which people communicate do more to affect the possibilities of who 
may become friends than they do to rattle the perceptions of the rules governing the great 
classical-Christian friendship. 
 There seem to be a few things about language, particularly the physiological 
aspects, upon which most people today will not debate strenuously. One should begin by 
looking at language physically. Burke and Ornstein (1997) try to explain the reason for 
language and offer an evolutionary perspective on language development.  For Burke and 
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Ornstein, increased use of tools and technology necessitate more complex forms of 
communication; thus, the beings who must cooperate will evolve in order to be able to 
benefit from the new technologies since more complex technologies may require 
increased communication. The discovery and control of fire, they posit, created more 
room for the brain and allowed speech to develop: “As fire made cooking possible, softer 
food meant that molar teeth gradually became smaller, and the shape of the mouth and 
larynx changed” (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 12).  People possess the physical parts to 
make the sounds that produce language, and spoken language comes before written 
language: “The majority of the world’s languages have never been reduced to writing 
(though only laboriously and with much instruction). This is hardly surprising, since 
compared with speech writing is a very recent invention—within the past 5,000 years” 
(Bolton 1985, 4). From here one might take the slippery slope and propose that new 
communication technologies bring about physical, evolutionary changes; thus, both the 
anatomy and the vocabulary of the human being will change. If these two things change, 
it is reasonable to expect human ideas to change; and this case concerns whether the 
friendship concept has changed. “Revolutionary achievements in the arts, in the sciences, 
and in moral and political thought typically occur when somebody realizes that two or 
more of our vocabularies are interfering with each other, and proceeds to invent a new 
vocabulary to replace both” (Rorty 1989, 12).  When people change their vocabularies, it 
should hold that people could change their belief systems, as Rorty (1989) suggests (21). 
Have such changes occurred in people’s perception of what constitutes qualitative 
friendship? How does the complexity of the language itself affect friendship?  
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 Although not everyone will accept the evolutionary argument, linguists can point 
out the speech organs and demonstrate how the sounds are made which produce 
language, and few if any speech experts would oppose those who claim that, “Children 
learn their native language swiftly, efficiently, and largely without instruction” (Daniels 
1985, 19). The arguments, then, will form around whether a child’s brain is simply pre-
programmed for language acquisition. Language learning, for whatever reason, seems to 
come, many will say, naturally. Steven Pinker, relying heavily on the work of Noam 
Chomsky, expounds upon what he calls, “The language instinct”: 
Children develop these complex grammars rapidly and without formal instruction 
and grow up to give consistent interpretations to novel sentence constructions that 
they have never before encountered. Therefore, he [Chomsky] argued children 
must be innately equipped with a plan common to the grammar of all languages, a 
Universal Grammar, that tells them how to distill the syntactic patterns of the 
speech of their parents. (Pinker 1994, 22) 
 
Many language enthusiasts today refer to Noah Chomsky’s in their work. “Chomsky 
believes that language, along with most other human abilities, depends upon genetically 
programmed mental structures. In other words, language learning during childhood is 
part of the body’s preprogramming pattern of growth” (Gliedman 1985, 367). As clinical 
as language acquisition may sound, one of the most amazing things is that: 
Virtually every sentence that a person utters or understands is a brand new 
combination of words, appearing for the first time in the history of the universe. 
Therefore, a language cannot be a repertoire of responses; the brain must contain 
a recipe program that can build an unlimited set of sentences out of a finite list of 
words. (Pinker 1994, 22) 
 
The language of each individual, then, is somewhat unique and fosters a creative process 
rather than the existence of an intrinsic nature relating to intellectual and moral progress 
beneath or independent of the neurological functions (Rorty 1989, 9). Children may not 
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learn language through formal instruction, but they still do learn the language of their 
environment although the language or acquired languages can be manipulated 
individually: “In spite of the underlying similarities of all languages, though, it is 
important to remember that children will acquire the language which they hear around 
them” (Daniels 1985, 19). 
 The artists, the science fiction writers, however, if these folks are to be accepted 
as soothsayers, might argue otherwise and claim that one’s responses can be both 
programmed and predicted. People and machines tend to follow patterns. They are both 
creatures of habit. In the realms of science and technology, machines are made to be 
continually more efficient. It could be that the bio-neural machine might also be steered 
to that kind of efficiency. Humanity, some claim, are naturally inclined to patterns and 
pattern recognition (Johnson 2009, 1222-1234). One might suggest, then, that there is, 
naturally, a friendship pattern. 
 
The Language of Friendship 
 
Language binds people to their society and to their community, especially in 
times when mobility is limited and one does not experience other cultures or languages. 
If the ability to learn language is hard-wired into the human mind, the language that one 
learns is wrapped up in the culture that produces it, and the influence of that culture or 
society is undeniable in the shaping of the individual: 
Indeed, it is the Word, which is closer to him than any world of natural objects 
and touches his weal and woe more directly than physical nature. For it is 
language that makes his existence in a community possible; and only in society, in 
relation to a “Thee,” can his subjectivity assert itself as a “Me.” (Cassirer 1953, 
61) 
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 With the knowledge that people learn the languages of their milieus and that they 
arrange and use language individually, to claim that all persons speak dialects and that 
language is adjusted to the needs of its speakers makes sense. The obvious examples of 
dialect are present in regional vocabulary and accents (Daniels 1985, 23-31). Within the 
groups of people who speak the same languages and similar dialects, people adjust 
language even further to: “Employ a range of styles and a set of sub-dialects or jargons” 
(Daniels 1985, 24). The shifting of language to accommodate the situation is related to 
social context: “We learn, in other words, not just to say things, but also how and when 
and to whom” (Daniels 1985, 25).  According to Daniels, there are registers within the 
language spectrum that have for bookends formal and informal language (Ibid.).  
 As the spectrum gets narrower on the informal end, Daniels, referring to the work 
of Martin Joos (1962), describes the intimate style: 
A husband and wife, for example, may sometimes speak to each other in what 
sounds like a very fragmentary and clipped code that they alone understand. Such 
utterances are  characterized by their “extraction”—the use of extracts of 
potentially complete sentences, made possible by an intricate, personal, shared 
system of private symbols. (Daniels 1985, 26) 
 
Although Daniels uses husband and wife for his description of the intimate style, it might 
be compared to the communication style of close, personal friends.  
It is important to realize that a language is not just an asset of a culture or group, 
but of  individual human beings. Our native language is the speech of our parents, 
siblings, friends, and community. It is the code we use to communicate in the 
most powerful and intimate expressions of our lives. (Daniels 1985, 32) 
 
Good friends are, one could say, very interdependent. Friends, therefore, evolve 
“consistent patterns of interaction” (Pearson and Nelson 1997, 104). Friends 
communicate with each other in ways that sometimes only they can understand.  
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One might be able to see some modification in this position with a new 
technological scenario, a situation that allows for practically instantaneous and accurate 
translation. It is not so far-fetched to envision one’s speaking in French into a cell phone 
and the message’s being received in English by an English speaking friend. Two people 
might be able to carry out an intimate conversation in this manner. The devices of speech 
recognition and instant translation already exist. One even has a selection of voices from 
which he or she might choose, and so one might give him or herself a different voice, or 
assign a voice to the other speaker as the two people converse digitally. The message is 
received in the desired language, desired voice, and desired vocabulary though the 
speaker might have a different voice and be speaking a different language. Another 
variable could be added: that of appearance. An individual can create an avatar to 
represent him or herself. With the rest of the message, the receiver could also have a 
different picture of the sender. In such a conversation, the physical or sensory realities of 
the individuals involved in the hypothetical scenario might not be present at all to either 
participant. It can even be wondered whether a superior friendship can be formed with 
any true physical or cultural knowledge on the part of the friends at all. Could a 
qualitative, intimate friendship exist this way? Again, it should be stressed that language 
and communication are significant aspects of friendship, and many empiricists will assert 
this claim. With time, however, the speaker’s language might become less important, but 
it can still be inferred that two special friends would establish their own vocabulary.  
Some in-depth social research into the importance of communication and 
language in friendship involves the study of adolescents with language impairments 
referred to as “significant language impairments” or “SLI” (Wadman, Durkin and Conti-
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Ramsden 2011, 42). These studies generally acknowledge that, “Children and adolescents 
without friends, or with poor friendship quality, are at risk of loneliness, stress, and 
concomitant developmental psychopathologies” (Durkin and Cont-Ramsden 2007, 1441). 
Although most of the research concerns adolescents, other studies have reported that 
adults with significant language impairments, or SLI, have issues “in respect to forming 
and maintaining close relationships” (Wadman, Durkin and Conti-Ramsden 2011, 43). 
Using other studies to establish a basis for their own research, Durkin and Conti-
Ramsden discuss reciprocity, a concept that has been presented already as a defining 
quality of friendship, one which is linked to the ability to communicate: “To achieve 
reciprocal relationships, it is essential to communicate. For typically developing children, 
a natural means of communication is readily available: talking to each other” (Durkin and 
Conti-Ramsden 2007, 1442). These researchers also emphasize the different type of 
communication that occurs between friends: “Language use in friendships is qualitatively 
different from that in other social contexts. For example, talk between friends involves 
more frequent repetition of each others’ assertions and more mutually oriented utterances 
than does talk with non-friends” (Ibid.).  
 The results of the research into the connection between language ability and 
friendship quality are fairly conclusive. It is inferred from the Durkin and Conti-Ramsden 
study that the expression of empathy requires reciprocal communication: 
It is certainly plausible that language difficulties that include problems with 
language understanding would give rise to general difficulties in “tuning in” to 
others’ verbally expressed interests, needs and expectations…but the present 
findings suggest that those with impairments that include receptive skills are at 
greatest risk of losing out in the dynamics of friendship formation and 
maintenance. (Durkin and Conti-Ramsden 2007, 1453) 
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Language Resilience and Reinvention 
 
It is hoped that Michel Foucault’s work has been cornered securely enough for 
use in the discussion of friendship and language, for his perspective is not so singularly 
methodological as that of most social and physical investigators: “Discourse in general, 
and scientific discourse in particular, is so complex a reality that we not only can, but 
should, approach it at different levels and with different methods” (Foucault 1970, xiv). 
Foucault openly bucks causality and takes what he calls an “archaeological” 
approach to human discourse, particularly scientific discourse, in terms of responses to 
questions regarding its evolution (Foucault 1970, xi-xiii). Language, however, retains a 
highly prominent role within Foucault’s line of reasoning as he looks at “a whole series 
of scientific ‘representations’” (Foucault 1970, xi). Language operates within a site or 
place for things. The site is based on an intricate set of changing paradigms produced by 
the many interrelationships between human systems and their parts. Human existence, for 
Foucault, must be understood holistically and relationally. Language appears to enable a 
manifestation and also to be a part of its emergence. Foucault uses the analogy for such a 
manifestation: 
And also a table, a tabula, that enables thought to operate upon the entities of our 
world, to put them in order, to divide them into classes, to group them according 
to names that designate their similarities and their differences—the table upon 
which, since the beginning of time, language has intersected space. (Foucault 
1970, xvii) 
 
Despite Foucault’s allusion to these sites or tables as being in a state of constant 
fluctuation, and even destruction, it must nevertheless be suggested that language can, as 
such a place where the absurd and the paradox can occur, be a major instrument in the 
operation of human concepts such as friendship. The question of whether the classical-
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Christian friendship ideal can operate as a definable thing through changing social and 
scientific realities, shifting vocabularies, and differing sites has yet to be answered. White 
(2014) might agree with Foucault that the prevalent linguistic bent towards a certain trope 
or “mode of emplotment” might dictate perception (26). Communication technologies 
will emerge from and as a result of new vocabularies, and they will help to create new 
sites for “thoughts to operate upon the entities of our world” (Foucault 1970, xvii). One 
question for the contemporary friend might be that of whether the new vocabularies used 
in text-messaging and e-mail are advantageous to maintaining friendship, for the use of 
these technologies would seem to emphasize quantity over quality in terms of the 
frequency of communication. Certainly, there is a rapidly changing vocabulary relative to 
the varied modes of communication that continue to be practiced through evolving 
technologies. 
Communication, hence language, must be regarded as a significant factor in the 
establishment and maintenance of quality friendships. Eudora Welty suggests that 
friendship and language are inextricably tied together. One creates the other, but as the 
chicken and the egg, it is unclear which one comes first: 
When we learned to speak to, and listen to, rather than strike or be struck by, our 
fellow human beings, we found something worth keeping alive, worth possessing 
for the rest of time…Friendship might have been the first, as well as the best, 
teacher of communication. (Welty and Sharp 1991, 40) 
 
If one thinks of language as the first technology people use to communicate, one for 
which, many will argue, people’s brains are already wired to learn, asking how the 
quality of friendship is affected when new technologies are developed to communicate 
between friends has validity. One might suspect that the language itself would undergo 
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some type of modification. As Rorty (1989) suggests, the vocabulary would change; thus, 
the truth of friendship, of what friendship is, would also change (1989). Some time has 
been invested in showing the importance of language, hence, communication in 
friendship. Henry David Thoreau (1960, 1991), nevertheless, is not entirely convinced 
about the linguistic part, and suggests that the communication occurs on a more 
profound, intangible level among the truest friends, and in one line dismisses most of the 
arguments that have hitherto been posited: “The language of Friendship is not words but 




Thoreau (1960, 1991) may have been suggesting a metaphysical bond between 
friends, but there have since Thoreau’s writing been many physical extensions beyond 
face-to-face communication. Although it is proposed to examine the different ways that 
friends have been communicating, particularly from oral traditions through the print era, 
this work will principally examine the effects that changing media have had on the 
operation of the classical-Christian friendship through the age of print in both literature 
and thought.  If one agrees that communication is an essential part of human existence 
and of friendship, one should also agree with McLuhan’s assessment that communication 
media influences human life:  
The personal and social consequences of any medium—that is, of any extension 
of ourselves—result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each 
extension of ourselves or by any new technology. (McLuhan 1964, 23) 
 
Postman (1998) would agree that new technologies can change the nature of things and 
consequently the way that people perceive the world. Changes are “ecological.” “A new 
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medium does not add something; it changes everything” (5). Friendship, therefore, or 
one’s concept of friendship must undergo some change if McLuhan and Postman are 
correct. Therefore, friendship literature should change. 
In order to gauge the effects of media on friendship, one can adapt an apparatus 
designed by Marshall T. Poe for media evaluation. Poe breaks down “five successive 
historical media: speech, writing, print, audiovisual media, and the Internet” (Poe 2011, 
25). He rates each medium according to several criteria. These criteria Poe (2011) calls 
“medium attributes” (23). Depending on whether the medium attribute is high or low, 
there will be an effect on various areas of human activity. For each medium attribute, Poe 
identifies a human need. For instance, if the medium attribute is accessibility, Poe 
attaches it to a human need for power. The communication network, then, controls the 
persons who have access to the medium. Medium access in turn determines the amount 
of power individuals have. With this result, Poe reaches conclusions about social 
practices and cultural values (Ibid.). Along with accessibility, Poe’s other medium 
attributes are privacy, fidelity, volume, velocity, range, persistence, and search-ability 
(Ibid.). Although Poe might deny McLuhan’s influence, his system is, perhaps, an 
extension of McLuhan’s concept of hot and cold media.  A hot medium is in “high 
definition,” according to McLuhan (1964, 36). In other words, it is crammed with 
information and usually floods one of the senses: “A photograph is, visually, ‘high 
definition’” (Ibid.).  Cold media do not provide so much data. The “audience,” who in 
some form is typically a viewer or a listener, has less information with which to work and 
must complete the picture for him or herself. McLuhan (1964) posits, therefore, that cold 
media require more “participation” and hot media less (36). One might extract from 
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McLuhan’s assertion that cold media are more dependent on imagination, experience and 
intellect than hot media are. People, in other words, must think differently depending 
upon the communication media involved.  Therefore, the way that people communicate 
























Oral Tradition: Creating Friendship Legends and Myths 
 
 
The first great era of friendship shall be designated according to the principal 
mode of personal communication in existence: speech, or speaking. Poe (2011), in his 
book, A History of Communication, labels this chapter, “Humanity in the Age of Speech” 
(16). Plato believed that face-to-face communication, or dialectic, was the surest path to 
understanding. “Yes indeed, dear Phaedrus. But far more excellent [than writing], I think, 
is…the art of dialectic” (Plato, quoted in Poe 2011, 16). The classical-Christian 
friendship is endowed with the qualities that spell out what it is to live virtuously. To live 
virtuously means to strive for excellence, or for that which promotes human flourishing 
(Hinman 1998, 323).  The virtuous person is a seeker of truth. Truth is always more 
important than to be pleasing (Cicero 1967, 39). It could be suggested that when two 
good friends are in direct communication, there is frankness and that each wishes the 
other to prosper, or to be excellent. Poe (2011) is helpful in establishing several areas for 
the evaluation of communication methods through his “Push Theory of Media Effects” 
(13). He concludes some things about the social practices and cultural values by truing 
them with the communication medium and resulting network. Speech communication 
seems to create and nurture friendships typical of what has been defined as the classical 
friendship model.  
While Poe (2011) is more concerned with the group dynamic, one can make 
inferences about friendship attributes based on Poe’s method. First, Poe (2011) calls 
speech accessible. It means that speaking is difficult for an authority to control without 
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resorting to draconian methods (15-19). Speaking creates a diffuse network. Poe (2011) 
forwards that speaking necessarily causes a more egalitarian environment (38). “Put 
yourself on a level with your friend” (Cicero 1967, 32). Reciprocity and equality are 
important principles of the classical friendship model.  
A communication network that relies heavily on speaking is, furthermore, an open 
one. In other words, it is more public than private (Poe 2011, 38). A speech network is a 
small network; therefore, information tends to be shared rather than concealed (Poe 2011, 
20). In the classical friendship model, friendships exist openly. In fact, the quality of a 
friendship is based on its endurance. Great and virtuous friendships are not to be 
forgotten. Socrates, in Plato’s Symposium, recalls the words of his mentor, Diotima:  
Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to 
avenge Patroclus…all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do 
them, in hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue; for they desire the 
immortal. (Plato 1993, 166)  
 
Cicero, too, parrots the same thought through his speaker Laelius: 
 
There are scarcely three or four pairs of friends on record; and it is classed with 
them that I cherish a hope of the friendship of Scipio and Laelius [the speaker] 
being known to posterity. (Cicero, 1967, 13) 
 
A further aspect of speech-reliant networks is their tendency to foster idealism.  
“Idealism is rooted in the idea that the unseen world is more enriching than the seen 
world” (Poe 2011, 20). Speech leans heavily on abstraction, and it is dependent upon 
symbols. The physical realities, the five senses generally, are limited to the language and 
expression of the speaker. Images must occur within the mind. “Speech represents data 
from all five senses (vision, sound, smell, taste and feeling) through one encoded sensory 
channel (sound). Speech is a five-to-one code” (Poe 2011, 42). Time and space are also 
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put into code: “To speak is to abstract, to remove perception from its concrete time and 
place and put it in conceptual buckets” (Poe 2011, 43). To encode something among a 
group of people through the speech medium means to engrain definitions within the 
minds of a population. A distinct and unwritten code of conduct, a friendship ethic, thus, 
might arise within the minds of those people who share the same speech network. This 
inquiry suggests that the classical-Christian friendship model is born from speech 
communication networks and that the model will be, generally, the same within any 
Western speech-centered society from Gilgamesh in Mesopotamia to Thorstein in 
Iceland—a period of over two-thousand years. 
Hayden White (2014) notes shifting narrative patterns depending upon the 
prevalent thinking of an era. Thus, a certain principle, or major premise, prevails by 
which historians and storytellers might institute a conclusion, or truth about the human 
condition. In the age of speech, the storyteller is both bard and historian. When referring 
to the recounting of history, White writes:  
And this coherence and consistency give to his work its distinctive stylistic 
attributes. The problem here is to determine the grounds of this coherence and 
consistency. In my view, these grounds are poetic, and specifically linguistic, in 
nature. (White 2014, 29) 
 
Speech communication and speaking networks lend themselves to well-traveled 
patterns that one might define as ritual. Poe (2011) calls this type of cultural value 
“eternalism” (58). Without the ability or desire to record externally, an understanding of 
friendship might become fixed and permanent internally. For the ancients, the best kind 
of friendship was an eternal one. Aelred (2010), who follows Aristotle and Cicero 
closely, claims that, “A friend loves always” (59). “He who is a friend is always a friend, 
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and a brother is born for the time of stress” (Proverbs 17:17). Cicero’s entire friendship 
discourse (1967) is based on his Socratic character Laelius’s definition of friendship 
resulting from Laelius’s loss of his great friend, Scipio.  
In choosing the term “eternalism,” Poe (2011) may have failed, however, to 
differentiate it sufficiently from the concept of immortality. Hannah Arendt (1998) 
distinguishes helpfully between immortality and eternity. While immortality remains 
human in context, many of the ancients view eternity as the great metaphysical center 
(20). To call something eternal is to imbue it with divine qualities. The interesting irony, 
when examining the nature of friendship, is the solitary character of the eternal, for the 
eternal or metaphysical, according to the ancients, is accessible principally in the 
contemplative state. Friends then, one could posit, help each other strive for immortality; 
but to reach eternity, if one can reach it, is an individual quest. As Merton (1955) claims, 
one must indeed allow for the individual in friendship (244). In the great friendship 
narratives, one will find that, when one friend dies, the other begins an important 
individual question. Gilgamesh, in fact, after Enkindu’s death, seeks immortality while 
Achilles hurls himself towards his personal destiny upon the death of Patroclus. David 
fulfills God’s will by becoming king of the Israelites after Jonathan is killed.  
Speech communication lends itself to individualism as well as plurality, and the 
final element of speech communication to be discussed is its penchant towards 
individualism within the network (Poe 2011, 58). Poe, looking at speech communication 
as it relates to groups of people who relied almost entirely on speech communication, 
makes what may seem to be a contrary inference about these small groups. He suggests 
that they possessed high degrees of individualism. In regards to communication and the 
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transfer of information within a speech network, one has little but his or her own 
resources and those of the small number of individuals surrounding him or her (Poe 2011, 
56-57). The person’s memory and mind, the individual’s knowledge and abilities, are 
often his or her only resource. Theoretically, then, he or she must be able to function 
autonomously though within a relatively small, interdependent group of people. In 
regards to the communication networks of small groups reliant on speech 
communication, one can assert that all the existing information was available to all the 
group members. “In early human communities, then, knowledge and status did not 
clump. Rather, they spread out among the members of the band, all of whom had some 
claim on them” (Poe 2011, 56-57). 
One friendship aspect that comes to mind when examining individuality is the 
freewill necessary to choose friends in the classical friendship model. Montaigne’s 
reference to Plutarch is easy to remember. Montaigne (1965, 1993) concurs that blood 
relations are no substitute for true friendship (1993, 135). Montaigne, in sticking with his 
predecessors on the topic of friendship, does not believe that the best kind of friendship is 
based on duty or kinship although the ancients highly regard both. One should call it 
loyalty. It follows, however, that, in order for someone to possess freewill, he or she 
needs to be an individual first before friendship can occur. As Merton writes: 
If I cannot distinguish myself from the mass of other men, I will never be able to 
love and respect other men as I ought. If I do not separate myself from them 
enough to know what is mine and what is theirs, I will never discover what I have 
to give them, and never allow them the opportunity to give me what they ought. 
(Merton 1955, 247) 
 
 McLuhan’s concept of hot and cold media should be introduced into this 
discussion. Briefly, a hot medium is in “high definition,” according to McLuhan (1964, 
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36). In other words, it is crammed with information and usually floods one of the senses: 
“A photograph is, visually, ‘high definition’” (McLuhan 1964, 36).  Cold media do not 
provide so much external data. The “audience,” who in some form is typically a viewer 
or a listener, has less information with which to work and must complete the picture for 
him or herself internally. McLuhan (1964) proposes, therefore, that cold media require 
more “participation” and hot media less (36). One might draw from McLuhan’s assertion 
that cold media are more dependent on an individual’s imagination, experience and 
intellect than hot media are. One must, if working with cold media, rifle his or her 
internal library to find answers. People, in other words, must compute differently 
depending upon the communication media in play.  Consequently, the way that people 
communicate and use their minds should influence their ideas about friendship. Speech 
communication, based on McLuhan’s definition, is a cold medium, for it requires intense 
participation and is channeled through only one of the senses: sound. The participants in 
spoken communication are necessarily reliant on their imaginations, experiences and 
learning in order to understand each other. In-depth speech communication requires the 
participants to be heavily engaged. 
This chapter introduction is hardly exhaustive, but as the chapter unfolds, frequent 
references will be made to the qualities of speech communication and to the criteria 
established for the classical friendship model as they relate to each other. In summary, 
Poe (2011) associates the following social practices and cultural values to a network of 
speech communication: 
 Social Practice    Cultural Value 
 
 Equalized     Egalitarianism 
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 Opened     Publican 
 Conceptualized    Idealism 
 Economized     Asceticism 
 Democratized     Deliberatism 
 Simplified     Monism 
 Ritualized     Eternalism 
 Amateurized     Individualism (Poe 2011, 58) 
 
The above list would seem to correspond with five essential aspects of the classical-
Christian friendship model as outlined earlier. First, friendship is a matter of free will, not 
of obligation. Second, friendship is mutual, freely reciprocated. There is no yoke. The 
reciprocity is circular and becomes one. Third, friendship is virtuous in an Aristotelian 
manner. By Christian standards, the virtuous person is wise, strong, just, and temperate. 
Friends must be virtuous and must possess the love of truth. Fourth, there must be 
allowance for individuality. It is selfish and unfriendly to refuse a friend’s autonomy. 
Fifth, finding the best kind of friend is limited. The two friends must possess those things 
in common that allow them to love each other in the special way of friendship. Last, 
being solitary in the wrong way is an impediment to human flourishing. A negative 
solitude, or alone-ness, is undesirable and the opposite of friendship. People who rely on 
a speech communication network are unlikely to experience isolation unless it is a form 
of punishment. Great friendships, as well, are often visible to the public eye. 
 
Gilgamesh and Enkidu 
In Western literature, some great friendships are depicted. What may be the first 
friendship ever written about in the West is between Gilgamesh and Enkidu, and it is 
contained in what is regarded as “the first great heroic narrative of world literature” 
(Lawall et al. 1999, 16). Gilgamesh is the mighty Sumerian king of Uruk. He is part god 
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and, “He met with no one who could withstand his arms” (Gilgamesh 1999, 19). But 
Gilgamesh’s subjects lament their king’s arrogance and tyranny. The Sumerian gods hear 
the people and decide to, “’Create his equal; let it be as like him as his own reflection, his 
second self, stormy heart for stormy heart. Let them contend together and leave Uruk in 
quiet’” (Gilgamesh 1999, 19). Once this equal, Enkidu, is created and before he meets 
Gilgamesh, he comes to know people; yet, he desires more than the sexual and 
gastronomic pleasures that he has experienced: “He longed for a comrade, one that could 
understand his heart” (Gilgamesh 1999, 21).  
This aspect of Enkidu, his inability to return to the animal world though he at first 
pursues his animal life, represents a key principle for distinguishing the human being 
from the animal in ancient civilization. His movement towards the world of men and 
towards Gilgamesh suggests that what it means to be human must exceed the biological 
and therefore, the tangible. The great friendship, then, between Enkidu and Gilgamesh 
should be thought of as transcendent. It is not physically bound. Arendt summons 
Heraclitus to help with this distinction: 
The distinction between man and animal runs right through the human species 
itself. Only the best (aristoi), who constantly prove themselves to be the best 
(aristeuein, a verb for which there is no equivalent in any other language) and 
who “prefer immortal fame to mortal things,” are really man; the others, content 
with whatever pleasures nature will yield them, live and die like animals. (Arendt 
1998, 19) 
 
But, it begins as a competition to find out which of the two heroes is the best and 
to establish the role of each one. Enkidu vows to challenge Gilgamesh, for he wishes to 
be known as the strongest; and he feels that Gilgamesh may be less than virtuous. 
Gilgamesh hears of Enkidu’s coming in a dream and tells it to his mother, the goddess 
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Ninsun. In his dream a meteor sent by the god Anu, symbolizing Enkidu, has fallen, and 
Gilgamesh tries to lift it. 
I tried to lift it but it proved too heavy. All the people of Uruk came round to see 
it, the common people jostled and the nobles thronged to kiss its feet; and to me 
its attraction was like that of a woman. They helped me, I braced my forehead and 
I raised it with thongs and brought it to you, and you yourself pronounced it my 
brother. (Gilgamesh 1999, 21) 
 
Gilgamesh’s mother interprets the dream, telling Gilgamesh: “’When you see him you 
will be glad; you will love him as a woman and he will never forsake you’” (Gilgamesh 
1999, 21). In a second dream, an ax represents Enkidu, and Gilgamesh’s mother re-
affirms the first dream: “’He is the brave companion who rescues his friend in necessity’” 
(Ibid.). When the two finally meet, they grapple, Enkidu is thrown, and Gilgamesh is 
pacified: “Then immediately his fury died” (Gilgamesh 1999, 22). Gilgamesh 
experiences a catharsis; Enkidu, an epiphany. Enkidu says that there is no one like 
Gilgamesh. Enkidu and Gilgamesh embrace, and, “Their friendship was sealed” 
(Gilgamesh 1999, 22-23).  
 Although they are great friends and nearly physical equals, Enkidu’s role is to 
support Gilgamesh, and this supporting role is proved later in the story. Enkidu 
accompanies Gilgamesh in Gilgamesh’s quest for glory although he counsels Gilgamesh 
against the mission known as the forest journey. The two friends kill Humbaba, the forest 
guardian; and later Enkidu dies in Uruk for helping Gilgamesh against the vengeance of a 
goddess whose advances Gilgamesh has rejected. Gilgamesh is ambitious and restless; 
Enkidu might be happier with simpler pleasures, but he backs Gilgamesh no matter the 
consequences. The Bull of Heaven is loosed on Uruk, and the two friends together are 
able to slay it; but for opposing the gods, for their hubris, one of the two friends must die, 
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and the gods choose Enkidu; for, the point is to punish Gilgamesh (Gilgamesh 1999, 26). 
The loss of his best friend will wound and humble Gilgamesh.  
 Gilgamesh will achieve glory and his name a place in word processing software 
dictionaries; however, only a close reading of Gilgamesh will reveal Enkidu’s role. 
Enkidu has his bitter moments once he senses that his death is imminent, and he curses 
the woman who led him to Gilgamesh without, nevertheless, renouncing his friendship 
for Gilgamesh. In fact, the Sumerian god Shamash speaks to Enkidu who then overcomes 
his anger and retracts his curse (Gilgamesh 1999, 27). Whatever Enkidu suffers, it is 
bearable for the sake of Gilgamesh and for having known Gilgamesh. In the end, the two 
have shared some great adventures together, and both have known friendship, something 
that Gilgamesh would have never known; and Gilgamesh is said to have experienced all 
things that human beings can know: “I will proclaim to the world the deeds of 
Gilgamesh. This was the man to whom all things were known” (Gilgamesh 1999, 18).  
 Gilgamesh is devastated by the loss of his friend. He compels the citizens of Uruk 
to weep and mourn. Gilgamesh orders that a statue be erected to honor Enkidu: “He 
summoned them all, the coppersmiths, the goldsmiths, the stone-workers, and 
commanded them, ‘Make a statue for my friend’” (Gilgamesh 1999, 36). In effect, 
Gilgamesh has already set out to immortalize his friendship. Gilgamesh then leaves Uruk, 
driven to begin his quest for immortality: 
Bitterly Gilgamesh wept for his friend Enkidu; he wandered over the wilderness 
as a hunter, he roamed over the plains; in his bitterness he cried, “How can I rest, 
how can I be at peace? Despair is in my heart. What my brother is now, that shall 
I be when I am dead. Because I am afraid of death, I will go as best I can to find 
Utnapishtim whom they call the Faraway, for he has entered the assembly of the 
gods.” (Gilgamesh 1999, 36) 
 
  73 
 How closely does this first tale of friendship correspond to the classical model of 
what friendship ought to be? First, there is choice. Gilgamesh and Enkidu choose to be 
friends rather than enemies. And, they are equals. Their bond is an almost sacred one as 
they leave on their first heroic adventure together. The gods created Enkidu to be a match 
for Gilgamesh. Gilgamesh’s mother, the goddess Ninsun, also formally entrusts Enkidu 
to guide her son, his friend: “Strong Enkidu, you are not the child of my body, but I will 
receive you like my adopted son…I entrust my son to you; bring him back to me safely” 
(Gilgamesh 1999, 25).  Both men are virtuous, and their heroic actions express their drive 
for excellence. They are courageous and overcome their fears together as they set out on 
their adventures: “Today, give me your aid and you shall have mine: what then can go 
amiss with us two?” (Gilgamesh 1999, 28). When Enkidu dies, Gilgamesh is alone. There 
is no one to fill the void. His alone-ness drives him away from Uruk into the wilderness, 
and he seeks immortality: “For Enkidu; I loved him dearly, together we endured all kinds 
of hardships; on his account I have come, for the common lot of man has taken him” 
(Gilgamesh 1999, 37). 
 The classical-Christian friendship model, as projected most explicitly among the 
early Christian thinkers, makes of the most excellent friendship something requiring 
supernatural intervention. The friendship of the archetypes Gilgamesh and Enkidu also 
involves the gods. Gilgamesh is a demigod. The great Sumerian god Shamesh takes a 
fatherly interest in Gilgamesh, and his mother, Ninsun, is identified as a goddess. Enkidu 
is formed in heaven and descends, in Gilgamesh’s dream, as a meteor (Gilgamesh 1999, 
21). The excellence of the friendship between Gilgamesh and Enkidu, thus, has divine 
impetus, which adds energy to the transcendent, eternal quality of the friendship.  
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Though Enkidu is not classified as a demigod, he is created very much like Adam, 
a creature formed from clay made specifically to balance Gilgamesh, and he is not born 
of human parents (Gilgamesh 1999, 19). At first Enkidu lives among the animals, but 
then he acquires wisdom and becomes a man (Gilgamesh 1999, 20). To distinguish the 
human being from the animal is important, for it separates action from behavior, action 
being a human attribute while instinct and behavior are in the nature of the beast. To be 
human suggests that one behaves not solely from necessity. Action is a conscious thing 
involving a decision that can go against the survival instinct. Herein lays the idea of 
heroic endeavor, which Gilgamesh and Enkidu undertake. This concept is carried forward 
by the Greeks.  
It is not that Plato or Aristotle was ignorant of, or unconcerned with, the fact that 
man cannot live outside the company of men, but they did not count this condition 
among the specifically human characteristics; on the contrary, it was something 
human life had in common with animal life, and for this reason alone it could not 
be fundamentally human. The natural, merely social companionship of the human 
species was considered to be a limitation imposed upon us by the needs of 
biological life, which are the same for the human animal as for other forms of 
animal life. (Arendt 1998, 24) 
 
Rather than suggest by this statement that friendship is an animal state, it affirms that 
friendship must exceed physical boundaries in order to be specifically human. It helps, of 
course, when friendship receives a push from the gods. 
 Another interesting element that emerges from the friendship story of Gilgamesh 
and Enkidu is the public nature of the friendship. Their friendship is something of which 
to be proud. Gilgamesh is with his friend Enkidu in the great market of Uruk, offering a 
sacrifice to the god Shamash and telling of his deed to come. The counselors fear that 
Gilgamesh and Enkidu will be destroyed by Humbaba, and Gilgamesh responds: 
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When he heard these words of the counsellors Gilgamesh looked at his friend and 
laughed, “How shall I answer them; shall I say I am afraid of Humbaba, I will sit 
at home all the rest of my days?” Then Gilgamesh opened his mouth again and 
said to Enkidu, “My friend, let us go to the Great Palace, to Egalmah, and stand 
before Ninsun the queen…They took each other by the hand as they went to 
Egalmah. (Gilgamesh 1999, 25) 
 
The friendship saga of Gilgamesh and Enkidu is born from a time when speech 
communication and its corresponding networks are the primary systems for human 
connectedness in this first great friendship story known to Western Literature. 
 
David and Jonathan 
 
 The Israelites follow the Sumerians closely with their friendship story, and one 
should note the similarities. Again, one of the friends must play the supporting role, and 
the friendship between David and Jonathan resembles the bond that exists between 
Gilgamesh and Enkidu. Jonathan’s conundrum between his obligation to his father and 
his friendship for David helps highlight their friendship and makes it both more complex 
and political. It is also an expression of the divine standard that elevates the friendship 
above some of the most important human laws. In the case of Jonathan, it is a friendship 
that surpasses his duty to his earthbound father. Jonathan loves David as himself, which 
is to say that he sees God’s will being worked through David: “And Jonathan entered into 
a bond with David, because he loved David as himself” (Samuel 18, 3 [NAB]). Although 
David is the chosen one and it is David’s story, Jonathan is most amazing as a friend, and 
like Enkidu, Jonathan will die while the other friend carries on. 
 Although David is God’s choice to rule over Israel and Jonathan aids David, both 
men take heroic action separately in order to establish themselves as courageous and 
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virtuous in the eyes of the Israelites. Both men trust in God and with His help triumph 
against superior force. 
 It is in Jonathan’s victory that he shows himself not to be aligned with his father, 
and it can be interpreted symbolically as Jonathan’s choosing God’s will over his father, 
Saul’s will. It is symbolic to say that Saul does not know that Jonathan has left the camp 
when Jonathan achieves his victory. Afterwards, Jonathan unwittingly defies his father’s 
oath and is nearly put to death for it (Samuel 14, 5-28). It is reaffirmed that the friendship 
between Jonathan and David is divinely inspired. Such a friendship is greater than 
familial obligation, and it is also worth dying for. Jonathan tries, however, to fulfill his 
filial duties but not at the expense of his friendship with David. 
 David is nobody. He has no claim to the throne of Israel. However, Jonathan, who 
the Israelites would have as the rightful successor, becomes David’s friend. By 
Jonathan’s death, he abdicates, leaving the way open for his friend David. When one is 
acting for himself, perhaps it is easier: “Jonathan had become as fond of David as if his 
life depended on him; as he loved himself” (Samuel 18, 1-3). Jonathan in fact gives 
David everything he has, including his armor, his weapons, and even his military 
privileges. Jonathan defends and protects David from Saul. He speaks to his father on 
David’s behalf (Samuel 19, 4-7). Saul, aware of the friendship between David and 
Jonathan, intends to act against his son’s wishes. David mistrusts Saul and believes that 
Saul is plotting David’s destruction. David informs Jonathan, who responds: “Heaven 
forbid that you should die!” And, “I will do whatever you wish” (Samuel 20, 2-4). 
Jonathan discovers his father’s plan and reports it to David, and the two must part 
  77 
company. Jonathan asks only that David treat his household with kindness, as if Jonathan 
already senses that his own death is imminent.  
They kissed each other and wept aloud together. At length Jonathan said to David, 
“Go in peace, in keeping with what we two have sworn by the name of the Lord: 
“The Lord shall be between you and me, and between your posterity and mine 
forever.” (Samuel 20, 42) 
 
 When Jonathan dies, David, like Gilgamesh, acknowledges his friend. He chants 
the elegy of Saul and of Jonathan: 
 “I grieve for you, Jonathan my brother! 
  most dear have you been to me; 
 More precious have I held love for you 
  than love for women.” (Second Samuel 1, 26 [NAB]) 
 
One can see the similarity to the story of Gilgamesh. The goddess Ninsun, Gilgamesh’s 
mother, also claims that Gilgamesh will love Enkidu as a woman (Gilgamesh 1999, 21). 
The friendship between David and Jonathan is again between two heroes, or warriors, 
and God has a hand in this relationship. One can also claim that Jonathan must die in 
order for David to realize his destiny, which is true of Gilgamesh who might not seek 
immortality or continue his life’s adventure had Enkidu not died. Gilgamesh and Enkidu, 
however, appear to be punished for their hubris, or defiance of the gods. Enkidu dies as a 
way of punishing Gilgamesh for their slaying of the bull of heaven. Jonathan, on the 
other hand, dies simply to clear the way for David. Jonathan’s death is not a punishment 
but instead a sacrifice as Jonathan fulfills God’s will.  
 
Job and Friends 
 
Another friendship tale in the Old Testament is found in Job. The friendship 
experience depicted in Job is less inspiring than that of David and Jonathan. Job and his 
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friends are not heroic figures in the sense of being great warriors or kings although Job is 
a hero in another way and rates a personal visit from God; for despite his hardships and 
his incomprehension of the reasons for them, Job is able to remain faithful to God and to 
himself. Job’s friends come to console him in his hours of misery, and from their visit 
one might learn something about friendship.  
 A first question that arises, regarding friendship, in the reading of Job is the man’s 
relationship to his wife. One can make comparisons between the wife’s and the friends’ 
significance in Job’s life. Both, for instance, are allowed to criticize Job, but Job throws 
his wife’s gender in her face when she chastises him. Job’s wife both questions and 
commands him: “Are you still holding to your innocence? Curse God and die” (Job 2, 8 
[NAB]). Job responds: “Are even you going to speak as senseless women do?” (Ibid.). 
Job draws a line in the sand between men and women, suggesting that, if equality is 
necessary for the best kind of friendship, women may have a lower capacity than men for 
such a thing or that it is not possible between husband and wife. 
 Although Job’s friends travel far to see Job, and they sit with him as a way to 
share in his suffering, they do so from pity. They, like Job’s wife, cannot believe that he 
is innocent. The difference between Job’s wife and friends is in their patience. Job’s 
friends seem more willing to endure with Job though they doubt him as well. Job seems 
to be somewhat more tolerant of them and rebukes them in ways different from the way 
that he dismisses his wife. From a purely practical perspective, however, one could argue 
that the wife has truly lost everything, for her life depends very much on Job’s 
economical situation. Everything that Job has lost is also her loss, which includes their 
children. Her loss and suffering are real while the friends, who have lost nothing, make 
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only token gestures. Job’s friends doubt Job. They are, however, expected to provide 
evidence that they are unable to produce in support of their belief in Job’s impiety. Their 
evidence is circumstantial, based upon all that has happened to Job. Job, therefore, 
because they have no proof, scolds his friends and questions their friendship: 
 Have I no helper, 
  And has advice deserted me? 
 A friend owes kindness to one in despair, 
  though he have forsaken the fear of the  
Almighty. (Job 6, 13-17) 
 
Job further suggests that his friends are cowardly and that they treat him unjustly. 
 
 How agreeable are honest words; 
  yet how unconvincing is your 
   argument!  
 You would even cast lots for the orphan, 
  and would barter away your friend! 
 Come, now, give me your attention; 
  surely I will not lie to your face. 
 Think it over; let there be no injustice. 
  Think it over; I still am right. 
 Is there insincerity on my tongue, 
  or cannot my taste discern falsehood? (Job 6, 25-30) 
 
The disbelief of Job’s friends is unceasing and Job continues to berate them for their on-
going request that he prostrate himself before God and beg for God’s mercy. The friends 
advocate for an admission of guilt in the hope of a lesser punishment, but Job believes 
himself to be innocent and will not plea-bargain: 
 Even now, behold, my witness’ is in  
   heaven, 
  and my spokesman is on high. 
 My friends it is who wrong me; (Job 16, 19-20) 
 
Job feels attacked and criticized by his friends, as if it is part of the suffering that he has 
been made to undergo, and for no apparent reason: 
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 These ten times you have reviled me, 
  have assailed me without shame! 
 Be it indeed that I am at fault 
  and that my fault remains with me. 
 Even so, if you would vaunt yourselves  
   against me 
  and cast up to me my reproach, 
 Know then that God has dealt unfairly 
   with me, 
  and compassed me round with his net. 
 If I cry out “Injustice!” I am not heard. (Job 19, 3-7) 
 
 In the friends’ defense, one can contend that they did not abandon Job. They only 
try to persuade him of the possibility that he has erred in some way. They do, however, 
fail to trust and help Job (Job 32, 1-3). The Lord is displeased with Job’s friends and 
leaves it up to Job whether to intercede on their behalf, which, as a good friend, Job does; 
and it is observed that only after Job’s intercession for his friends does the Lord 
compensate Job for all that Job has had to suffer (Job 42, 7-11). 
 A most fascinating aspect from the angle of speech communication itself is the 
vitality of the language. While the stories of Gilgamesh and David compare in their 
heroic content, Job and Gilgamesh come together in the manner of their telling. The 
stories are narrated poetically. They are wrought with images. In this vein, one should 
recall that Gilgamesh probably traveled the path of the oral tradition: “The earliest 
written stories date from roughly 2000 B.C. E., but oral versions of the story both 
preceded them and continued on, parallel with the written tradition” (Lawall et al. 16, 
1999). The monologues of Job and his friends are rich with metaphor and simile, and 
they are referred to as “poetic dialogues” (Bergant 2006, 237).  Hebrew poetry differs 
from classical and contemporary poetry in that there is generally no rhyme. Instead, the 
rhythm depends upon tonal patterns that are lost when the original Hebrew is translated 
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(Bergant 2006, 238). Stories like Job and Gilgamesh are intended to be heard. Gilgamesh, 
when he recounts his dreams, looks for interpretation from both Enkidu and his mother. 
Gilgamesh recounts one of his dreams:  
We stood in a deep gorge of the mountain, and beside it we were the smallest of 
swamp flies; and suddenly the mountain fell, it struck me and caught my feet 
from under me. Then came an intolerable light blazing out, and in it was on 
whose grace and whose beauty were greater than the beauty of the world. He 
pulled me out from under the mountain, he gave me water to drink and my heart 
was comforted, and he set my feet on the ground. (Gilgamesh 1999, 27) 
 
Gilgamesh’s dream is allegorical, and Enkidu interprets it as a victory over the forest 
guardian, Humbaba who the mountain in Gilgamesh’s dream symbolizes (Ibid.). Job and 
his friends almost seem to take pride in their eloquence. It is as if the most eloquent 
speaker is the possessor of truth. White (2014) might suggest that such use of metaphor 
and allegory is necessary since the storyteller-historian lacks “conceptual precision,” and, 
“such historians usually make up for the vacuity of their generalizations by the vividness 
of their reconstructions of particular agents, agencies, and acts represented in their 
narratives” (14). Job is not easily outdone. One should note the extraordinary use of 
analogy: 
 For a tree, there is hope, 
  If it be cut down, that it will sprout 
   again 
  and that its tender shoots will not cease. 
 Even though its root grow old in the  
   earth, 
  and its stump die in the dust, 
 Yet at the first whiff of water it may 
   flourish again 
  and put forth branches like a young 
   plant. (Job 14, 7-9) 
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In these examples, the references are usually to nature, emphasizing that human 
experience is heavily based on nature’s processes. Such comparisons make them easy to 
remember within an oral tradition, so that such stories and lessons can be retold. Stories 
of friendship, therefore, and what friendship should be become rooted in the memories of 
the storytellers and audience. 
 
Achilles and Patroclus 
 
Homer’s immortal Iliad is surely born from an oral tradition, and it defines the epic 
poem: “It is certain that they [The Iliad and The Odyssey] were intended not for reading 
but for oral recitation….The poems exhibit the unmistakable characteristics of oral 
composition” (Lawall et al. 1999, 98). One is reminded in Lawall’s introduction to 
Homer’s two great epics of both the memory and the inventiveness of the oral poet: 
The oral poet had at his disposal not reading and writing but a vast and intricate 
system of metrical formulas—phrases that would fit in at different places in the 
line and a repertoire of standard scenes…as well as the known outline of the 
story. Of course he could and did invent new phrases as he recited—but his base 
was the immense poetic reserve created by many generations of singers who lived 
before him. (Lawall et al. 1999, 98) 
 
The friendship, then, between Patroclus and Achilles has itself become a rich and 
immortal one, for the death of Patroclus serves as a most powerful catapult within The 
Iliad. Their frequently retold friendship must have become engrained within the thought 
libraries of those generations of people who were so long exposed to the poem, and it 
becomes, perhaps, an essential part of one’s beliefs and education. Finally, a poet like 
Homer, possessing the necessary skill, sculpts a definitive version in written form. 
Though the world is grateful to Homer for harnessing The Iliad and The Odyssey, one 
might wonder whether the power of the story, and, consequently, the friendship, has not 
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somehow been diluted through the translation of the written work although The Iliad (and 
The Odyssey) remains a great and wonderful story. 
The grand friendship of Achilles and Patroclus is referred to frequently in the 
earliest philosophical discourses about both love and friendship. Their friendship is most 
comparable to that of Gilgamesh and Enkidu. 
What one finds exists in almost all of the classical friendship stories is a divine or 
metaphysical element. Enkidu is created by the gods and simply deposited, fully grown, 
near Uruk for the sake of becoming Gilgamesh’s friend. Gilgamesh’s mother is a 
goddess, and the gods intervene constantly, one might even say detrimentally, in the lives 
of the two friends. The Sumarian gods sentence Enkidu to death: “Anu, Enlil, Ea and 
Heavenly Shamash took counsel together, and Anu said to Enlil, ‘Because they have 
killed the Bull of Heaven, and because they have killed Humbaba who guarded the Cedar 
Mountain one of the two must die’” (Gilgamesh 1999, 32). Jonathan is guided to a great 
military victory, establishing his heroic credentials, and he seems to understand the 
importance of God’s wishes for David who the Lord has chosen to succeed Saul. God 
speaks to Job directly, calling upon him to intervene for his friends, and the Lord 
chastises Job’s friends specifically. Achilles is another demigod, and the gods are 
constantly mixing into and shaping the outcomes at Troy. In fact, Apollo is most 
responsible for the death of Patroclus.  
Then at the fourth assault Patroclus like something superhuman— 
then, Patroclus, the end of life came blazing up before you, 
yes, the lord Apollo met you there in the heart of battle, 
the god, the terror! Patroclus never saw him coming, 
moving across the deadly rout, shrouded in thick mist 
and on he came agains him and looming up behind him now— 
slammed his broad shoulders and back with the god’s flat hand 
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and his eyes spun as Apollo knocked the helmet off his head  
(Homer The Iliad 1999, 159) 
 
Patroclus’s death spurs Achilles to his destiny and the eventual fall of Troy. Except Job, 
in fact, the death of a friend serves as the catalyst for some extraordinary endeavor on the 
survivor’s part. Gilgamesh seeks immortality; David becomes the king of the Israelites. 
Achilles slays Hector, which leads to the fall of Troy and to his own death. All three men, 
it could be claimed, become more human. The great pain caused by the loss of each one’s 
friend unleashes something within them: 
 Patroclus . . . I will never forget him, 
 not as long as I’m still among the living 
 and my springing knees will lift and drive me on. 
 Though the dead forget their dead in the House of Death, 
 I will remember, even there, my dear companion.  
(Homer The Iliad 1999, 186) 
 
 No one has been able to convince Achilles to fight, but Patroclus’s tears finally 
move Achilles to give up his armor to Patroclus so that he might fight to stalemate the 
unrushing Trojans:  
 Meanwhile Patroklos came to the shepherd of the people, Achilleus, 
 and stood by him and wept warm tears, like a spring dark-running 
 that down the face of a rock impassable drips its dim water;  
 and swift-footed brilliant Achilleus looked on him in pity,  
(Homer The Iliad 1993, 189) 
 
And later, after Achilles kills Hector and as he continues to grieve for Patroclus, he is 
once again stirred with pity, this time for Priam, and he allows the old king to give Hector 
a proper burial: 
 He [Achilles] rose from his seat, raised the old man by the hand 
 and filled with pity now for his gray head and gray beard, 
 he spoke out winged words, flying straight to the heart: 
 “Poor man, how much you’ve borne—pain to break the spirit!” 
 (Homer The Iliad 1999, 202) 
  85 
 
Heroes like Gilgamesh and Achilles seem to soften and become fuller human beings after 
their friends die. Achilles accepts his mortality and no longer fears his fate:  
 But now I’ll go and meet that murderer head on, 
 that Hector who destroyed the dearest life I know. 
 For my own death, I’ll meet it freely—whenever Zeus 
 and the other deathless gods would like to bring it on!  
 (Homer The Iliad 1999, 164) 
 
 Again, with the exception of Job, what emerges from these early friendships is the 
idea of the equality of the friends in each friendship pair. Gilgamesh and Enkidu are near 
to being physical equals, and Jonathan is a warrior in his own right. Patroclus, too, shall 
rival the Trojan hero Hector as, wearing Achilles’ armor, he drives the Trojans back; 
however, there is a paradox to this equality. One of the friends is always playing second 
fiddle to the other, and this subordinate friend inevitably dies before the more important 
hero does, and that friend’s death ignites the hero and triggers important events. It is one 
thing if each friend alternately serves the other, but one friend in the couple stands out as 
being distinctly superior, and that superior being shall be the one to mourn the loss of his 
companion. Yet, each of the supporting friends assumes his role willingly and is, perhaps, 
the better friend. Jonathan agrees to aid David against Jonathan’s father, Saul. Enkidu 
follows Gilgamesh into the wilderness to aid in dispatching the menacing Humbaba, the 
forest guardian; but it is the depiction of Patroclus’s performing menial services for 
Achilles that best illustrates subservience: 
 So Prince Achilles hailed and led them in, 
 sat them down on settles with purple carpets 
 and quickly told Patroclus standing by, “Come, 
 a bigger winebowl, son of Menoetius, set it here… 
 he paused. Patroclus obeyed his great friend. 
 (Homer The Iliad 1999, 136) 
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The friends Achilles and Patroclus know each other well, and Patroclus knows his role: 
 With that,  
 he gave Patroclus a sharp glance, a quiet nod 
 to pile the bedding deep for Phoenix now, 
 (Homer The Iliad 1999, 147) 
 
Patroclus, in fact, is given specific instructions by Achilles, and as consequence of being 
caught up in his own glory and forgetting his subordinate role, he suffers the intervention 
of Apollo, which leads to his death. Like Enkidu and Jonathan, Patroclus is innocent. 
 
Roland and Oliver 
 
 A similar heroic friendship in epic literature is that of Roland and Oliver in The 
Song of Roland. Roland is Gilgamesh while Oliver is Enkidu. Roland and Oliver also 
compare to the friendships of David and Jonathan and Achilles and Patroclus. The name 
Oliver represents his position in the epic. The olive branch symbolizes peace and 
submission, and the name Oliver derives from the olive tree. Roland and Oliver are part 
of the French rearguard that protects Charlemagne’s army from the Saracens. They have 
been deceived by the traitor Ganelon and are about to face an insurmountable number of 
hostiles. Oliver tells Roland to blow his horn in order to bring back the main army, but 
Roland refuses (The Song of Roland 1999, 1130-1131). Oliver tries three times to 
convince Roland, but Roland sees calling for help as both disloyal and dishonorable; he is 
determined to fight. Oliver stands by Roland, much as Enkidu stands by Gilgamesh, 
despite Enkidu’s pragmatic counseling against the expedition into the forest to kill the 
forest guardian Humbaba. In the stanza after Oliver’s final request to Roland that Roland 
should blow the horn, the two friends are labeled: 
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Roland is good, and Oliver is wise, 
both these vassals men of amazing courage: 
once they are armed and mounted on their horses, 
they will not run, though they die for it, from battle. 
Good men, these Counts, and their words full of spirit.  
(The Song of Roland 1999, 1131) 
 
Throughout the epic, it will often be repeated that Roland is good and Oliver is wise. 
Subsequently, both Oliver and Roland will die, and Roland will witness the death of his 
friend. Like Enkidu, Oliver will be unhappy with his own fate and will direct some of his 
displeasure at his friend Roland for allowing their destruction. Though apparently blinded 
in combat and swinging his sword wildly, he accidentally strikes Roland. Oliver also 
intends to withhold a woman in his family from Roland should they survive the battle. 
Still, when Oliver dies, he and Roland are reconciled, and Roland forgives his friend for 
any transgression. Ultimately, angels from heaven will bear Roland’s body away, and it is 
Roland who will be glorified for his blind loyalty, or faith, despite his seemingly 
irrational decision to fight and the subsequent massacre of his troops. Like Enkidu, Oliver 
is known only to the literature student. Still, Gilgamesh asks to take Enkidu’s place as 
Enkidu dies; and Roland, upon seeing his friend about to die, finally complies with 
Oliver’s wishes and blows the horn to alert Charlemagne. As in the tale of Gilgamesh and 
Enkidu, it is understood that Roland and Oliver have shared many battles together before 
the ultimate battle with the Saracens. Both pairs of friends have, literally, fought for their 
lives together and shared their lives in a heroic sense. The mission of one becomes the 
mission of the other, and both Enkidu and Oliver have given their lives for their friends.  
Greater love has no one than this, that he lay down his life for his friends. You are 
my friends if you do what I command. I no longer call you servants, because a 
servant does not know his master's business. Instead, I have called you friends, for 
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everything that I learned from my Father I have made known to you. (John 15:13-
15) 
 
 What differentiates The Song of Roland from Gilgamesh and The Iliad is the 
character of the main hero, Roland, and his reasons for fighting. His reasons better 
approximate the biblical tale of David and Jonathan. Unlike Achilles and Gilgamesh, 
Roland seems less concerned with his own edification than with fighting for 
Charlemagne and their appointed mission of unifying the Christian world and of 
spreading Christianity: 
It describes the process by which France left behind its Germanic past as a loose 
confederation of powerful families and accepted its future as a Christian nation 
united by loyalties to king and country….The central protagonist is the great 
warrior Roland, who embodies in an especially pure form the spirit of feudal 
loyalty to one’s overlord. [And, subsequently, to God in this instance] (Lawall et 
al. 1999, 1104) 
 
Roland is stubborn, but it is less about hubris than about duty. Achilles and Gilgamesh 
are very much about themselves. In all cases, their friends support their heroes, regardless 
of their motivations. 
 Another critical aspect of The Song of Roland to the friendship discussion is in the 
nature of its construction. Like The Iliad, Gilgamesh, and of Job, The Song of Roland is 
born from an oral tradition. It is a poem, a song, and it is meant to be heard:  
The poem shows unmistakable signs of having emerged from a period of oral 
composition. As in the Homeric poems and Beowulf, many of its phrases are 
metrical formulas originally combined by an oral poet into complete lines and 
then into larger passages as he re-created the poem anew at each performance. 
(Lawall et al. 1999, 1104) 
 
In The Song of Roland and Gilgamesh, although the friendships are critical, 
certain things emerge in the epics that appear more vital, and someone must pay the 
price. For both Roland and Gilgamesh, honor and following one’s destiny are most 
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important. Subsequently, both witness the deaths of their friends, for which they are 
indirectly responsible. While Roland and Gilgamesh seem to serve their own glory or a 
greater will first, it is for Enkidu and Oliver to serve their friends. Gilgamesh and Roland 
are appreciative of their friends and mourn their deaths deeply. The deaths of their friends 
lead to important action, as does the death of Patroclus in The Iliad.  
 
Thorstein and Bjarni 
 
 The gulf between an oral tradition and literacy has closed slightly by the time 
“Thorstein the Staff-Struck” is penned in Iceland some time during the thirteenth century. 
Certainly, the story is less of a poem and more of a yarn. Nevertheless, the story or most 
of its elements are likely carried over from an oral tradition: “Oral tradition bridged the 
interval between the tenth century and the thirteenth” (Lawall et al. 2006, 1374). The tale 
presents two brave, strong men who discover that they are equals when they are goaded 
into combating each other. Both men are reluctant to clash but must fight for honor’s 
sake. One of the men, Thorstein, subordinates himself to the other, Bjarni, and Thorstein 
does so willingly once each man recognizes the merits of the other; for Thorstein’s 
surrender solves the problem of honor for both men in relation to their social positions. 
The relationship between the two men meets much of the criteria for a classical 
friendship as the two men cope with the problem of maintaining honor through a virtuous 
solution, and, in this case, neither friend has to die wherein in all the other friendship 
stories, with the exception of Job, one of the two friends perishes. 
 In Gilgamesh, there’s only one way to settle the question of merit. A fierce fight 
ensues, Enkidu is thrown, and he becomes Gilgamesh’s great companion. No one before 
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had ever matched Gilgamesh. Thorstein and Bjarni fight to a draw although Thorstein 
gives Bjarni restorative opportunities. Each man, in fact, gives the other a chance to kill 
the other—ignobly.  Twice Thorstein could have killed Bjarni, and each time Bjarni 
trusts him not to. 
Bjarni said to Thorstein, “I’m getting thirsty now, I’m not as used to hard work as 
you are.”  
 “Go down to the stream and drink,” said Thorstein. 
Bjarni did so, and laid the sword down beside him. Thorstein picked it up, 
examined it and said, “You can’t have been using this sword at Bodvardsdale.” 
(“Thorstein the Staff-Struck” 2006, 1378) 
 
Bjarni does not answer. It could be suggested that the sword in question is not the type of 
sword used to cut down an honorable man. In the second instance, “’Everything seems to 
go wrong for me today,’ he (Bjarni) said. ‘Now my shoe thong’s loose.’ ‘Tie it up then,’ 
said Thorstein” (“Thorstein the Staff-Struck” 2006, 1379). Bjarni, in effect, bows to 
Thorstein, acknowledging him as an equal. Finally, as the two take turns swinging their 
swords, it is Bjarni’s turn to strike a shield-less Thorstein, and, as in Gilgamesh, one 
could say that their friendship is sealed. 
It was Bjarni’s turn to strike. Both men had lost their shields. Bjarni said, “It 
would be a great mistake in one stroke both to throw away good fortune and do 
wrong. In my opinion I’d be fully paid for my three servants if you took their 
place and served me faithfully.” 
Thorstein said, “I’ve had plenty of opportunity today to take advantage of you, if 
my bad luck had been stronger than your good luck. I’ll never deceive you.” 
(“Thorstein the Staff-Struck” 2006, 1379). 
 
 A notable theme in “Thorstein the Staff-Struck” (2006) is the obligation an 
honorable man has to his family and kinsmen. In the story of David and Jonathan, 
Jonathan manages to remain faithful to his father while making his friendship to David a 
priority. It is suggested that the most virtuous kind of friendship might supersede kinship 
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in “Thorstein the Staff-Struck.” One learns that Bjarni has slain some of his own 
kinsmen, showing no quarter, in the often-referenced fight at Bodvardsdale. Bjarni’s two 
half-brothers, though regarded as servants, have big mouths and Bjarni overhears them 
accuse him of cowardice for not avenging the death of his stable hand, Thord, whom 
Thorstein was forced to kill in order to restore his own honor before the eyes of his 
father. Bjarni, then, sends the two brothers to avenge the alleged wrong. These two 
attempt, treacherously, to kill Thorstein who dispatches them both. Even at that point, 
Bjarni does not seem intent on pursuing the matter, for the men who died, though 
kinsmen, apparently lacked Bjarni’s respect; and he, it could be inferred, views 
Thorstein’s actions as justified. While Bjarni is feeling pressure, Thorstein’s father is 
urging his son forward. The father insists that Thorstein is a coward if Thorstein does not 
take action to right a wrong done to Thorstein. Ultimately, when Bjarni and Thorstein 
reach their understanding, Thorarin loses his son to Bjarni, but not in death. Thorstein 
goes off to serve Bjarni, and Bjarni provides slaves to care for Thorarin and his horses, 
thus liberating Thorstein of the responsibility of caring for his blind father, who, 
symbolically, has been blind to the great discernment and virtue of his son. 
 In Job’s test, another question is posed, that of the wife’s role as a friend. Job’s 
wife is most straightforward in her criticism of the steadfast Job, and he rebukes her 
summarily as being a foolish woman. Bjarni’s wife receives similar treatment: “’You’re a 
typical woman,’ said Bjarni, “’arguing against the very thing you were urging just a few 
hours ago! There’s a limit to my patience, I can only stand so much taunting from you 
and others’” (“Thorstein the Staff-Struck” 2006 1378). In both cases, the women are 
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reduced and seem to act more as instigators and gossipers. Certainly, they are not 
presented as their husbands’ friends or equals.  
 Both men in “Thorstein the Staff-Struck” try to avoid fighting as they both seem 
to have recognized the integrity of the other. Bjarni says to his wife, “No one seems 
willing to learn from another man’s lesson. Thorstein has never killed anyone without a 
good reason” (“Thorstein the Staff-Struck” 2006, 1378). Like the allusion in the 
beginning of the yarn, a horse fight leading to the entire conflict, both men are forced to 
fight like two stallions. Because of his position in the community, the chieftain, Bjarni, is 
spurred by his wife and the equivalent of civic obligation. For Thorstein’s it is his father 
who cracks the whip behind him. In the traditional Icelandic society, a man had to uphold 
his personal honor and good standing: “Each man considers the respect of the community 
essential to his self-respect; hence they act as the code requires, regardless of their 
personal inclination or of the merits of the case” (Lawall et al. 2006, 1375). 
 In the end, it boils down to loyalty and service so that each might save face. Their 
union benefits both Thorstein and Bjarni:  
Thorstein went with Bjarni over to Hof, and stayed in his service for the rest of 
his life. He was considered a man of great courage and integrity. Bjarni kept his 
standing and became better-liked and more self-controlled the older he grew. He 
was a very trustworthy man. (“Thorstein the Staff-Struck” 2006, 1380) 
 
So, too, in the Song of Roland one encounters the idea of service: Oliver to Roland and 
Roland to Charlemagne. Charlemagne’s service, meanwhile, is specifically to God since 
there is no one else over him. God lengthens a day for Charlemagne, and He sends 
Charlemagne messages in dreams.  
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 Unlike all the previous friendship narratives, or threads, divine intervention seems 
to be withheld, at least explicitly, in “Thorstein the Staff-Struck.” Neither Bjarni nor 
Thorstein is a demigod. God or gods do not appear to anyone or take any recorded action. 
However, Bjarni and Thorstein continue to be outstanding men, and Bjarni, almost as a 
footnote, sets out to become a Christian. He dies on a pilgrimage to Rome, which one 
could speculate, symbolizes the road to paradise after having lived a virtuous life, one of 
wisdom, fortitude, justice and temperance. 
 
The Question of Subordination 
 
They are mythologized friendships in Gilgamesh, The Iliad, “Thorstein the Staff-
Struck,” The Song of Roland, and, some might argue, that of David and Jonathan. The 
relationships may not have existed at all, and the nature of these relationships, if they did 
exist, is part of the myth. Nevertheless, qualities of friendship are evident. The friendship 
bond becomes something almost supernatural. Friendship bonds between the elderly and 
their dogs are not about relationships between humans; however, one should recall that 
many of the elderly in Peter Peretti’s study claim that their pets are their only friends and 
that the qualities for friendship are identified: companionship, usefulness, and loyalty 
being among them (Peretti 1990, 154).  In these examples, friendships, between both 
mythical characters and elderly dog owners and their pets, show that loyalty is highly 
valued and that friends enhance the lives of their friends. The other variables that Peretti 
identifies—companionship, usefulness, and emotional bond—are also heavily embodied 
in the epic friendships. Enkidu, for whom Gilgamesh has feelings as if for a woman, 
accompanies Gilgamesh on his forest journey (Gilgamesh 1999, 21). He is useful both in 
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interpreting Gilgamesh’s dreams and in the fighting with Hambaba (Gilgamesh 1999, 
27). Achilles “longed for Patroclus’ manhood, his gallant heart” (Homer The Iliad 1999, 
189). Achilles yearns for the friend who knows his heart. Oliver, meanwhile, battles 
alongside Roland and is allowed to question Roland’s judgment (The Song of Roland 
1999, 1140-1142). There is argument, and the bishop who is with the company must 
remind Roland and Oliver of their friendship (Ibid.).  Still, Oliver does as Roland wishes, 
Enkidu does as Gilgamesh wishes, and a good dog usually does as its master commands. 
These relationships, therefore, are somewhat hierarchical despite their unconditional 
natures and the affection that the friends have for each other. Thorstein, too, though 
Bjarni’s equal, willingly “went with Bjarni over to Hof, and stayed in his service for the 
rest of his life” (“Thorstein the Staff-Struck” 2006, 1380). 
McSwite (2002), in an analysis of Kafka’s insight and Lacan’s idea, explores the 
benefit of mutual relationships in public administration, and his/her evaluation might 
apply to ideas about friendship as well. McSwite agrees with Lacan’s theory of the 
burden of desire and explains how it is established. 
The movement through life is toward thanatos and away from eros. The lust for 
life becomes a lust for death. In this view, then, the central issue of life is 
assuming and bearing one’s desire, a desire that can never be fulfilled in life 
because of its involvement with death. (McSwite 2002, 33) 
 
If one accepts this idea, “No one can die for us and no one can live for us…we are each 
located in what I prefer to call a sacred space that is our own” (McSwite 2002, 34). 
Authority, as in a hierarchical relationship, can violate that space, and here one must 
separate the men from the dogs. Roland exercises authority over Oliver because he is 
appointed by Charlemagne to lead the king’s rearguard. Roland is also Charlemagne’s 
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nephew. Enkidu, when brought to meet Ninsun, Gilgamesh’s mother, is told that she 
adopts him as her child, thus making him the brother of Gilgamesh, and she asks Enkidu 
to look out for Gilgamesh (Gilgamesh 1999, 25). Enkidu is not only honor bound because 
of friendship but also duty bound to protect Gilgamesh as Oliver must comply with 
Roland’s commands because Oliver is the vassal of Charlemagne. Patroclus serves 
Achilles even in a menial capacity when Achilles asks for more wine: “Come, a bigger 
winebowl, son of Menoetius, set it here…”he paused. Patroclus obeyed his great friend 
(Homer The Iliad 1999, 136). 
According to McSwite, there is a possibility, then, that a relationship is violated 
when one friend has authority over another: 
Role designs can prescribe the use of authority in ways that violate relationships. 
Some role designs do not allow for genuine relationship at all; others require the 
breaking of mutual relationship in only specific circumstances. In any case, the 
person exercising authority, even with the best conscious intentions, is likely to 
violate the sacred space of the other. (McSwite 2002, 34) 
 
It is true that both Oliver and Enkidu will experience some bitter moments before their 
deaths mostly because their counsel has gone unheeded although they do remain faithful 
to their friends. Could one contend that both Gilgamesh and Roland took advantage of 
the unconditional devotion of their friends? Is unconditional commitment to one’s friend 
necessary in order to achieve an ultimate form of friendship? 
 
Beowulf, Grendel and Solitude 
 
This final poem is presented out of its chronological position in relation to the 
others, for it probably predates The Song of Roland and “Thorstein the Staff-Struck.”  
Beowulf is a song that distinguishes between solitudes, meaning that both the right kind 
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and the wrong kind are exemplified. To reiterate, one’s being alone, especially in the 
wrong way or in the sense that it is called loneliness, is being posited as an antithesis of 
friendship. 
 Between the characters of Beowulf and Grendel, one is able to distinguish two 
types of solitude. While independent Beowulf strives to behave virtuously and for 
acceptance, the spiteful Grendel is the loathsome, isolated destroyer. Grendel is identified 
as one of Cain’s descendents: 
 He had dwelt for a time 
in misery among the banished monsters, 
Cain’s clan, whom the Creator had outlawed 
and condemned as outcasts. (Beowulf  2006, 1182) 
 
To someone of an early Germanic culture like the Danes or the Geats, one’s roots and 
family ties are most important. The killing of one’s brother, or any kinsman, leads almost 
assuredly to hell’s gates. Beowulf, when engaged in a verbal combat with another 
warrior, attacks his opponent with the following: 
 You killed your own kith and kin, 
so for all your cleverness and quick tongue, 
you will suffer damnation in the depths of hell. (Beowulf  2006, 1192) 
 
The killing of one’s kinsman suggests no allegiances. Grendel claims no allegiance to 
God or to humanity. Grendel is referred to as “a fiend out of hell” (Beowulf 2006, 1182). 
Grendel is, “Malignant by nature, he never showed remorse” (Beowulf 2006, 1183). 
When one is against God and against humanity, such as Grendel, “he ruled in defiance of 
right” (Ibid.). The poem reports that Grendel will not make any sort of bargain: 
 Nothing but war; how he would never 
 parley or make peace with any Dane 
 nor stop his death-dealing nor pay the death price. (Beowulf 2006, 1183) 
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It is said that, “Grendel waged his lonely war…he was the Lord’s outcast” (Ibid.). 
Grendel has no real home, and again, for the Germanic peoples of Beowulf’s day, “the 
worst condition into which a man can fall is to be an outlaw or wanderer, someone who 
has no home” (Lawall et al. 2006, 1174).  
In the age of speech, to be alone is both not human and unnatural. Cicero (1967) 
writes, “Nature abhors isolation, and even leans upon something as stay and support; and 
this is found in its most pleasing form in our closest friend” (38). Aelred (2010) refers to 
Genesis 2:18 when God says, “It is not good that man should be alone” (2010, 66.57). 
The story of Frankenstein’s creature is very similar. The creature remarks, “Yet 
even that enemy of God and man had friends and associates in his desolation; I am quite 
alone” (Shelley 1976, 271). He is loathed by humanity and God is not his creator. 
Grendel has, at least, his mother, but even this relationship has an unhealthy odor because 
she, too, is a loathsome creature for whom the laws of God and of humanity have no 
bearing. Thomas Merton (1955) might say that Grendel lives in a false solitude, or at 
least that he displays the same symptoms. Grendel “has been denied the right to become a 
person;” therefore, Grendel, like the creature in Frankenstein, “takes revenge on society 
by turning his individuality into a destructive weapon” (247-248).  
 Beowulf’s inclusion as a piece in the classical friendship puzzle requires further 
explanation, for the hero Beowulf, though accepted and a king of his people, remains a 
solitary figure. In his final battle against a powerful dragon, only one man steps forward 
to assist the elderly Beowulf, and not because he and Beowulf are great friends, but more 
in the way of Beowulf stepping up to help the aging Danish king. Nevertheless, the poem 
begins with an allusion to friendship. It is an old bond, a former friendship, which brings 
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Beowulf to the Danes and to the Danish king, Hrothgar, who is seemingly helpless 
against Grendel’s nightly attacks. Grendel prowls the kingdom and attacks the men in 
their banquet hall while they sleep. Grendel literally kills and eats the men. Beowulf 
arrives on Danish soil to repay Hrothgar for helping his father when the father was in 
trouble. Beowulf is introduced to the king: “This man is their son, here to follow up an 
old friendship” (Beowulf 2006, 1187). 
 Hrothgar and Beowulf, one could claim, become friends. In fact, Hrothgar, upon 
close examination, is a most honorable character, and in that regard Beowulf’s equal. His 
weakness is his age. Hrothgar should be likened to a responsible godfather or a wise and 
loving uncle. It is his acceptance and acknowledgement of Beowulf’s great deeds that 
establish Beowulf’s position among both the Danes and Beowulf’s own people, the 
Geats. The poem does not have as a principal theme friendship; however, Beowulf 
possesses the prerequisite friendship qualities in abundance. Perhaps it is that Beowulf, 
like Charlemagne in The Song of Roland, simply has no equal. There is no second self, 
one whom Beowulf can love as himself or above himself, as, for instance, Jonathan loves 
David: “And Jonathan entered into a bond with David, because he loved David as 
himself” (Samuel 18, 3 [NAB]). It does not appear, furthermore, that Beowulf has a wife; 
or if he does she is not a significant presence in his life, for Beowulf, as far as the listener 
knows, has no direct heirs. The one physical match that Beowulf does have, Breca, is 
more of a rival than a friend, although this person does seem to have helped shape 
Beowulf’s character. Their intense competition has perhaps prepared Beowulf for his 
heroic achievements: 
 The truth is this: 
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when the going was heavy in those high waves, 
I was the strongest swimmer of all. 
We’d been children together and we grew up 
daring ourselves to outdo the other, 
boasting and urging each other to risk 
our lives in the sea…. (Beowulf 2006, 1191) 
 
In keeping with the other hero friendships, the friends push each other to their destinies or 
to some great achievement; or they assist each other in their adventures. Gilgamesh and 
Enkidu slay Humbaba, the forest guardian, and the bull of heaven together. Enkidu’s 
death drives Gilgamesh to seek immortality. Job’s friends, though not regarded as heroic 
friends or the best of friends, test his resolve. Jonathan makes it possible for David to 
survive and to become the King of the Israelites. Patroclus’s death propels Achilles to kill 
Hector and thus fulfill his destiny. Oliver, though he represents reason and is allowed to 
criticize Roland, stands by Roland as together they confront the Saracen hordes. Oliver’s 
death finally prompts Roland to blow his horn and alert Charlemagne. Bjarni’s challenge 
of Thorstein establishes Thorstein as a courageous man and as a great fighter. The two 
are united in a relationship of mutual respect. In many ways, Beowulf surpasses them all 
in his noble comportment, exhibiting the qualities necessary to become the best kind of 
friend. Beowulf, in fact, is renowned for these virtues: 
 Thus Beowulf bore himself with valor; 
 he was formidable in battle yet behaved with honor 
 and took no advantage; never cut down  
 a comrade who was drunk, kept his temper 
 and, warrior that he was, watched and controlled 
 his God-sent strength and his outstanding  
 natural powers. (Beowulf 2006, 1226) 
 
Beowulf even goes so far as to give Grendel a fair fight. Knowing that Grendel disdains 
the use of weapons, Beowulf will defeat Grendel in hand-to-hand combat. Beowulf has 
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the faith to match his raw strength, used for good, against Grendel’s raw strength, used 
for evil.  
 Although Beowulf must boast, for it is expected of warriors in the violent, 
Germanic world from which the poem emerges, he does so with less hubris than either 
Gilgamesh or Achilles. He seems to have heeded Hrothgar’s advice:  
“O flower of warriors, beware of that trap. 
Choose, dear Beowulf, the better part, 
eternal rewards. Do not give way to pride.” (Beowulf 2006, 1218) 
 
Beowulf’s courage and resolve more closely resemble Roland’s determination. Beowulf, 
though aware of his own reputation, has come to the Danes pledging to perform a service. 
In this sense, he is loyal to Hrothgar and his people. Roland, too, is fulfilling a mission 
for his lord, Charlemagne. Both heroes are unflinching in their missions. Roland, in fact, 
dies, and Beowulf is willing to accept death if it should come. Beowulf and Roland both, 
furthermore, recognize God’s power and seem to have a sense of fulfilling His will but 
through the intermediaries of their kings. Beowulf is particularly careful to credit God 
with enabling his accomplishments. After his battle with Grendel’s avenging mother, in 
which he is finally victorious, Beowulf tells Hrothgar and the other warriors what 
happened in the monster’s underwater lair.  
 I barely survived the battle under water. 
It was hard-fought, a desperate affair 
that could have gone badly; if God had not helped me, 
the outcome would have been quick and fatal. 
Although Hrunting [a sword] is hard-edged, 
I could never bring it to bear in battle. 
But the Lord of Men allowed me to behold—  
for he often helps the unbefriended— 
an ancient sword shining on the wall, 
a weapon made for giants, there for the wielding. (Beowulf 2006, 1216) 
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 Perhaps having a great friend is like possessing a great sword. Beowulf’s words 
prompt one to recall Aelred’s speculations about friendship with God. Aelred proposes 
that the need for friendship is something natural and that it is a God given desire within 
every human being (Aelred 2010, 65-66). According to Aelred (2010), if one rejects 
friendship, it is damaging because one at the same time is distancing him or herself from 
God. That person becomes a beast like Grendel (46). Aelred drives this point 
heavenward:  
Thus rising from the holy love with which a friend embraces a friend to that 
which a friend embraces Christ, one may take the spiritual fruit of friendship fully 
and joyfully into the mouth, while looking forward to all abundance in the life to 
come. (Aelred 2010, 126.134) 
 
Perhaps Beowulf represents the next generation of friend, the one closer to God; for his 
father initially forged the friendship bond with Hrothgar whom Beowulf comes to defend. 
Or, it could be submitted, according to Beowulf’s words, that God will befriend the one 
who is in need and who is striving for the good.  
 What should one, however, make of Beowulf’s lack of a companion in the same 
way as Gilgamesh, David, Achilles, Roland, and even Thorstein? One can refer again to 
the need for proper self-love, a love that does not become grotesque. Self-love is not 
vanity or hubris. It cannot, furthermore, be a self-loathing as both Grendel and 
Frankenstein’s creature seem to experience. As proposed in the beginning of this chapter, 
Beowulf sprints past his fellow heroes in achieving a proper balance between pride and 
vanity. He also shows self-control and humility. Of all the friends and heroes thus 
presented, one might conclude that Beowulf would make the best of friends though it 
would be difficult for a friend to approach Beowulf’s level of honor and integrity. It is 
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logical that such a man would become a venerated king, for he is above others but at the 
same time serves his people nobly. Yet, he remains without that special friend. Merton is 
summoned again to describe the proper self-love and the need for individuality. Without 
either, one is incapable of the best kind of friendship. The person cannot be approached, 
nor can he or she approach others: 
If I cannot distinguish myself from the mass of other men, I will never be able to 
love and respect other men as I ought. If I do not separate myself from them 
enough to know what is mine and what is theirs, I will never discover what I have 
to give them, and never allow them the opportunity to give me what they ought. 
(Merton 1955, 247) 
 
Beowulf seems to have made the right kind of separation, and his ultimate greatness is 
acknowledged in the poem, beginning with Hrothgar’s praise and recognition through to 
Beowulf’s final battle and his funeral. Beowulf sets a high precedent. The poet may be 
suggesting that Beowulf stands somewhere between God and man without the possibility 
of an earthly equivalent. Only one warrior, Wiglaf, who has been justly treated by 
Beowulf and who remembers Beowulf’s deeds, stands by Beowulf in the last battle; thus, 
there is hope that the qualities that make for friendship in Beowulf’s violent age will 
endure. Everyone else has fled, and Beowulf is surrounded by the dragon’s flames. 
Wiglaf makes his way to him: 
 “Go on, dear Beowulf, do everything 
 you said you would when you were still young 
 and vowed you would never let your name and fame 
 be dimmed while you lived. Your deeds are famous, 
 so stay resolute, my lord, defend your life now 




 They had killed the enemy, courage quelled his life; 
 that pair of kinsmen, partners in nobility,  
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 had destroyed the foe. So every man should act, 
 be at hand when needed; but now, for the king, 
 this would be the last of his many labors 
 and triumphs in the world. (Beowulf 2006, 1237-1238) 
 
 The poem Beowulf, like the other stories, is evolved from a world of speech 
communication. Speech is even revered in Beowulf’s warrior culture. Reference in the 
poem is made to his “word hoard” (Beowulf 2006, 1185) as if it is a weapon’s locker, and 
eventually Beowulf will be compelled to grapple verbally with the warrior Unferth who, 
envious, attempts to discredit Beowulf (Beowulf 2006, 1190-1191). Beowulf proves to be 
a good storyteller, and his actions later will confirm his words. The poem Beowulf is 
composed in a specific Anglo-Saxon pattern called alliterative verse, which is a carryover 
from the oral tradition. Many would have heard and learned the story before the single 
surviving manuscript was written around 1000 AD (Lawall et al. 2006, 1177). Thus, the 
same communication attributes that exist in the other classical friendship stories are 
present in Beowulf. One can reason, then, that such a story would become rooted in the 
minds of the population that heard the story over several centuries. Beowulf and the 
stories discussed in this chapter are internalized by their listeners and one could argue 
eternalized by those listeners. Certainly, these epic tales have been immortalized. 
 
Summation and Connection 
 
 At first glance, what is most similar about these friendship tales, all created 
somewhere between 2500 B.C.E. and the thirteenth century? For one thing, the friends 
and heroes live in violent worlds where one survives by the sword. Even in Job, who is 
the one exception to the warrior, his sons and daughters are murdered. The first 
friendship story begins with combat between the friends, Gilgamesh and Enkidu. They 
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set out on a dangerous mission together to kill an entity that appears to have done no real 
harm. Allegorically, one could claim that the slaying of Humbaba is a taming of nature, 
with nature being something to overcome in those times, if only to give the killing a 
moral foothold. David and Jonathan are heavily engaged in combat with other peoples. 
God, in fact, enables both to kill others. Both David and Jonathan are capable warriors 
and achieve success in warfare. Achilles is the fiercest man alive, the most feared fighter 
of all the Greeks and the Trojans, and his friend, Patroclus, is stopped only by Apollo’s 
blow delivered from behind. As in Gilgamesh, the gods have a hand in killing one of the 
hero friends. Roland and Oliver, too, are committed to battle and are incredible fighters, 
carving through legions of enemy troops. Thorstein kills a man who has humiliated him; 
and then he fights his equal, Bjarni, wielding swords and shields. Beowulf rips off the 
flesh-eating Grendel’s arm and shoulder. Essentially, the most skilled and courageous 
fighting men establish the greatest friendships and are the most respected within their 
societies. They are leaders, kings, and role models.  
 Along with their prowess in combat, most of these men also rate divine qualities 
or divine interventions of sorts. Gilgamesh and Achilles are demigods. Enkidu is formed 
specifically by a god to be a companion. David and Jonathan are directed by God, God 
speaks to Job, Roland is carried away by angels, Bjarni becomes a Christian, and it is 
suggested that Beowulf is performing the will of God as Beowulf pits himself against 
superhuman evil: “But now a man, with the Lord’s assistance, has accomplished 
something none of us could manage before now for all our efforts” (Beowulf 2006, 1199).  
 All of these friends and heroes are men of action. They must usually perform 
some extraordinary feat or withstand incredible hardship, undertakings that would be 
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beyond anything but a contemporary superhero’s challenges. Although they often act for 
their own edification, their trials are regarded as noble and virtuous. The Christian friends 
and heroes tend to be a bit more selfless in their loyalty and in their rendering of service 
to their leaders and to their people. They also humble themselves before God and behave 
courteously toward those people who are deserving of their admiration. All these men 
earn their human rewards and sometimes receive earthly compensation from the heavens. 
Job is certainly compensated with rewards that far exceed his losses: “Also, the Lord 
restored the prosperity of Job, after he had prayed for his friends; the Lord even gave to 
Job twice as much as he had before” ([NAB] Job 42, 10). God recognizes Roland by 
sending angels to recover his body. Roland’s salvation is secure.  
 The friends and heroes, finally, are all men, and the women that do appear in 
these friendship sagas have little or no real impact unless they are goddesses. The human 
female, however, has very limited power and hardly appears in any of the stories. If 
anything, she is an instigator of conflict, like Helen of Troy. Women are almost fully 
dependent upon the men in the stories. The women are important possessions but never 
equals. Simply put, women are oppressed. Simone de Beauvoir (1949), with reference to 
Engel’s The Origin of the Family, supplies plausible reasons for this fact. First, there is 
the need for weapons and their manipulation.  If the weapon is more than a woman can 
handle, she becomes immediately inferior: “Il suffit que l’instrument réclame une force 
légèrement supérieure à celle dont la femme dispose pour qu’elle apparaisse comme 
radicalement impuissante” (Beauvoir 1949, 96). Only Job does not handle a sword in any 
of the stories so far reviewed. Beauvoir also connects women to their economic roles as 
agriculture and husbandry become increasingly important in early societies. Before 
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mechanization, fields are cleared and trees are felled by hand. She claims that in societies 
where there is a need for physical strength, such as in sustained warfare or heavy 
farming, the woman’s role will always be subservient, and that, in these times, societies 
became patriarchal as private property was transferred from father to son (Beauvoir 1949, 
96-97). Only the invention of technological equalizers and economic restructuring can 
redefine the roles of women in society: “Le problème de la femme se réduit à celui de sa 
capacité de travail. Puissante au temps où les techniques étaient adaptées à ses 
possibilités, détrônée quand elle est devenue incapable de les exploiter” (Beauvoir 1949, 
98).  
 The problem in the times of these friendships is one of inequality without the 
possibility of achieving it according to the terms that two men might achieve friendship. 
One returns to the idea of subservience. Especially in the ancient world where war and 
combat are frequent occurrences, the more powerful and respected man is the one who 
dominates the others and basically possesses more property and wealth. His deeds, in 
fact, net him great gifts and high esteem. He is a good friend to have in the most 
utilitarian sense. Beauvoir claims that if people regarded each other exclusively in 
friendship, and she would seem to be referring to a better kind of friendship, there would 
be no enslavement or subordination: 
Si le rapport originel de l’homme avec ses semblables était exclusivement un 
rapport d’amitié, on ne saurait rendre compte d’aucun type d’asservissement: ce 
phénomène est une conséquence de l’impérialisme de la conscience humaine qui 
cherche à accomplir objectivement sa souveraineté. (Beauvoir 1949, 101) 
 
That which makes women different from slaves and vassals, according to Beauvoir 
(1949), is their complicity with men. They are not seeking to revolt in the same way that 
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a slave or an unhappy laborer might be, for her life is indissolubly linked to the male in 
terms of the human race itself and the perpetuation of humanity (Beauvoir 1949, 101). 
The female condition is not considered in the earliest friendship stories, all of which 
occur in male-centered societies. 
 The entire point of rehashing these great stories of friendship has been to prove 
that speech communication, principally as poetry and song, has been an essential factor in 
preserving models for the best kinds of friendship. It is arguably true that most of the 
friendship stories existed through many generations before they were committed to 
writing. One might postulate from White’s (2014) explanation of poetic form or, “Mode 
of Emplotment,” in historical writing that the early bard-historians also relied on 
particular modes of emplotment to express important qualities and values. For White 
(2014), the mode of emplotement (linguistic means) reflects the historian’s, or the 
storyteller’s, preloaded form of argument and ideology: 
Once the world of phenomena is separated into two orders of being (agents and 
causes on the one hand, acts and effects on the other), the primitive consciousness 
is endowed, by purely linguistic means alone, with the conceptual categories 
(agents, causes, spirits, essences) necessary for the theology, science, and 
philosophy of civilized reflection. (White 2014, 34) 
 
The highly metaphorical modes used by the ancient bards, who are also the historians, 
express the essential characters and characteristics of the hero friends. The oral tradition, 
as a metaphor, arrives as synecdoche, which is an integration of qualities and essences 
that have emerged to the storyteller-historians or always existed and that are prefigured 
into the friendship tales by them:  
Rather, it is to be construed as a symbol of quality that is characteristic of the 
whole individual, considered as a combination of physical and spiritual elements, 
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all of which participate in this quality in the modality of a microcosmic-
macrocosmic relationship. (White 2014, 35) 
 
Consequently, through repetition, the qualities that make for virtue and friendship might 
become deeply fixed in the listener’s mind and ready for transfer. The classical heroes 
and friends are all endowed with similar characteristics that enable them to be 
outstanding friends in keeping with the criteria as outlined by Poe (2011) in his “push 
theory of media effects” and Merton (1955) in his identification of the requisite virtues. 
Rather than carve a friendship ideal in stone, in the age of speech, it is carved within the 
mind and some might say the soul of humanity. Minds are pliable, however; even today’s 
neuroscientist will agree that the human brain possesses a certain degree of plasticity and 
that it evolves, and it shall be shown that changes in media could bring about 
modifications in the way that people perceive friendship. For instance, the friendship 
model that is born from the oral tradition is flawed in two discernable ways that would 
not have been regarded as weaknesses when the friendship stories were created. One 
problem is that of woman and friendship. Women are seemingly excluded from the 
noblest kind of friendship. Furthermore, friendship is restricted to gender. Men are 
friends with men, and little is shown of friendships between women. A second problem is 
that of subordination. Although both friends are virtuous, one of the two friends generally 
takes precedence over the other. 
 Certainly, the hero friends display the qualities that comprise the classical 
friendship model. All the friends have free will and make choices. No one forces the 
friends to become each other’s companion. Yet, each friend is quite unique as an 
individual. The friends are not twins. Each friend, furthermore, makes allowances for the 
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individuality of his friend. No friend makes any attempt to change the character of the 
other.  Each friend struggles internally with some problem, and though the friends can 
lend assistance and help with understanding, no friend can rid the other of the burden that 
each one bears. Each friend has his flaws and is virtuous in his own right. Only Job and 
Beowulf do not have pairs; in fact, Beowulf has a direct opposite in Grendel, and in Job 
one is provided with examples of friendship that are less than exemplary and not to be 
emulated. God is angry with Job’s friends. Beowulf is worthy of friendship, Grendel is 
the embodiment of the wrong kind of solitude; and in his last battle, the most virtuous 
among Beowulf’s followers steps forward selflessly to stand by his king, come what may. 
 These legendary friendships are surely greatly mythologized if not pure myth. The 
heroes and friends seem almost superhuman. Some are. Their behavior is to be admired 
and emulated in order to achieve the greatest kind of friendship. Like the best examples 
and role models in any society, the friendships depicted in the earliest friendship stories 
seem all but unattainable. A final, common characteristic of these friendship narratives is 
the grand connection between speech and action in the age of speech: “For action and 
speech…are indeed the two activities whose end result will always be a story with 
enough coherence to be told, no matter how accidental or haphazard the single events and 
their causation may appear to be” (Arendt 1998, 97).  Certainly, the stories here reviewed 
have endured the test of time, and these friendship stories are almost exclusively about 
men taking action. These poems survived long enough, centuries in some cases, before 
being committed to paper. This classical-Christian paradigm, furthermore, has continued 
to operate.  
 




Bridging Oral Tradition and Print: The Manuscript 
 
 
Your religion was written on tables of stone by the iron finger of an angry God, lest you 
might forget it. The red man could never remember or comprehend it.  
Our religion is the traditions of our ancestors, the dreams of our old men, given them by 





Chief Seattle, in his 1854 speech, says, “and is written in the hearts of our people” 
(“Chief Seattle Speech” 2014, 708). He is a spokesperson for societies that relied upon 
verbal communication. The people Chief Seattle represents governed themselves 
according to oral traditions. Their principles, then, had to reside somewhere, not on clay 
or parchment, but “in the hearts of our people” (Ibid.). Can such values and beliefs, in 
other words, be as deeply rooted and understood when such guidelines for living do not 
have to be committed to the heart, or, as the expression goes, by heart? Plato believes that 
what constitutes wisdom, for instance, is lost as humanity steers towards the exhaustive 
documentation of all things:  
It [writing] will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it, 
through lack of practice at using their memory, as through reliance on writing 
they are reminded from outside by alien marks, not from inside, themselves by 
themselves: you have discovered an elixir not of memory but of reminding. To 
your students you give an appearance of wisdom, not the reality of it; having 
heard much, in the absence of teaching, they will appear to know much when for 
the most part they know nothing, and they will be difficult to get along with, 
because they have acquired the appearance of wisdom instead of wisdom itself. 
(Plato quoted in Burke and Ornstein, 1997, 87) 
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“Your religion was written on tables of stone by the iron finger of an angry God, lest you 
might forget it. The red man could never remember it” (“Chief Seattle Speech” 2014, 
708).  
 Others support the idea that with writing occur changes in the way that people 
think and view the world: “The alphabet converted traditional knowledge into an external 
object easily available for inspection, no longer dependent on memory. The result of this 
was that new ways of talking and thinking about the world became possible” (Burke and 
Ornstein 1997, 68). Stanislas Dehaene (2009), a renowned neuroscientist who has studied 
the way the human brain recycles itself as a human being learns to read, adds to the 
discussion of memory, suggesting that more is gained than lost and that what might be 
lost is ambiguous with the acquisition of literacy. As one learns how to read, there is “a 
selective pruning process” (Dehaene 2009, 206). Written language does not necessarily 
stimulate the same regions of the brain as spoken language does. Dehaene (2009, 208) 
presents considerable physical and scientific evidence to support his submission that, 
“Literacy drastically changes the brain—literally!” “The literate brain engages many 
more left-hemisphere resources than the illiterate brain even when we only listen to 
speech” (Dehaene 2009, 208-209). Dehaene (2009) posits further that there is an increase 
in verbal memory space in the literate (208). Memory, then, according to neuroscientists 
like Dehaene, runs contrary to Plato’s idea that, “Writing will produce forgetfulness in 
the souls of those who have learned it” (Plato quoted in Burke and Ornstein 1997, 68). 
Brain imaging technologies in well documented studies would seem to confirm the 
scientific hypothesis: “Illiterates can remember the gist of stories and poems, but their 
verbal working memory—the temporary buffer that stores instructions, recipes, names or 
  112 
phone numbers over short periods of time—is vastly inferior to ours [those who are 
literate]” (Dehaene 2009, 210). Perhaps one, however, should not be so dismissive of the 
idea of gist in memory, for to understand the gist of something suggests a reduction or an 
integration of information to its essentials: “Typically, the mind reduces complex 
quantitative information to simple categories like one, two, and many. Keeping accounts 
in terms of one, two, and many is an invitation to disaster” (Poe 2011, 67). The 
metaphorical approach, or synecdoche, can be perceived as positive, for it suggests an 
integration of parts into a comprehensible whole: “The expression suggests a relationship 
among the parts of the individual, considered as a combination of physical and spiritual 
attributes, which is qualitative in nature and in which all of the parts participate” (White 
2014, 35). For the intangible things, or, perhaps, to be more human, gist is important, 
especially in reference to myth and its importance in human activity: “For myth is the 
instant vision of a complex process that ordinarily extends over a long period” (McLuhan 
1964, 8).  
 Dehaene (2009) and Poe (2011), in reference to memory, are apparently 
discussing the quantity of things that come to be remembered. Perhaps the grasping of the 
essential “gist,” or intrinsic quality, is precisely the ability that Plato fears humanity 
might lose as a consequence of writing. It’s “the hearts of our people” (“Chief Seattle 
Speech” 2014, 708), and “It [writing] will produce forgetfulness in the souls of the people 
who have learned it…. [It will give] the appearance of wisdom rather than the wisdom 
itself” (Plato quoted in Burke and Ornstein 1997, 68). Dehaene (2009), furthermore, 
specifically points to short term and not long term memory (210). The religious reference 
that Seattle makes has possibly to do with some form of long term memory, one that can 
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be passed down through the ages, or as something latent that can be recalled with the 
proper education. Seattle (“Chief Seattle Speech” 2014) is talking about rules of human 
conduct and intrinsic values. Seattle (Ibid.) and Plato (quoted in Burke and Ornstein 
1997, 68) could be speaking of both wisdom and ethics as they guide human 
understanding and interaction. These men may not be arguing against documentation and 
quantification since that type of record keeping has to do with the pragmatic, extrinsic 
rigors of daily living such as might occur in commerce and government, especially as 
civilizations grow into complex infrastructures that are consequences of increased 
production and population. 
 Ironically, it is a matter of record that, though the classical-Christian friendship 
models apparently flourished and were born from an age before literacy, without writing 
one can only speculate as to whether these models and stories might still be known. What 
was once in the hearts and souls of the people was, both metaphorically and literally, 
“written on tables of stone” (“Chief Seattle Speech” 2014, 708). 
 Seattle (“Chief Seattle Speech” 2014) makes a valid connection to religion. As 
already proposed as part of the classical friendship model, the best kind of friendship is 
usually associated with the gods.  In Plato (1993), Aristophanes calls the god, Love, “the 
best friend of men” (157-158). Love is thought of as a god. Aelred suggests that God 
created friendship. Eve was created for the sake of companionship (Dutton 2010, 29). 
Friendship, for Aelred, is as close as one can be to comprehending the eternal bliss of 
knowing Jesus Christ: 
Thus rising from the holy love with which a friend embraces a friend to that 
which a friend embraces Christ, one may take the spiritual fruit of friendship fully 
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and joyfully into the mouth, while looking forward to all abundance in the life to 
come. (Aelred 2010, 126.134) 
 
Enkidu is specifically created by the Sumerian gods to be a match for Gilgamesh 
(Gilgamesh 1999, 19).  For Augustine (2002), true friendship is not possible without 
God’s intervention (4.4.7).  There is almost always a metaphysical quality associated in 
the earliest definitions of friendship. Once Bjarni meets his match in Thorstein, his final 
mission is to seek God as he becomes “a devote Christian and went to Rome on a 
pilgrimage” (“Thorstein the Staff Struck” 2006, 1380). The concept of friendship is not, 
for the ancients, something that needed to be spelled out or carved in stone “lest you 
might forget it” (“Chief Seattle Speech” 2014, 708). To Seattle, one can infer that the 
understanding of friendship is an intrinsic value generated within the heart. The 
understanding is subliminal. The true friend is able to grasp the gist of it. The concept of 
friendship is not something voluminous and limited to short term memory. 
 Writing, however, is also believed to have divine properties among the early 
civilizations that practiced it.  Hermes is “the deity of writing, who taught writing to 
men” (Poe 2011, 81). The Greeks are not the only ones to connect the gods with 
invention: “The Sumerians believed that writing was brought from heaven by the deity 
Enki…the Egyptians considered the goddess Seshat the inventor of writing” (Ibid.). 
These beliefs are nurtured by religious authorities and rulers in order to retain their power 
and status: “This notion of divinely sponsored rule—or even the divine rule itself—is 
enshrined in nearly every major political and religious doctrine that comes down to us 
from the 4,000-year period in which Manuscript Cultures dominated the earth” (Poe 
2011, 76). The rules for divinely appointed leadership are the words of the gods, in 
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writing, and only an elite handful of people are able to read the text. Therefore, it is 
logical that the readers themselves would possess divine properties and that the illiterate 
would submit to those people who were able to deliver and interpret the message: 
Moses, Jesus, and Mohamed received the Word of the Lord (or, in the case of 
Jesus, was the Lord).  You weren’t. Their rightful successors—rabbis, priests, and 
imams—know what the Word means. You don’t. So all in all it’s best to leave the 
Word where it is, firmly in the private hands of princes and priests. (Poe 2011, 79) 
 
Interestingly, when one considers some of Jesus’ statements about friendship, one should 
also remember that Jesus himself, as far as scholars can gather, never wrote anything 
down. One could surmise that literacy is not requisite for knowing and believing in God. 
Humanity is indebted to Christ’s disciples for their memories and their delving into the 
memories of others in order to be able to record Christ’s teachings with, one might 
speculate, the inspiration of the Holy Spirit guiding them in their recollections: “Greater 
love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John 15:13).  
 Friendship, the classical version, seems, during the time before literacy to expand 
beyond the elite, to be something possible only among the elite. The elite friends in the 
great epics of the past are almost always princes, warriors and demigods. Gilgamesh is a 
half-god king. His friend Enkidu is created in heaven and sent to earth. Achilles is a 
demigod and prince. Roland and Oliver are among the ruling elite, the Franks; and they 
are the most renowned and holy of Charlemagne’s twelve pairs. Jonathan is a prince, and 
David becomes king of the Israelites. Ultimately, both friendship and writing are 
regarded as divine or divinely inspired. Neither of them appears to be purely the 
invention of human ingenuity or experience.  
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 If friendship is transcendent and the concept is a divine quality that resides in the 
hearts and souls of human beings, is it something that already exists but that simply needs 
to be encouraged? Is it natural? Such qualities as friendship, if they are transcendent and 
natural, appear to be selective until mass literacy gives fuller access to the wisdom that 
unlocks them, a special knowledge or wisdom that had once been the sacred turf of holy 
men and monarchs. To what extent, then, is such a concept as friendship divinely inspired 
or even natural? Whether one believes that nature is God’s creation or not, he or she 
might find it hard to dispute that the desire for companionship, at least, is natural. 
Creatures seek out their likenesses for the sake of survival and perpetuation. Among most 
species, the act of communication seems to come naturally, just as the desire for others of 
its kind is probably innate.   
Certainly, the ability to speak and listen is learned without formal education. 
Dehaene (2009) is convinced that babies have already begun processing the sounds of 
language while in the womb: “In the first few months of life, infants demonstrate 
surprising language competencies…Furthermore, they pay special attention to the rhythm 
of their native language, heard in utero during the last months of pregnancy” (197).  By 
the time young children begin learning to read, they have extensive knowledge of their 
native language and are fully capable of back and forth communication, and this 
linguistic ability simply happens: 
At the age of five or six, when children are exposed to their first reading lessons, 
they already have expert knowledge of phonology. They also possess a 
vocabulary of several thousand words, and have mastered the basic grammatical 
structures of their languages. These “rules and representations” are implicit. The 
child is not aware of his expertise and cannot account for it. (Dehaene 2009, 198) 
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Writing and reading, however, do not come naturally. The human brain must be 
programmed to read. “Years of hard work are needed before the clockwork-like brain 
machinery that supports reading runs so smoothly that we forget it exists” (Dehaene 
2009, 2). Dehaene is obstinate in his assertion that reading forces a “recycling” of “the 
neuronal networks” and that “literacy changes the brain” (Ibid.). Still, reading is not 
entirely unnatural. The strokes and shapes most commonly used in most alphabets are 
commonly seen in nature: “The arrangements or configurations of individual strokes tend 
to be the same. Their frequency follows a universal distribution that closely parallels 
natural scenes” (Dehaene 2009, 178). Thus the symbols that are part of writing are not 
entirely, as Plato (quoted in Burke and Ornstein 1997, 87) calls them, “alien marks.” 
Based on this information, Dehaene (2009) insists that “all learning rests on rigid innate 
machinery” (142). One is born with specific hardware for learning, but at the same time 
the human brain “cannot be fully pre-wired” (Ibid.). If there were not some plasticity, the 
brain could not be re-wired for the various tasks that human beings encounter. What is 
critical for learning, according to Dehaene, is the human brain’s ability to connect to 
something that resembles the physical world: 
Our genome, which is the product of millions of years of evolutionary history, 
specifies a constrained, if partially modifiable, cerebral architecture that imposes 
severe limits on what we can learn. New cultural inventions can only be acquired 
insofar as they fit the constraints of our brain architecture. (Dehaene 2009, 146) 
 
One might suggest that the human brain either comes equipped for friendship or that it is 
malleable enough to acquire it culturally based upon that already existent architecture, 
and one should be interested in how reading might play into the way people regard 
friendship. 
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To reiterate, the quest of this exploration is for the knowledge of whether a 
different form of communication or media for human transmission can affect that which 
is written in the souls and hearts of men and women in terms of human qualities such as 
friendship. One should continue to pursue those qualities and whether that type of 
friendship has survived the transitions brought about by changing and varied 
communication media. The question remains of whether the re-arrangement of the human 
mind based on media infusion can shape the way people think about friendship. “The 
new gift would eventually make us think in a new way” (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 40). 
Writing is language externalized and visualized. It allows for “an unparalleled way of 
manipulating information external to the mind” (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 41). 
We are absurdly accustomed to the miracle of a few written signs being able to 
contain immortal imagery, involutions of thought, new worlds with live people, 
speaking, weeping, laughing…. What if we awake one day, all of us, and find 
ourselves utterly unable to read? (Nabokov, Pale Fire, quoted in Dehaene 2009, 
54)  
 
While it is postulated that language is obtained naturally, beginning prior to birth, 
“Nothing in our evolution could have prepared us to absorb language through vision” 
(Dehaene 2009, 4). Reading and writing are human constructs that human beings, with 
instruction, eventually take to; yet Dehaene (2009) will not accept one particular theory: 
“Neither the hypothesis of an intelligent creator nor that of slow emergence through 
natural selection seems to provide a plausible explanation for the origins of reading” (5). 
To get some idea of how reading could change one’s perception of friendship, one 
should note that writing and reading can physically distance friends from each other and 
that different parts of the brain are used for facial and voice recognition from those parts 
that function for reading. Dehaene refers to one of the earliest case studies of a man who 
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loses the ability to read. This man, however, is still fully able to function and 
communicate:  
This is the paradox of ‘verbal blindness’: the patient is only blind to letters and 
words. Visual acuity remains excellent, objects and faces are easily recognized, 
and the patient can still find his way around in a new environment or even 
appreciate painting. (Dehaene 2009, 55) 
 
The question remains of whether utilizing different parts of the brain can affect an 
individual’s paradigms. There is little doubt that the ability to read and write changes the 
structure of societies.  
 It is important to remember that the manuscript era repeated much of what had 
already been established within the earliest civilizations and that it both preserved and 
retained key cultural elements from a time before written communication became integral 
to those civilizations. What came from the discovery, or the gift, of writing was a more 
efficient way to communicate thoughts and information: “A written text is not a high-
fidelity recording. Its goal is not to reproduce speech as we pronounce it, but rather to 
code it at a level abstract enough to allow the reader to quickly retrieve its meaning” 
(Dehaene 2009, 33). Dehaene (2009) goes on: “Any servile transcription of sound would 
detract from this aim.” (34).  
However, this power rests, during the manuscript era especially, in the hands of a 
ruling class: “It would make possible higher levels of organization required to keep the 
community viable and to help it survive. But organized survival would also require new 
levels of obedience, new constraints on behavior, new layers of social authority” (Burke 
and Ornstein 1997, 40). 
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Poe’s “Push Theory of Media Effects” (2011) permits a comparison of the 
manuscript era with the age of speech in terms of the way the media might function in 
society and the way it might impact those people using them.  During the manuscript era, 
accessibility to the medium is low, thus the network of those using this form of 
communication is limited. The need or desire for power can be concentrated to a specific 
few. Hierarchies can develop, and there is a sense that one is part of an elite group. 
Privacy is high since few people have access. Such a network can become secretive and 
closed. These characteristics contrast with those of speech-based communities where 
everyone has access. Fidelity is low in both oral and manuscript cultures. Social practices 
and cultural values are abstract and idealized. Volume is low since so few people use the 
system. The tendency of these people is towards asceticism. There is economy of use 
because the materials necessary for writing are expensive, their availability is restricted, 
and they require training and knowledge to use. The cost of entering such a network is 
prohibitive. The velocity is low. Generally, written communication travels in one 
direction. It is a monologue so tends to be authoritarian in tone such as the Ten 
Commandments or the Code of Hammurabi. It is the voice of the gods and of their 
intermediaries, the rulers and priests. The range of this communication is high, for it can 
be transported, repeated exactly and preserved to the extent that the times permitted. 
Written communication can reach many, but in the manuscript era, it is selective. Writing 
is persistent for it is linear and historical. The manuscript allows for temporality. Time 
can be more neatly packaged than it can be when external documentation is not possible. 
Such a communication’s network is difficult to search, for it is unmapped and again, only 
the low percentage of people who are literate can forage within the network for 
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information (Poe 2011, 23, 98). The manuscript era is one of specialization and 
hierarchy. 
These factors are important to the concepts of friendship because writing helped 
to create conformity (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 52). Myths, legends and teachings 
became permanent and unchanging. The early philosophizing about friendship and the 
first documented friendship myths could be taught and perpetuated even by those people 
who did not, as Plato claims, truly possess wisdom. Little before the printing press can 
fundamentally change in how the best kind of friendship is perceived. The friendships 
born of oral traditions simply become fixed. Although they are debated and discussed, 
few new friendship models emerged directly from the manuscript era. As literacy grows, 
however, new possibilities sprout. Where literacy is more prevalent in Greek and Hebrew 
cultures, concepts can expand beyond the narrow confines of royal families and religious 
intermediaries; but as individuals, how does reading affect the possibilities for friendship, 
especially as it concerns cultural influences? And, how does “the use of literacy” in 
society affect friendship? Written laws and new forms of governance with evolving 
bureaucracies must alter the way individuals interact with each other: “In Mesopotamia, 
the extension of social control through the use of literacy radically altered the relationship 
between individuals” (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 53). 
The Random House College Dictionary (1980) provides ten definitions for the 
word culture. For the purpose of inquiring about friendship, the best, general definition is 
probably “the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings and 
transmitted from one generation to another.” Dehaene (2009) defines culture as “the 
shared mental representations that define a group of human beings” (148). Reading 
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changes culture; therefore, all those things that are associated with culture also have the 
potential for change.  Dehaene (2009) believes that, “the learning brain acts as a filter that 
selects and constrains the cultural representations that will be propagated” (148). He 
asserts that children, practically from birth, quickly learn to identify faces, voices, and 
their native languages. He also contends that within the first few months of being, 
children develop “a sense of empathy for others” even when children experience “sensory 
deprivation” (Ibid.). For Dehaene, one comes to understand that he believes all existence 
of things human belong to the brain, as a good neuroscientist should; yet he dismisses the 
monkey see, monkey do idea as well as the tabula rosa or blank slate theories of the 17th 
and 18th centuries: 
The neuronal recycling hypothesis leads us quite logically to postulate the 
existence of “cultural attractors,” universal foci of competence that are shared by 
all humans, explain the stability of the major features of human cultures and 
prevent the drifting that would inevitably take place if children were merely 
attempting to imitate their peers. (Dehaene 2009, 148) 
 
 Literacy, the acts of reading and writing, to Dehaene (2009), are humanity’s 
attempt to “transmit the cultural objects we find most useful, but—as is particularly 
apparent with writing—we intentionally attempt to perfect them.” (149). If friendship is 
an important cultural and human quality, based upon Dehaene’s hypothesis, it could be 
semi-intrinsically transferred from one generation to the next. As long as it remains 
desirable, or “useful” to the culture, it will not be filtered out. Even if something were not 
useful or desirable, because of its intrinsic-ness, or hard-wired character, it might take 
several generations of brain recycling before such a thing was no longer carried forward 
or accepted. One must ask the question, at this point, of whether one’s beliefs and values 
are to an extent pre-programmed and whether one is simply following a long established 
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pattern in the brain and that over time there is a recycling process—if Dehaene’s 
reasoning is correct. Reading helps reinforce such transmissions because reading enables 
greater precision, complexity, permanence and review than the instructions received 
through ritual and storytelling when the listener is highly dependent on the memory and 
interpretation of the presenter. With reading there is, perhaps, less need for gist in 
comprehension: 
We actively and intentionally transmit these cultural inventions to others, at a 
speed made possible by efficient instruction. Ultimately, the stable cultural 
representation that define the core of a human group are thus those that can be 
rapidly incorporated into the architecture of the human brain, because they find an 
echo in preexisting circuits capable of efficient neurological recycling. (Dehaene 
2009, 149) 
 
Classical-Christian friendship theory and its accompanying epics, mythologies 
and narratives that provide the models were immortalized during the manuscript era, and, 
if one can apply Dehaene’s reasoning to friendship, specific friendship components were 
wired into the human brain’s cultural machinery thousands of years ago. The power to 
read the classics and the classical discourse may have, arguably, fused some core 
principles for friendship within the human mind because they have been continually 
reinforced. Has there been much filtering and recycling of the friendship model since the 
beginning? There is little doubt that the principles espoused in the classical models of 
friendship run deep, whether they are of the heart, of the soul, of the mind, or of all three. 
How the model operates through print culture might be impacted by the way in which it 
historians and storytellers transfer it. White (2014) believes that, “a historiographical 
style represents a particular combination of modes of emplotment, argument, and 
ideological implications” (28). How the classical-Christian friendship model operates in 
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fiction, then, might depend on the prefigured mode of argument and the ideological 
implications that determine the mode of emplotment: 
This gives to the individual thinker’s conception of the field the aspect of self-
consistent totality. And this coherence and consistency give to his work its 
distinctive stylistic attributes. The problem here is to determine the grounds of 
this coherence and consistency. In my view, these grounds are poetic, and 
specifically linguistic, in nature. (White 2014, 29) 
 
The modes of emplotment, according to White (2014, 30), derive from their 
“tropological” characteristics. Metaphor, for instance, is “literally ‘transfer’.” The type of 
metaphor, or trope, then, can also act upon the model as it operates within a new 
historical domain. All the factors that White (2014) explains undergo change as Western 
civilization progresses through the age of print. 
It is important to leave this discussion with a strong reminder that reading does 
change the way human beings think, literally. Reading re-wires the brain, and it does not 
happen automatically. Reading and writing must be taught in order to be mastered, a 
process that takes many years of practice. It also eliminates the need for face-to-face 
communication or sound, two essential elements of those friendships that emerged from 
speech cultures. Reading, furthermore, is usually an activity carried out by the individual, 
privately: 
Withdrawn into the peace of this desert, 
along with some books, few but wise, 
I live in conversation with the deceased, 
and listen to the dead with my eyes  
(Francisco de Quevedo quoted in Dehaene 2009, 1) 
 
The question remains of whether literacy has the potential to create a withdrawal from the 
classical-Christian friendship model and to, generally, alienate people from each other. It 
is easy to guess that literacy assists cultural shifts and that literacy may both create new 
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friendship paradigms and modify the classical-Christian model; but an investigation must 
encompass a time when literacy was escalating after the invention of the printing press 
and before other communication media became widespread.   
When a new cultural invention finds its neuronal niche, it can multiply rapidly 
and invade an entire human group. A new period of cultural stability then ensues, 
until yet another invention arrives on the scene to disrupt the equilibrium. In a 























The Classical-Christian Friendship Operating in the Age of Print: 1500-1700 
 
 
The invention and subsequent widespread use of the printing press 
unquestioningly aided those people who understood and controlled the technology to 
construct the social, economic and political infrastructures of the larger Western nations 
that still exist. In the West, furthermore, the printing press changed the way that people 
understood Christianity: “The effect of Gutenberg’s letters would be to change the map 
of Europe, considerably reduce the power of the Catholic church, and alter the very 
nature of knowledge on which political and religious control was based” (Burke and 
Ornstein 1997, 123). The task remains to discover whether this new communication 
media directly or indirectly altered perceptions of friendship models and therefore 
depictions of friendship in works of fiction. All of the areas mentioned (religion, politics, 
and “the very nature of knowledge”) designate factors that might operate from the outside 
upon individuals, and many people believe that individuals can be conditioned by those 
circumstances. As cultural and social paradigms change, so might ideas about friendship. 
The printing press allowed a greater number of people to present friendship hypotheses 
and to create friendship narratives as populations became more literate and better 
educated. More folks could read and write, and there was more printed matter on hand. 
The accessibility of knowledge in print rose quickly: “In 1455, there were no printed 
texts in Europe, but by 1500 there were twenty million books in 35,000 editions, one 
book for every five members of the population” (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 123). 
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 The classical-Christian friendship model continues to operate in the print era, but 
it undergoes several modifications, and these changes are evident within the 
philosophical discourses on friendship and the fictional friendships that emerge. In the 
late Renaissance there is a wish to embrace the classical-Christian friendship ideal, but 
those who concern themselves with friendship and who are able to observe friends in 
their daily living have a greater wish to depict friendship as it applies to the general 
population.  White (2014) would call this form of narrative “contextualist.” The early 
print era friendship narratives are explained “by being set within the ‘context’ of their 
occurrence” (White 2014, 17). In these historical instances, or settings, the writer (a 
contextualist) “insists that ‘what happened’ in the field can be accounted for by the 
specification of the functional interrelationships existing among the agents and agencies 
occupying the field at a given time” (Ibid.). The social field and human interrelationships 
have changed. Friends among the growing population of literate entrepreneurs and 
merchants are not portrayed as demigods and warriors. They are not kings nor are they 
enlightened by the gods. Perhaps this occurrence is due to an expanding readership. More 
people are reading, particularly the growing bourgeoisie or merchant class: “The cheap, 
popular books flooding the presses quickly created a new reading public, not least among 
them merchants, who typically knew little or no Latin. Political and religious printed 
propaganda could be used to mobilize this growing, more literature middle class” (Burke 
and Ornstein 1997, 130). Books marketed to this new group of readers were perhaps 
more practical, or “contextualist,” and less romantic than the poetry of The Middle Ages. 
One can speculate that the new readers were interested in reading about people who were 
more like themselves though they might still, politically, support a monarchy and have 
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strong religious convictions. The nobility, the Catholic Church and Christian reformers 
remained powerful entities for a couple centuries after the launch of the printing press, 
for they retained some control over the technology. 
 And, there was more elbow rubbing because of the volume of written material and 
the growing literacy. For one thing, printing became an important industry, and many 
different kinds of people were needed in order to make that which was being printed 
marketable. The new printing houses exemplified this blending of knowledge and skill:  
Platin’s new printing press epitomized the new entities springing up all over 
Europe, bringing together an entirely new mix of intellectual and commercial 
disciplines. This in itself was revolutionary, since before printing these separate 
areas of specialist knowledge had no reason to interact. (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 
134) 
 
The days of knowledge belonging solely to the nobility, to the scribes, and to theologians 
were coming to an end. The new domain of knowledge would at first and for a long time 
belong to the wealthiest and best educated. Religion also remained an important variable 
in literacy because Catholics and Protestants wished to educate their followers into their 
belief systems: “Luther and Loyola had, in different ways, established the education 
system as a principal agent of the different belief systems” (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 
141). The bottom line, however, for educators, was to fulfill “the need, in a time of 
rapidly growing trade and commerce, to use education as a tool for inculcating ‘useful’ 
knowledge” (Ibid.). Friendship, then, that classical model of it, might be reevaluated it 
terms of its feasibility, or utility, and this reassessment appears within the earliest fiction 
literature emerging from the print era. 
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The Picaresque Novel 
The Spanish picaresque novels indicate a new and growing readership that is 
increasingly caught up in the social character, or zeitgeist, of the first decades of the 
printing press era. The globe has been circumnavigated and great fortunes are to be made 
through ruse, cunning, brute force, and recognized—often powerful—authority. 
Discoverers, merchants, kings and even the church are able to enrich themselves on the 
treasures in the new territories. There are pirates at sea and there are lesser pirates on 
land, for by today’s illusory marketplace morality these lesser or secondary capitalists are 
criminals because they have not the least regard for their fellow human beings. In the 
cynical picaresque novel, it is another kind of jungle, not entirely dissimilar in its 
degradation of humanity as Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle (1905) was over three hundred 
years later. Yet, the writers of fiction were not insensitive to or uneducated in the topic of 
friendship; and the picaresque novelist was one of the first to question some of the 
transcendent ideas about it. 
 The novel Guzmán de Alfarache puts the classical-Christian friendship under 
scrutiny, particularly as it concerns the “other self” concept, the belief that the greatest 
friend is another self. Gilbert-Santamaría (2011) here refers to the beginning of the 
friendship between Guzmán de Alfaranche and Sayavedra: “The entire episode is framed 
as a meditation on the nature of friendship in the picaresque, first through an extensive 
theoretical discussion of the topic, and then with the appearance of Sayavedra himself, 
through a kind of practical case study” (83). 
 Like so many of the great mythical or classical friendships, one of the friends will 
die while the other forges ahead in a continuing saga, either to achieve his greatness or to 
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make some edifying discovery. Sayavedra, too, dies in Alemán’s novel, and the story 
continues; but Guzmán and Sayavedra are not demigods or concerned for their people. 
These picaresque friends are not looking to posterity unless their reputations or 
accomplishments can profit them in some way. In comparison to the model friends, 
Guzmán and Sayavedra’s friendship is an irony:  
The trope of Irony, then, provides a linguistic paradigm of a mode of thought 
which is radically self-critical with respect not only to a given characterization of 
the world of experience but also to the very effort to capture adequately the truth 
of things in language. It is, in short, a model of the linguistic protocol in which 
skepticism in thought and relativism in ethics are conventionally expressed. 
(White 2014, 37) 
 
Guzmán and Sayavedra are not virtuous men, and one of the important criteria for the 
possibility of the best kind of friendship is that both people be, though flawed, perceived 
as good, heroic or at least redeemable. Alemán’s novel is about another kind of person: 
“Guzmán’s contemplation of his own experiences leads to the pessimistic recognition of 
the difficulties of this kind of friendship [other self] in a world populated by tricksters, 
thieves, and charlatans” (Gilbert-Santamaria 2011, 84).  
 The friendship narrative in Guzmán de Alfarache describes the failure of 
friendship in the classical sense and shows instead that friendship is more a matter of 
alliance, utility and maybe some admiration, as well as subordination, although it has 
already been pointed out that there is almost never total equality between the model 
friends with one always in some way being superior to the other and served by the other. 
Jonathan serves David and helps him elude Saul. Jonathan’s death facilitates David’s 
ascendance as king of the Israelites. Achilles, in his rage over the killing of his friend by 
Hector, kills the Trojan hero and actively engages in the destruction of Troy. Oliver 
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serves Roland, despite Oliver’s better judgment, which leads to Oliver’s death. Enkidu 
dies because he is an accessory to Gilgamesh’s hubris as Gilgamesh insults a Sumerian 
goddess and the two friends together slay the bull of heaven. Thorstein, willingly, 
becomes the servant of Bjarni. Friends wish to serve each other.  
 Sayavedra, too, becomes the servant of Guzmán, but his devotion is indeed 
something of an honor among thieves as Sayavedra admires Guzmán’s cunning after 
Sayavedra is outfoxed by him. It is a bit different from Gilgamesh’s throwing Enkidu and 
ultimately both these first classical demigod friends find their other selves. The principal 
thing to glean, however, from Guzmán and Syavedra’s friendship is that of pessimism: 
“Gone is the classical optimism that might allow one to suffer false friendships born of 
necessity, here replaced with despair in the face of the realization that one’s ‘other self’ 
may not, in fact, exist” (Gilbert-Santamaria 2011, 85).  
 Of interest about the friendship that does form between Guzmán and Sayavedra, 
are the opportunity and subsequently the ability to share their personal narratives. The 
similarity of their stories enables empathy between the friends. Their understanding leads 
to something beyond the purely utilitarian union. It is a sort of purgatory, above self-
serving utility but not quite heavenly in its virtue. These people in the picaresque model 
have only this chance to comprehend and identify themselves in more introspective and 
psychological ways. The sharing of stories and the discourse it enables allow a middle-of-
the-road kind of friendship, which one might claim to be more plausible in the picaresque 
setting and within the timeframe of early modernity:  
The more purely discursive model for personal intimacy on display in the Guzmán 
gives new life to the Aristotelian notion of the friend as ‘another self,’ replacing 
the categorical ideal with a dynamic, inherently modern vision of friendship as a 
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complex emotional relationship subject to continuous renegotiation and at 
constant risk of dissolution. (Gilbert-Santamaria 2011, 86) 
 
Gilbert-Santamaria (2011) explains that the friendship of Guzmán and Sayavedra is one 
of “inherent fragility” because one finds, in the picaresque novel that, “the ruthless 
deceptiveness of life in the public sphere relentlessly threatens to undermine the 
benevolent impulses that make stories of private friendship possible” (86). 
 In Alemán’s novel, the friendship inevitably fails, and Guzmán, though he is 
emotionally moved by Sayavedra, befriends without total trust. Guzmán has exposed the 
possibility of betrayal and, in a sense, defeated Sayavedra, who asks to be Guzmán’s 
servant. Sayavedra serves, and Guzmán commands. Although Guzmán listens to 
Sayavedra’s ideas and advice, he makes his decisions and assigns tasks to Sayavedra. 
Gilbert-Santamaria (2011) translates from the novel: “It seemed to me that if someone 
wanted to serve me, there being so few good young men, that this one would be the least 
bad…for I already knew that I needed to protect myself from him, and with someone 
else, seeming to be faithful, I might not take care” (88) The friendship evolves 
accordingly: “The two develop a relationship that defies the static categories of classical 
models for friendship in favor of a fluid, evolving partnership that creates a provisional 
space for intimacy and trust in a world otherwise defined by trickery and deception” 
(Ibid.).  
 There seems to be a new kind of isolation, unlike Grendel’s, that partitions the 
individual into a persona for the public eye and another, private person while the heroes 
and friends held up as the examples of the best kinds of friendship in classical models 
suffer no such crises and are always the same persons both publicly and privately. There 
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is no act of deception, or separation, thus making the possibility of “another self” more 
reasonable to believe since nothing is hidden. There will not be, in the friendship of 
Guzmán and Sayavedra, any public display of loss or mourning when Sayavedra dies 
although publicly, it is expected. Perhaps the dualism in personality is a reflection of the 
possibilities of the new print media that make available worlds, people and ideas with 
which one might interact privately and where discourse is not required. There is a 
unidirectional quality to print (Poe 2011, 136). The reading, or telling of stories, or even 
the reading of books, which at one time had been a public practice, became privatized as 
more literature was printed in the vernaculars and as more people become literate (Poe 
2011, 124). One was able to conceal something: “the privacy of print allowed people to 
enter the public sphere and do as they liked in the private sphere” (Poe 2011, 125). 
People could entertain themselves in what publicly might be regarded as inappropriate 
ways without anyone knowing. The possibility for vice, it would seem, could be greater, 
and one can appear to the public as virtuous while indulging privately in deviant 
practices. Furthermore, there is growing specialization. Although “print made the world a 
much more varied, information-rich place” (Poe 2011, 141), there is the paradox that 
specialization increases because so many more areas of knowledge are being born: “As 
the professions established themselves in print, their members increasingly used printed 
books to communicate with each other in language that became more and more 
incomprehensible to all but members of the profession” (Burke and Ornstein 1997, 142). 
Friendship, however, even in the picaresque model, seems to bring out the best in 
the two people, especially as they treat and relate to each other: “The ideal of the friend 
as ‘another self’ is thus reanimated as an act of goodwill between two very imperfect 
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individuals” (Gilbert-Santamaria 2011, 89). Guzmán is able grow past his social image 
and pragmatic considerations: “Constructed in direct opposition to the larger social 
context, Guzmán’s new friendship with Sayavedra provides him ‘with the opportunity as 
well as the necessary to demonstrate his own uniqueness’” (Gilbert-Santamaria 2011, 
90). The private friendship allows for discourse, something that is absent in the world of 
the picaresque in which no one in public life is to be trusted and individuals practice 
wrong purposes both publicly and privately. It breaks the picaresque mold, which is 
described as “alienation” with little opportunity for individual expression (Gilbert-
Santamaria 2011, 95). This type of friendship might be possible for even a monster like 
Grendel and another like him. Neither Guzmán nor Sayavedra are exactly the most 
savory of human beings. One might postulate that should such a friendship emerge, the 
friends would become, generally, more virtuous; but these friends instead continue to be 
unremorseful criminals together. 
Guzmán and Sayavedra’s bond does not reach the classical level although it 
represents a fragile friendship and the best possibility within the picaresque novel, which 
is always a relative one. Sayavedra becomes mad with fever as the two are aboard ship, 
sailing to escape Genoa. The madness causes Sayavedra to throw himself overboard, 
which is how he dies, but before he dies he recounts all he knows of Guzmán’s life as if it 
were his own. Although Sayavedra is delirious, one might call his retelling a betrayal of 
confidence. Guzmán can feel no sympathy: “He laughs at Sayavedra’s mad ravings, but 
then, realizing that he is retelling Guzmán’s own life story, fears the public disclosure of 
his shady dealings” (Gilbert-Santamaria 2011, 97). It is ironic that Sayavedra shall 
become “the other self” in such a way. Again, perhaps Alemán is being sarcastic in this 
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representation of “the other self.” Guzmán is the proverbial cat, landing back on his feet. 
There is no epiphany: “Confronted with the death of his ‘other self,’ Guzman retreats into 
the Picaro’s habit of deception while simultaneously negating to his reader any trace of 
his former friendship” (Ibid.). 
The impact of the printing press, one could claim, is to separate the public and 
private realms, which also creates a duality in the human being. The classical model of 
friendship is carefully scrutinized in the picaresque novel Guzmán de Alfarache of Mateo 
Alemán. The story aptly shows the difficulty of such a paradigm although it does offer a 
friendship model that is not purely pragmatic: “Perhaps more than any other literary 
mode of the period, the picaresque affirms the essential deceptiveness of public life 
against which any expression of sincere personal intimacy must constantly struggle to 
gain even merely transient recognition” (Gilbert-Santamaria 2011, 98).  
 
Defense and Adjustment 
 
Milton comes to mind first though some of his friendship rhetoric is part of a 
political agenda. He uses the ideal friendship as an analogy for the type of relationship 
that should exist between the government and the people, and he questions the manner of 
servitude that a monarchy has the possibility of engendering if the ruler becomes 
despotic. In the early, classical friendships, one can argue that a hierarchy exists, but the 
friends serve willingly. Bjarni suggests that Thorstein’s service would right matters 
between the two, a proposition that Thorstein gladly accepts though the two prove to be 
equals. Thorstein’s agreement is political. The two understand that they are on the same 
level physically, intellectually, and virtuously; but Bjarni’s reputation is at stake, and he 
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holds a position of some authority in the community. Thorstein’s voluntary submission 
allows Bjarni to save face and improves Thorstein’s condition. Sayavedra also wishes to 
serve Guzmán in Alemán’s picaresque novel, but it is not in menial service. The two are 
partners in the confidence game. Sayavedra becomes Paul Drake to Guzmán’s Perry 
Mason (Perry Mason, CBS, 1957-1966) except that the picaresque friends are criminals. 
It is a working relationship but also one of friendship. Milton, with reference to the best 
kind of friendship, suggests that it cannot be based on servitude, or at least, involuntary 
servitude. Milton, in equating friendship with the voluntary service one might render to a 
monarch, makes considerable use of Etienne de La Boétie’s Discours de la servitude 
voluntaire. La Boétie was Montaigne’s great friend. Milton forwards “La Boétie’s 
contention that, ‘each one should be able to look into the other as into a mirror and 
recognize himself’” (Chaplin 2011, 213). Montaigne asserts that “friendship feeds on 
communication” (Ibid.), and claims that his friendship with La Boétie is “a complete 
blending of their wills” (Ibid.). In other words, Milton recalls the flag-bearers of the 
classical friendship model while making considerable allusion to Aristotle and Cicero. He 
further embraces the Christian idea that the best kind of friendship could be as near as 
one might get to God. For Milton, “all men are ‘born free, being the image and 
resemblance of God himself’” (Chaplin 2011, 215).  
 Milton, however, working his way around the potential for hubris and without 
radically diverging from the classical friendship model, even suggests the reasons for the 
formation of friendships such as Guzmán and Sayavedra’s. He also opens the door to the 
possibility of a superior friendship between men and women. Adam is questioned about 
his wish for companionship since God needs none. Adam wisely responds that perfection 
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needs no companion and that in his imperfection he requires “conversation with his like 
to help/Or Solace his defects” (Chaplin 2011, 220). In other words, the human being 
needs empathy, and perhaps some human sympathy, too. For Milton’s Adam, mere 
propagation of his image, because Adam is imperfect, is uncertain and what he describes 
as “unity defective” (Chaplin 2011, 221). Therefore, the Adam needs “Collateral love, 
and dearest amity” (Ibid.). This love and amity are brought about through conversation, 
or communication.  
 Communication, not unlike that necessity in the friendship of Guzmán and 
Sayavedra, is vital, yet Milton sticks with the virtuous, best kind of friendship that 
remains under God’s scrutiny. The novelty, however, is one of inclusion. Adam’s first 
companion and that person with which he will form the first friendship of “Collateral 
love, and Dearest amity” (Chaplin 2011, 221) is a woman. One’s understanding of the 
abhorrence of solitude is also apparent in Milton, for voluntary solitude is a form of 
hubris. Suddenly, the one who shuns and loathes society is more of a monster than the 
outcast who seeks, because of his involuntary exclusion, to destroy it. Nevertheless, 
Milton holds to the classical paradigm, that friendship “is fashioned from rational 
creatures who have demonstrated their virtue and chosen to participate out of their own 
free will” (Chaplin 2011, 223). Choice, then, is an important player in the friendship 
paradigm, which would suggest, as in the picaresque novel, a concern for whether the 
soul-mate, or one’s likeness, might indeed exist and whether even the best kind of 
friendship is rather a work of willpower and communication. The best kind of friendship, 
to be sure, is not always identifiable without some action. 
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Women in the Discourse 
 
Katherine Philips is an important 17th century voice that speaks about friendship 
in her poetry and letters. She walked directly through the slowly opening friendship 
portal, one that had remained mostly closed to women. Even today, some contemporary 
critics in examining Philips’s poetry have erroneously sought to depict her as a stifled 
homosexual; yet in her correspondence and poetry she seems bound towards the purest 
Christian form of friendship without any gender partiality. In a response to a Philips 
letter, Jeremy Taylor wrote “A Discourse of the Nature, Offices and Measures of 
Friendship” by which he tries to answer each of Philips’s major points, her first question 
being that of “how far a Dear and perfect friendship is authoriz’d by the principles of 
Christianity” (Llewellyn 2002, 2). Based upon Taylor’s review of Philips’s letter to him, 
he provides the following useful summary of how he believes Philips might define “Dear 
and Perfect friendship”: 
By friendships, I suppose you mean, the greatest love, and the greatest usefulness, 
and the most open communication, and the noblest sufferings and the most 
exemplar faithfulness, and the severest truth, and the heartiest counsel, and the 
greatest union of mindes, of which brave men and women are capable. (Taylor 
quoted in Llewellyn 2002, 2) 
 
Philips and her pen pals continue to engage in the important comparison of friendship 
with marriage, and they also, perhaps less as a matter of discourse and more as a matter 
of practice, raise the question of a public and private schism as to where the best kind of 
friendship might occur; but one should first take a moment to defend Philips as a 
champion of the classical friendship model infused with the Christian ideal of purity. 
Llewellyn (2002) writes, in reference to Philips poem entitled “Friendship”: “Philips is 
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directly concerned with matters relating to the soul and the process of enlightenment 
which friendship allows it to attain” (3).   
 In the same poem, “Friendship,” Philips makes an interesting comparison between 
marriage and friendship and the potential difficulty of reaching the superior friendship 
within marriage. For Philips it would seem that friendship is a matter of the soul and that 
the material or physical life can be problematic: 
For when two soules are chang’d and mixed soe, it is what they and not but they 
can doe; And this is friendship, that abstracted flame, Which creeping mortals 
know not how to name. All Love is sacred, and the marriage thy Hath much of 
Honour and divinity; But Lust, design, or some unworthy ends May mingle there, 
which are despis’d by friends. (Philips quoted in Llewellyn 2002, 3) 
 
As much as Philips seems to espouse the idea of a friendship of souls, one free of gender, 
marriage has its built-in physical barrier to the best friendship experience. Philips would 
probably claim that any physical intimacy between friends, homosexual or heterosexual, 
prevents the ultimate friendship.  
 How does the printing press fit into Philips’s friendship philosophy and her choice 
to uphold the classical friendship model and to enter upon the marriage question? Philips, 
first, is a highly literate woman. Llewellyn (2002) reminds his readers that, “Philips’s 
separation of the degrees of love appears to be informed by both her reading of Donne 
and her understanding of Platonic love” (4). Printing allows for the multiplication of 
copies. It is easy enough for Philips to put her hands on past and present writing that has 
gone to the presses: “Philips’s concerns centre on the spiritual configurations of 
friendship can certainly be informed by an understanding of Platonic treaties of the 
period” (Ibid.). Llewellyn (2002) states further: “Although she was a woman she was by 
no means unique in having access to the work of male philosophers” (6). 
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 What becomes increasingly interesting with the print era is the conscious 
acknowledgement of communication as essential element in human relations. Philips, like 
La Boétie, spotlights the communication that exists between the best of friends. 
Following in the classical tradition, Philips believes that the best kind of friendship 
enables a communication of souls. She sees friendship as a means by which one can 
explore and discover his or her soul and her friend’s soul. Friendship, then, leads to a 
greater self-awareness as well as an awareness of one’s friend (Llewellyn 2002, 5). In all 
of her friendship poetry, as a consequence of her belief of a soul connection, she grants 
friendship a metaphysical power that is in keeping with the classical model of friendship. 
Friendship, for Philips, is a way of understanding immortality:  
This is in essence what she refers to in “Friendship in Emblem,” too, when she 
speaks of “Friendship’s exalted interest” (26) and of the belief that “friendship 
from good=angels springs,/To teach the world heroique things.” (39-40) 
(Llewellyn 2002, 5) 
 
Philips’s concept of friendship closely follows Aelred and other Christian writers of the 
middle ages: 
Thus rising from the holy love with which a friend embraces a friend to that 
which a friend embraces Christ, one may take the spiritual fruit of friendship fully 
and joyfully into the mouth, while looking forward to all abundance in the life to 
come. (Aelred 2010, 126.134) 
 
Philips crosses the gender gap in friendship, and there is earlier evidence in Christian 
narrative the escape from physicality in the soul friendship: The soul friend relationship 
of the Celtic saints breaks the mold, to an extent, although a reciprocity exists: “Soul 
friend relationships are characterized by mutuality: a profound respect for each other’s 
wisdom, despite any age or gender difference” (Sellner 1995, 2). In short, Philips sees 
friendship in its classical form as non-sexual, and she ponders the question of whether 
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marriage, because of its physical component, as distinct from the best kind of friendship 
because, “The friendship poems under this reading attest to and are meant to be read as 
enactments of a spiritual engagement by two souls which transcends the physical world” 
(Llewellyn 2002, 6). Philips makes it clear that women are just as capable as men of the 
superior kind of spiritual friendship she extols: “Soules no sexes have” (Philips quoted in 
Llewellyn 2002, 12). 
 A final thought regarding Philips’s friendship poetry is that the soul friendship she 
defines, particularly in reference to two women, is a private matter, since women do not 
participate in the “dull, angry world” (Llewellyn 2002, 10). In the poem, “To my 
Lucasia,” Orinda speaks to Lucasia saying:  
...sit down and view How sweet the mixture is! How full! How true! By what soft 
touches spirits greet and kiss, And in each other can compleat their bliss: A 
wonder so sublime it will admit No rude spectatour to contemplate it. The object 
will refine, and he that can Friendship revere must be a noble man. (Philips 
quoted in Llewellyn 2002, 10) 
 
While Gilgamesh and Enkidu stride hand in hand through the city of Uruk in the first 
friendship narrative, declarations of friendship, especially between two women, are by 
private correspondence in 17th century England that might make possible a spiritual, soul 
connection. The picaresque novel, too, suggests that a friendship seeking a higher plane 
cannot exist publicly. In fact, the friends in the picaresque world must retain the ability to 
dissolve or repudiate such friendships depending on the circumstances.  
 
Molière and the Picaresque Mindset 
 
Perhaps Alemán and other Spanish novelists of the 1500s had become more 
existential in their thinking than their Renaissance contemporaries. Certainly, the 
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protagonists seem to dismiss the possibility of reaching something as beyond the worldly 
as the soul friendship. Guzmán and Sayavedra plot incessantly to enrich themselves as 
they coldly play the deception game. Friendship, for Sayavedra, the type that is 
developing between him and Guzmán, is something mysterious. Sayavedra does not seem 
to have the necessary intellectual or spiritual tools for such a friendship. Guzmán, on the 
other hand, forms a philosophical premise. He seems to better understand the friendship 
that is evolving with Sayavedra, but he cannot reconcile that friendship with his 
pragmatic concerns of material well-being. His world, one in which he survives by his 
wits, trumps friendship. He can never let his guard down fully or trust entirely in his 
friend. The Guzmán and Sayavedra friendship, Alemán seems to suggest, although it can 
never match the classical-Christian friendships in sincerity and completeness, might be 
the best that two friends can realistically achieve when the friends are battling for 
survival and success in the post Gutenberg world and the age of discovery. 
 Molière, in Le Misanthrope, written in 1666, would seem to be of the same 
opinion as Alemán, for Molière’s main character, Alceste, who is le misanthrope, 
continually denies his friend Philinte because in Alceste’s view Philinte is not the model 
friend; yet Philinte behaves as a genuine friend and, without any personal motive, 
counsels Alceste correctly. Philinte, however, the pragmatist, blends into a world that 
Alceste refuses to either understand or to accept: “Le siècle [17th century] appartient tout 
entier à la duplicité souriante et au prudent cynisme des Philinte, hommes parfaitement 
conscients de la folie des hommes, mais aussi de la folie qu’il y aurait à refuser d’être 
fous avec eux” (Barbereau and Christensen, eds. 2006, 13). The 17th century, at least, 
belongs to a smiling duplicity and a prudent cynicism of people like Philinte. These men 
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are perfectly conscious of the foolishness of men but also undestand that it is foolish not 
to sit at the table and play cards. Philinte, although not the main character, is Guzmán’s 
descendant. He will not stand beside Alceste for the sake of their friendship and Alceste’s 
misanthropy. One difference between the Guzmán de Alfarache novel and Le 
Misanthrope is in the choice of milieu. While the Alemán characters are outside the 
nobility and privileged class, Molière’s belong to the upper strata of French society. 
Nevertheless, it is a society whose characters are poker players who shuffle and deal for 
their reputations. There is the public self, and this persona, in order to be well regarded, 
simply needs “se montrer complaisant, agréable, enjoué et naturel pour mériter le titre 
d’honnête homme” (Barbereau and Christensen 2006, 14). It is often a game of bluff. It is 
a matter of looking and sounding good. If one looks and sounds like an honest man, he 
must be one. Alceste simply refuses to take a hand. As a consequence, he becomes 
isolated and the gap between man and monster, between Grendel and Beowulf, becomes 
a narrow one though Alceste is, metaphorically, trying to follow Beowulf’s lead. For 
Molière and Alemán, such virtue, and such extraordinary friendships as might exist 
according to the classical examples and models, are indeed mythical and fictitious; and 
therefore, impossible. Guzmán’s and Philinte’s approaches to friendship are possibilities 
while Sayavedra, sick and insane because of his illness, commits suicide by throwing 
himself overboard. Alceste, in le Misanthrope, declares that he will leave what he 
perceives as a world of treason, injustice, and vice to seek a place apart from the rest of 
the world where one is free to be an honorable man: 
Trahi de toutes parts, accablé d’injustices,  
Je vais sortir d’un gouffre où triomphent les vices, 
Et chercher sur la terre un endroit écarté 
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Où d’être homme d’honneur on ait la liberté. (Molière 2006, 133) 
 
Like Sayavedra, Alceste is throwing himself overboard, but illness is not the cause of 
Alceste’s lunacy, which Philinte and the woman Alceste desires, Célimène, both 
recognize. Alceste would like Célimène to go away with him, and she responds: 
 La solitude effraye une âme de vingt ans; 
 Je ne sens point la mienne assez grande, assez forte, 
 Pour me résoudre à serer de tells noeuds, (Molière 2006, 132) 
 
To translate rather literally, Célimène says that solitude frightens a 20-year-old soul, and 
that she does not believe that hers is great enough or strong enough to marry Alceste. 
Living with Alceste, in other words, would mean a life of isolation for her. As a comedy, 
then, Le Misanthrope is ironic, for the reconciliation that normally occurs, for comedy is 
“a plot form that has as its central theme the notion of reconciliation” (White 2014, 27). 
Alceste intends to isolate himself without apology. 
Alceste’s refusal, his misanthropy, is hubris; his unwillingness to conform is un-
heroic. Friendship, furthermore, in le Misanthrope, is presented in the same way as the 
alliances in Guzmán de Alfarache are depicted: “Les amitiés sont intéressées et tenues 
pour un marchandage ou un ‘commerce’ comme un autre” (Barbereau and Christensen 
2006, 15). Friendships are merchandise to be bartered and sold. 
 As the first scene of the play begins, Philinte is critical of Alceste’s mood or 
attitude, which Alceste makes no effort to conceal. When he uses the word amis, or 
friends, Alceste attacks Philinte: 
 Moi, votre ami? Rayez cela de vos papiers. 
 J’ai fait jusques ici profession de l’être; 
 Mais, après ce qu’en vous je viens de voir paraître, 
 Je vous déclare net que je ne le suis plus, 
 Et ne veux nulle place en des coeurs corrompus. (Molière 2006, 23) 
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Alceste tells Philinte to forget about their friendship and proclaims himself no longer 
Philinte’s friend, saying that he does not want a place in corrupt hearts. Philinte argues 
his case. Apparently, he has spoken well of someone whom Alceste despises. In their 
argument, Philinte makes a claim for being civil. Alceste retorts that any man who cannot 
speak sincerely and from the heart is a dishonorable person: “Je veux qu’on soit sincère, 
et qu’en homme d’honneur/ on ne lâche aucun mot qui ne parte du coeur” (Molière 2006, 
25). Philinte makes a further claim for civility. He tries to point out the usefulness of 
maintaining good relations with the people in their social milieu: “Mais quand on est du 
monde, il faut bien que l’on rende/ Quelques dehors civils que l’usage demande” 
(Molière 2006, 26). Philinte is trying to remind Alceste that in their society, a certain 
behavior, a kind of civility, is expected. Alceste cannot be moved; regarding friendship, 
there can be no compromise: “Non, vous dis-je; on devrait châtier sans pitié /ce 
commerce honteux de semblants d’amitié” (Ibid.). One should, in effect, condemn such 
false friendliness. Philinte and Alceste debate the whole idea of the false person, and 
Alceste is relentless. Philinte, who admits to recognizing the insincerity around him, asks 
that Alceste give some latitude to people because of the times and because of human 
nature. Philinte believes it is insane to try to correct the world. One should not scrutinize 
others and their morality too closely:  
 Mon Dieu, des moeurs du temps mettons-nous moins en peine, 
 Et faisons un peu grâce à la nature humaine; 
 Ne l’examinons point dans la grande rigeur, 
 …Et c’est une folie à nulle autre seconde 
 De vouloir se mêler de corriger le monde. (Molière 2006, 30-31) 
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Alceste retorts that Philinte’s philosophical bent, his recourse to reason, leads to an 
inuring and to one’s never becoming appalled or angry by a human interaction that is a 
ruse and a trap set for personal gain or recognition.  
 Que pour avoir vos biens on dresse un artifice, 
 Ou qu’on tâche à semer de méchants bruits de vous, 
 Verrez-vous tout cela sans vous mettre en courroux? (Molière 2006, 31) 
 
Alceste is, in effect, denouncing the heroes of the picaresque novels, the Guzmáns who 
profit by their falsity and the Philintes who will engage such characters and are 
subsequently willing to wear masks of their own.  Philinte cannot, ultimately, convince 
Alceste that Alceste’s position is untenable despite his argument that it is human nature to 
deceive and that he will not allow himself to become incensed by it just as he is not 
surprised, though he lacks today’s understanding of the animal kingdom, by what he 
believes to be the normal behavior of vultures, monkeys and wolves: 
 Comme vice unis à l’humaine nature, 
Et mon esprit enfin n’est pas plus offensé  
De voir un homme fourbe, injuste, intéressé, 
Que de voir des vautours affamé de carnage, 
Des singes malfaisants et des loups pleins de rage. (Molière 2006, 32) 
 
Philinte also makes the argument that one’s public presence is what matters. It is a world 
of appearances, not of morality or force of conviction. Alceste remains a man of 
principle, claiming that it is better to lose, in this case, his legal claim, than to become an 
actor. He is a man of principle: Je voudrais, m’en coutât-il grand’chose, [p]our la beauté 
du fait, avoir perdu ma cause (Molière 2006, 34).  
 In act 1, scene 2 of le Misanthrope, Alceste’s position is tested by the character 
Oronte who wishes to befriend Alceste. He showers Alceste with compliments. In 
essence, he wishes to form a friendship quickly and to be liked. He wants others to 
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admire him, so he scratches Alceste’s back while claiming to be sincere. Alceste will not 
accept to form a friendship pact with Oronte. Alceste’s retort evokes the classical model 
of friendship: 
 Monsieur, c’est trop d’honneur que me voulez faire; 
 Mais l’amitié demande un peu plus de mystère, 
Et c’est assurément en profaner le nom 
Que de vouloir le mettre à toute occasion. 
Avec lumière et choix cette union veut naître; 
Avant que nous lier, il faut nous mieux connaître, 
Et nous pourrions avoir telles complexions 
Que tous deux du marché nous nous repentirions. (Molière 2006, 40) 
 
In this response, Alceste explains that friendship is more mysterious, that it is about 
enlightenment and choice. Anything less would be to profane the nature of friendship. 
The two friends must better know each other and be of similar temperaments or they will 
regret such an accord.  
 The irony lies in the question of whether in his misanthropy Alceste himself is 
creating a  persona for the public eye. Alceste’s claim to sincerity and truth ceases, in a 
sense, to be a virtue when it becomes excessive, or uncompromising. Even in the greatest 
friendships among the classical-Christian archetypes, there are moments of humility or 
concession among the heroes. For instance, Roland does blow his horn, after Oliver’s 
death, to summon Charlemagne. Achilles allows Priam to take the body of Hector. The 
heroes recognize their errors and weaknesses. Still, Alceste’s breaking of his friendship 
with Philinte and his unwillingness to befriend Oronte suggest the difficulty of forming 
the classical-Christian kind of friendship in the modern age. Alceste, unless he concedes 
to shift his paradigm, appears to be heading in the direction of Grendel towards becoming 
a monster. He has forgotten that even the best people are imperfect and also that 
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forgiveness can be a Christian virtue. To place oneself in the judgmental position of 
Alceste is a kind of hubris although Alceste, based upon the classical-Christian paradigm 
of friendship, is correct to say, “Mais l’amitié demande un peu plus de mystère,/ Et c’est 
assurément en profaner le nom/ Que de vouloir le mettre à toute occasion” (Molière 
2006, 40). 
Changes to the Classical-Christian Friendship: 1500-1700 
 
Print appears to make friendship more sterile and utilitarian, according to the 
pessimistic literary artists of the first centuries after Gutenberg. There is more 
specialization and also alienation as groups of people and individuals are able to isolate 
themselves without the prior vilification of solitude that appears to have existed during 
the oral and manuscript eras. Grendel can exist and even be accepted as long as he 
remains to himself or among those like him. In fact, it would seem that the isolated 
individual can either escape the feeling of isolation by entering the print world as an 
alternative to the physical one outside; or, better still, he can correspond with his group or 
society without physically encountering its members. McLuhan (1964) says it best: “That 
most potent gift bestowed on Western man by literacy and typography: his power to act 
without reaction or involvement” (162).  
The classical-Christian model of friendship, with some modification, operates in 
the early print era but is seen more, perhaps, as a thing for which the would-be friends 
must labor. The notion that it is destined, transcendent, or even serendipitous is replaced 
by a diminished possibility that it can happen by chance or that the gods take a hand. 
There is an element of chance, but both friends must want the friendship and must have 
the will to work at its maintenance. Otherwise, the friendship cannot bloom into the 
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exemplary kind of friendship depicted in the classical models. The good news, also, is 
that the best kinds of friendship are not exclusive. Friends need not be heroes, demigods, 
or god-generated to experience the greatest kind of friendship; they need only to make a 
mutual effort and to develop an awareness of their friendship. Some friendships, on the 
other hand, particularly female friendships, Philips suggests through her poetry, can 
become the spiritual relationships as experienced by the early Celtic saints. However, 
close friendships are increasingly private affairs. Writers will often depict those 
friendships as personal interactions removed from the public eye. Certainly, the world of 



















Eighteenth Century Classical-Christian Friendship in Print 
 
Poe (2011) states that “print culture” reigned for 450 years (151). Postman (1998), 
in “Five Things We Need to Know about Technological Change,” sums up what has been 
posited from the beginning of this discourse: 
That every technology has a philosophy which is given expression in how the 
technology makes people use their minds, in what it makes us do with our bodies, 
in how it codifies the world, in which of our senses it amplifies, in which of our 
emotional and intellectual tendencies it disregards. (Postman 1998, 5) 
 
It can be claimed that the expansion of print media has impacted perceptions of 
friendship. The classical notion of friendship begins running the gauntlet of print culture 
in the 16th century as printing accelerates until most of the Western World is literate by 
the 20th century. Today, “The leaders of all modern societies agree that literacy is a 
necessity and reading a virtuous act” (Poe 2011, 150). 
 L’Âge de Raison, or the Enlightenment, is a time period when many thinkers seek 
to disconnect from religion and political tradition as they are pulled toward science. 
Although literacy in the 18th century is still limited to the aristocracy and to the 
bourgeoisie, there is a burgeoning availability of news and of published work in many 
different areas of learning and knowledge, fueling new interests. L’Encyclopédie, a 
twenty-eight volume collection of knowledge, is under construction for a period of 
roughly 15 years. It includes essays on many subjects and it responds to the aspirations of 
a bourgeoisie eager for progress: “L’Encyclopédie répond bien aux aspirations d’une 
bourgeoisie de progrès qui a le goût des ‘arts utiles’” (Kerautret 2002, 60). In order to 
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appeal to the new readership, works on engineering, or the applied sciences, are included 
alongside articles about science and the liberal arts. In short, print allows for the 
documentation of everything. L’Encyclopédie is an attempt to catalogue knowledge that, 
in one collection, “l’honnête homme” of the 18th century could ever wish to know about 
“les sciences et de tous les arts—mathématiques et médicine, histoire et grammaire, 
théologie et droit [law] musique et littérature” (Kerautret 2002, 61). Interests have 
become more physical and social than spiritual. In literature, this movement fosters a 
gritty kind of fiction and philosophical discourse as writers grope with human behavior as 
they observe it, and they look for the answers in the external, or natural, forces operating 
upon humanity. It becomes questionable, therefore, whether the classical friendship has 
any sort of innate or spiritual component to it and whether, as it has previously been 
defined, is even possible. The novelists and short story writers of the 18th century, 
following those of the 17th century, take irony to new levels. White (2014) calls irony the 
negation of the metaphorical tropes (32). White (2014) refers to the metaphorical tropes 
as “naïve” (36). “They can be deployed only in the belief in language’s capacity to grasp 
the nature of things in figurative terms” (White 2014, 36). Irony, then, plants doubt in the 
truth of such interpretation:  
The basic figurative tactic of Irony is catachresis (literally “misuse”), the 
manifestly absurd Metaphor designed to inspire Ironic second thoughts about the 
nature of the thing [friendship] characterized by the inadequacy of the 
characterization itself. (White 2014, 36) 
 
Many of the writers and philosophers of the 18th century are not transcendental thinkers 
in the metaphysical sense. They do not take the “formist” or “organicist” positions as 
White (2014, 14-15) defines them. The organicist, for instance, would run with the idea 
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of a constant, such as a friendship paradigm: “The Organicist is inclined to take about the 
‘principles’ or ‘ideas’ that inform the individual processes discerned in the field and all 
the process taken as a whole” (White 2014, 16). The ironist, then, is calling into question 
any supernatural or metaphysical notion about a principle, or in this case, a paradigm. 
One often finds that the important writers of novels and short fiction depict 
friendship as philosophical discourse between two people without the emotional or 
spiritual factor. Although one is concerned with nature and the physical sciences and how 
they shape humanity, there is also a reduction of the sensual when it becomes confined to 
print, which some see as detrimental to humanity: “Literature man undergoes much 
separation of his imaginative, emotional and sense life, as Rousseau (and later the 
Romantic poets and philosophers) proclaimed long ago” (McLuhan 1964, 90). In fiction, 
there is a continuation of friendships akin to those found in the picaresque novels in 
which friends use each other for personal gain; utility is more important than the 
relationship itself although such friendships must include some elements of the classical 
friendship paradigm. One could accuse the 18th century writers of staging the realism 
movement based upon what they observe as natural in human relationships. The idea of 
human nature would seem to come into being as a debatable topic during this time period. 
Those who claim to be honorable or virtuous are often made out to be hypocrites, fools or 
con artists while the confidence man and opportunist become heroes. Certainly, the flaws 
and vices are not the same as they are in the classical friendships. 
Improved literacy and infrastructure have also allowed for more written 
communication. Since it takes so long for letters and documents to reach destinations, the 
writing process is an ongoing one. Correspondents write in the form of diaries and 
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journals as if their messages could be delivered that day. Although in philosophical 
discourse, there is still a preference for the Socratic method of dialogue in the way that 
ideas are presented and in the interaction of friends, there are also instances of friends in 
literature corresponding through written communication. Goethe’s Sorrows of Young 
Werther (1962) illustrates the importance of letters in friendships. Werther shares his 
thoughts and feelings through correspondence with his friend William. In fact, the 
narrator leans heavily on the first person evidence in Werther’s letters.  
With print and correspondence, hence, literacy, friendship has become a much 
more complex matter. The idealist, if one may use the label, finds it difficult to pinpoint 
friendship as Aristotle (1980), Cicero (1967) and Aelred (2010) define it. This individual, 
then, shows a penchant for turning within himself since humanity can offer nothing out of 
its own genius. The universe, thus, the natural, can be most helpful as Rousseau (2012) 
believes that the answers are planted within one’s soul and that one must seek inwardly to 
rediscover a primordial sort of understanding that is the true nature of humanity and 
brings one closer to the creator: “La contemplation de l’univers, forcent un solitaire à 
s’élancer incessament vers l’auteur des choses” (61). The solitary person’s 
contemplation of the universe forces this individual incessantly towards the creator. 
Society and the human intellect for invention obscure truth and right. The classical 
paradigm for friendship might seem impossible for someone like Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
because of human contrivance. He, for instance, gives up the hope of finding a worthy 
soul: “Cet espoir, quique éloigné, tenait mon âme dans la même agitation que quand je 
cherchais encore dans le siècle un coeur juste, et mes espérances que j’avais beau jeter 
au loin me rendaient également le jouet des hommes d’aujourd’hui” (Rousseau 2012, 
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39). He goes further to suggest that his hope, which he could not easily reject, of finding 
a true heart made him the play thing of his contemporaries. Rousseau (2012) compares 
himself to Molière’s Alceste in Le Misanthrope, and friends like Philinte are insufficient. 
Rousseau (2012) writes a letter to D’Alembert in which he depicts Alceste as the sincere 
moralist, true to himself and his beliefs, while Philinte is likened to Rousseau’s 
contemporaries, worldly philosophers who ridicule those who would cling to a moral 
imperative despite hearing the best well-reasoned arguments illuminating human 
potentialities:  
Jean-Jacques s’identifie avec Alceste jusqu’à le façonner à sa propre image. 
Quant à Philinte, il lui prête les défauts de Grimm, son ennemi intime. Aussi 
plaide-t-il sa propre cause quand il accuse Molière de ridiculiser la vertu et 
d’opposer à l’honnête homme (Alceste, c’est-à-dire Rousseau), l’homme de 
société, idéal de Voltaire et des philosophes. (Lagarde and Michard, eds. 1985, 
278) 
 
Alceste in Le Misanthrope decides to leave the society and the company that he declares 
are corrupt, and he intends to seek some hidden place where people live virtuously:  
Je vais sortir d’un gouffre où triomphent les vices,  
et chercher sur la terre un endroit écarté  
Où  d’être homme d’honneur on ait la liberté. (Molière 2006, 133) 
 
Rousseau must also withdraw from society in order to preserve his moral standard. 
Instead of El Dorado, Rousseau wishes to seek the depths of his natural human self for 
truth, and he believes that union with all that the universe has created can facilitate the 
journey although human intellect and invention, of itself, cannot. There can be no union 
with humanity for Rousseau, but there is salvation in feeling the universe’s creator, who 
must be good and true and who can be known. 
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 Although Rousseau’s solitude is voluntary, and some of his detractors regard it as 
beastly, Rousseau sees it also as a way to combat his enmity: “J’aime mieux les fuir que 
les haïr” (Rousseau 2012, 116). He prefers to flee his enemies rather than to hate them. 
However, separation and solitude are not so simple. In this sense, Rousseau (2012) 
regards himself as an exception, claiming that any other person would be horrified at the 
prospect of breaking from society: “Je me vais presque avec indifference dans un état 
dont nul autre homme peut-être ne supporterait l’aspect sans effroi” (142). He contends 
that it is preferable to be alone than among nasty, treasonable people who feed on hatred: 
“Je suis devenu solitaire, ou, comme ils disent, insociable et misanthrope, parce que la 
plus sauvage solitude me paraît préfèrable à la société des méchants, qui ne se nourrit 
que de trahisons et de haine” (129). 
Mary Shelley (1976), like her protagonist Dr. Victor Frankenstein, conducts a 
remarkable experiment in her novel Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus. Shelley’s 
work caps the 18th century and begins the 19th as humanity’s scientific knowledge and 
technical prowess grow. The story itself, first published in 1818, Shelley chooses to set in 
the 1700s. In Frankenstein, Shelley effectively removes God as creator, thus, if one 
follows Rousseau’s line of reasoning, removing the possibility of finding truth and right. 
Humanity’s creation, the being that Victor Frankenstein assembles, is soul-less; and the 
creature itself becomes incredibly conscious of his place in the universe, which is no 
place; it is utterly alone and bereft of guidance. Nothing can be gotten from either 
humanity or from God, by the creature’s reckoning. Humans, in fact, including 
Frankenstein, are horrified by the creation, which is humanity’s own, and specifically 
Frankenstein’s. The creature cannot even claim as much as Satan has: “Yet even the 
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enemy of God and man had friends and associates in his desolation; I am quite alone” 
(Shelley 1976, 271). The creature is a godless sentient organic machine, but he reacts in a 
very human way to his isolation for he is in fact constructed of human parts and therefore 
an extension of humanity: “I asked, it is true, for greater treasures than a little food or 
rest; I required kindness and sympathy” (Shelley 1976, 156). Only through the creation of 
another like itself can the creature tolerate its wretchedness, for a companion could void 
the aloneness that the creature is otherwise doomed to experience. Frankenstein’s 
creature, denied entry to society and shunned by his creator, demands that Dr. 
Frankenstein make him a companion. The creature warns his maker: “If I have not ties 
and no affections, hatred and vice must be my portion” (Shelley 1976, 175).  
 Frankenstein makes a pact with the creature, consenting to deliver a companion, 
for the creature has promised to withdraw into the wilderness with his mate and to never 
again make contact with humanity. Frankenstein, however, breaks the compact, refusing 
to produce another creature of which he cannot be certain since a new entity would have 
a will of its own. The creature is enraged. He destroys all the individuals who matter to 
Frankenstein. In effect, it’s Dante’s Inferno for Frankenstein. The creature must live 
without affection; therefore, Frankenstein shall experience contrapasso, or, retribution as 
he, too, who has known love and companionship, also learns the misery of seeing those 
possibilities annihilated. The creature becomes Frankenstein’s demonic tormentor: 
Your hours will pass in dread in misery, and soon the bolt will fall which must 
ravish from you your happiness for ever. Are you to be happy in the intensity of 
my wretchedness? You can blast my other passions; but revenge remains—
revenge, henceforth dearer than light and food! I may die; but first you, my tyrant 
and tormentor, shall curse the sun that gazes on your misery. Beware; for I am 
fearless, and therefore powerful. (Shelley 1976, 204) 
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Frankenstein’s creature and Grendel have much in common, yet Grendel is not 
man-made. He is, instead, a representation of mysterious nature’s dark side. He is a 
“natural” freak and deformity, a loathsome aberration but with a mother who is an 
anomaly like himself. To Beowulf and his contemporaries, Grendel is an abomination, 
aligned with evil and the devil, yet he is a thing that has also, somehow, been fashioned 
by God. One could jest that Grendel is like Frankenstein’s creature in that he is 
something of a prototype or first attempt gone sour. Frankenstein’s creature is different. 
Though a living thing, he is man-made and therefore nameless. Adam named all the 
creatures of the earth, and Frankenstein’s monster did not yet exist. The monster’s 
artificial life isolates him more profoundly than Grendel can claim to be, but the results 
are similar: murder and hatred of mankind. Violence, revenge, suicide, insanity—these 
things are common occurrences when living beings reach the point of total aloneness. 
After Frankenstein is dead, the creature vows: “I shall collect my funeral pile, and 
consume to ashes this miserable frame, that its remains may afford no light to any curious 
and unhallowed wretch, who would create such another as I have been” (Shelley 1976, 
272). 
In Beowulf’s time, before literacy and the printing press, the clan and family were 
of uppermost significance. One needed to be capable of tracing his or her origins. By the 
18th century, it has become much easier for one to be separated from his or her clan: “If 
Western literate man undergoes dissociation of inner sensibility from his use of the 
alphabet, he also wins his personal freedom to disassociate himself from clan and family” 
(McLuhan 1964, 90). This dissociation opens the door wider to the forming of close 
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relationships outside family, but it also enables another type of solitude that, though not 
quite as loathsome as Grendel’s or Frankenstein’s creature, can be negative. 
 
Voltaire: Optimistic about Friendship 
Although the 18th century is know as a philosophical age, literature, the arts and 
the sciences drive much of the philosophical discourse of the time. Philosophers are first 
writers, or men and women of letters: “Pourtant, les grands écrivains du temps sont des 
littérateurs avant d’être des philosophes et le souci de l’art accompagne toujours la 
réflexion” (Kerautret 1983, 14). The writers of the time, in other words, are writing to 
hold the reader’s interest and to entertain and not simply for the purpose of presenting 
philosophical points. Writers like Voltaire and Diderot are able to project their thinking 
through their fictional works, and their audience remains people largely like themselves. 
The readers have become the successful merchants, businessmen and their literate 
families. There is a zest for the future and a taste for luxury. There is talk of moral 
conscience as society progresses. Voltaire is the ambassador of this optimistic group 
(Kerautret 1983, 6). The problem lies with those who oppose the forward thinkers, and 
the enemy of progress includes the church and superstitious belief, which Voltaire attacks 
with irony. Students of literature, philosophy and history are expected to understand 
Voltaire, but like Voltaire’s writing, the obvious can sometimes be deceptively elusive. 
Certainly, Voltaire writes about friendship mostly as a secondary theme. His fictional 
works emulate the picaresque novel in its depiction of human injustice and opportunism. 
Voltaire and his contemporaries, through the use of satire and irony, take calculated 
swipes at those people whom they consider responsible for the worst of human 
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conditions. In Candide ou L’Optimisme, Voltaire (1972) devotes several pages, during 
Candide’s visit to Paris, to a discussion about books and plays, and in this discourse 
Voltaire expresses his view of writing and what the writer and playwright must 
accomplish, highlighting how writers and publications have become very important in 
people’s lives by the 18th century (Voltaire 1972, 333-335). “Si l’on écrit plus seulement 
pour amuser et pour distraire, il n’est pire crime que d’ennuyer” (Kerautret 1983, 14). In 
other words, if one writes only to amuse and to distract, the only worse crime is to bore 
the reader; but the idea, too, is to dispel that idea any sort of transcendent, supernatural 
law. 
For the purpose of examining friendship, Candide ou L’Optimisme is one choice 
because the naïve main character encounters many people and with them forms 
relationships. At the end of the novel, Candide emerges with several friends although 
their relationships were not always called friendships. For instance, at story’s end, the 
man who tutors Candide, Pangloss, becomes a member of Candide’s loose association of 
friends to which each member contributes something, but throughout the novel Pangloss 
is most deeply admired, and Candide tries, whenever confronted with adversity, to 
ponder the course of action that Pangloss might take as Pangloss is the ultimate optimist. 
There is always something of a student to teacher relationship between the two. 
Candide’s relationship to the woman he loves and has been pursuing throughout the 
novel becomes a marriage devoid of romance. In fact, Candide, in the end, no longer 
wishes to marry beloved Cunégonde, the woman he is pursuing throughout the novel. She 
is never, also, the friend who accompanies Candide or who discourses with him. Her 
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relationship to Candide is symbolic, and one point to the use of allegory in Candide ou 
L’Optimisme. 
Martin and Cacambo are the friends acquired in the journey. Martin is forever the 
pessimist, who insists that there is nothing for which to hope. He believes that it is best to 
accept the worst in order not to be surprised. Martin is the eternal cynic, and he provides 
the polemic to Pangloss’s blind optimism. Interestingly, Martin worked in Paris at a print 
shop during his first visit to Paris, and it is while with Martin in Paris that there ensues a 
discussion about books, plays and writing (Voltaire 1972, 327, 333-335). When Candide 
asks Martin to accompany him to Venice, Martin responds that he will because he has no 
money and Candide does: “On y reçoit très bien les étrangers quand ils ont beaucoup 
d’argent; j’en ai point, vous en avez, je vous suivrai partout” (Voltaire 1972, 328). 
Martin seems bound to Candide by necessity. Candide makes provisions for Martin. He 
has become attached to him and does not wish to part with him (Voltaire 1972, 329). 
Martin, however, shows his gratitude as he becomes, to an extent, Candide’s protector 
when Candide falls ill in Paris. Martin blocks those who would profit from Candide’s 
illness to the point of throwing out a solicitor who asks Candide to pay in advance for 
someone to make sure that he is properly buried as Martin realizes that Candide’s illness 
is not serious and that those around him who know of Candide’s wealth are only seeking 
to profit from it by keeping Candide sick. Martin exhibits the important friendship trait of 
honesty. He is always frank with Candide, arguing against optimism. Its being an honest 
argument, one might see it as a positive element of friendship. Martin recommends that 
Candide forget about his friend Cacambo and reuniting with his love Cunégonde. “La 
mélancholie de Candide augmenta et Martin ne cessait de lui prouver qu’il y avait peu de 
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vertu et peu de bonheur sur la terre” (Voltaire 1972, 342). Martin is always pointing at 
examples in their world of vice and unhappiness.  
Although Martin’s observations are discouraging to Candide, perhaps Martin’s 
arguments also compel Candide to keep searching for the positive outcome. Martin 
cannot protect Candide from all Candide’s naivety as the people he and Martin meet in 
Paris are able to dupe Candide and steal much of Candide’s wealth. Martin, however, 
extracts Candide from precarious situations. The question remains of the extent of 
Martin’s affection for Candide. Martin also, although he is practical in regards to money, 
makes clear that he does not see wealth as the way to alleviate the human suffering. In 
fact, he regards charity as a bad idea when Candide gives money to a former servant girl 
and her friend, and Candide declares that they will be happy: “Je n’en crois rien du tout, 
dit Martin; vous les rendez peut-être avec ces piastres beaucoup plus malheureux 
encore” (Voltaire 1972, 345). Martin doesn’t believe that the couple will be any happier 
with Candide’s gift and that in fact they might become unhappier, and he is proved 
correct later in the story. Furthermore, the recipients never recognize Candide’s 
generosity. From their discourse about wealth and charity, one can guess that Martin is 
not staying with Candide only because of Candide’s jewelry. Martin also wishes Candide 
the happiness that Candide desires in being reunited with his sweetheart, but Martin 
doubts the reunion’s occurrence (Voltaire 1972, 345). 
Cacambo (a rather uncomplimentary name) is probably the nearer possibility to 
the true friend in the classical sense, and he passes through several adventures with 
Candide before Candide meets Martin. As with the classical models, however, there is 
never quite the sense of full equality. There is the hero, and there is his friend. There is 
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Gilgamesh, and there is Enkidu. Although Enkidu’s back story is well developed, it is 
Gilgamesh’s story. In fact, the reader is first introduced to Cacambo as Candide’s valet. 
Despite Cacambo’s supporting role, Voltaire (1972) takes a moment to remind the reader 
of Pangloss’s teaching, as Candide remembers it, that men are equal: “Pangloss m’a 
toujours dit que les hommes sont égaux” (304). Candide always treats Cacambo as a 
friend and partner. An element of reciprocity exists though Cacambo behaves as someone 
serving his master. The narrator offers the following reason for Cacambo’s devotion: “Il 
s’appelait Cacambo, et aimait fort son maître, parce que son maître était un fort bon 
homme” (Voltaire 1972, 299). Simply, Cacambo loves Candide because Candide is a 
good man. The two friends’ both being virtuous is a prerequisite of the classical 
friendship model although ideas of what constitute virtue are in flux. Candide, especially, 
and Cacambo are probably as clean as Voltaire will allow characters to become without 
taking a romantic turn. Cacambo’s virtue resides in his loyalty to Candide. It is fortunate 
for Candide that he relies on Cacambo who gets them out of jams because Cacambo 
keeps his cool (“Cacambo ne perdait jamais la tête”), takes action, and gives good 
advice (Voltaire 1972, 307, 309), which Candide always follows, showing Candide’s 
complete trust.  
Cacambo, in some ways, is representative, too, of the times in which he lives. 
There is a willingness to take calculated risks and the thought of learning or experiencing 
something new is better than the alternative of doing nothing and of trusting to fate. 
Together, Cacambo and Candide are adventurous, ambitious, and hopeful. Cacambo 
encourages Candide to move ahead: “Si nous ne trouvons pas des choses agréable, nous 
trouverons du moins des choses nouvelles” (Voltaire 1972, 310). Cacambo’s many 
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abilities, including that of speaking the native dialect in El Dorado, puts Candide in the 
backseat as Candide follows Cacambo in something of a role reversal: “Candide ne jouait 
plus que le second personnage, et accompagnait son valet” (Voltaire 1972, 313). And, 
the two even behave like questing heroes, though with a twist. Like many of the great 
classical-Christian hero friends, they have a desire for great accomplishments and wealth 
for the sake of being special and above the ordinary crowd. They decide that they cannot 
flaunt themselves if they remain in El Dorado where nothing particular distinguishes one 
person from the other. Furthermore, Candide remains steadfast in his desire to rescue his 
beloved Cunégonde. Cacambo is delighted at the prospect of leaving: “Ce discours plus à 
Cacambo” (Voltaire 1972, 317). As hero friends, Voltaire (1972), ironically, refers to 
Candide and Cacambo, the fellow travelers, as two vagabonds. The two men are not 
warrior heroes like Achilles and Patroclus. Candide and Cacambo become great friends, 
but without the supernatural element. For Voltaire, it would seem that virtuous men can 
become almost archetypical friends but without divine intervention. Of special interest, 
too, is the change in narrative tone. References to actions and activities appear in the 
plural rather than the singular. The reader, furthermore, has access to Cacambo’s 
thoughts. Most other characters in Candide ou l’opimisme are only known by their 
actions and words. As they are about to leave El Dorado, the king embraces “les deux 
vagabonds” tenderly (Voltaire 1972, 318). The two characters are indistinguishable. The 
friends are equals in El Dorado.  
Candide, of course, continues to be romantically hopeful while Cacambo is 
hopeful but in a more practical way. When Candide and Cacambo lose most of the 
treasures that they were able to haul out of El Dorado, Candide tells Cacambo that all the 
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material wealth of the world is perishable. All that matters to him is the virtue and the 
happiness of being reunited with the one he loves, Cunégonde. While Cacambo agrees 
with Candide, he takes stock of what they still have in terms of resources. Cacambo is 
optimistic that they will be able to pursue Candide’s goal with what they have remaining: 
“Mon ami, vous voyez comme la richesse de ce monde sont périssables. Il n’y a rien de 
solide que la vertu et le bonheur de revoir Mlle Cunégonde. – Je l’avoue, dit Cacambo; 
mais il nous reste encore deux moutons avec plus de trésors que n’en aura jamais le roi 
d’Espagne” (Voltaire 1972, 319). Although the people one cares about are the most 
important thing, one still needs earthly resources to move ahead.  
Ultimately, Candide and Cacambo decide to separate. Cacambo is charged with 
taking some of their diamonds and with arranging Cunégunde’s freedom from the 
Argentine governor while Candide makes his way with the remaining jewels to Venice, 
which Candide thinks is a free country (Voltaire, 1972, 321). Candide cannot return to 
Argentina where he is a fugitive, and he claims that Cacambo is more capable than he is: 
“Tu es plus habile que moi” (Ibid.). Candide, in tasking Cacambo, addresses him as his 
dear friend: “Voici, mon cher ami, lui dit il, ce qu’il faut que tu fasses” (Ibid.). Cacambo 
is reluctant to leave Candide, not only because he is a good master, but because he has 
become a close friend. His pleasure in rendering a service to his friend, however, 
outweighs his distress at separating from him: “Il était au désespoir de se séparer d’un 
bon maître, devenu son ami intime; mais le plaisir de lui être utile l’importa sur la 
douleur de le quitter” (Ibid.). 
The way things have gone for Candide, he has mostly been used by the people 
whom he has trusted, for Candide always begins by believing the good. Martin will be 
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one exception, but Cacambo is by far the greater one. Cacambo’s willingness to 
undertake such a difficult task and the hardships he suffers with Candide as Cacambo 
tries to complete his mission are in keeping with the hero friend tradition. Cacambo is 
faithful to Candide from start to finish. Candide, too, never loses faith in his friend: “Je 
compte sur Cacambo comme sur moi même” (Voltaire 1972, 341). Candide relies on 
Cacambo as he relies on himself. Although it is beginning to look hopeless, and Candide 
begins to fear the worst, Cacambo reappears: “Il se retourne et voit Cacambo. Il n’y avait 
que la vue de Cunégonde qui put l’étonner et lui plaire d’avantage. Il fut sur le point de 
devenir fou de joie. Il embrasse son cher ami” (Voltaire 1972, 352). Candide turns and 
sees Cacambo. There was only the sight of Cunégonde that could astound and please him 
more. He was on the verge of being crazy with joy. He embraces his dear friend. 
If the friendship between Candide and Cacambo meets much of the criteria of the 
classical-Christian friendship as expressed in the earliest friendship fiction, how is this 
18th century friendship different as a consequence of print culture? 
The slave states still exist in Voltaire’s time, but some are beginning to question 
the notion of slavery. According to Poe (2011), print culture, from the increased 
availability of documentation and written works and the subsequent growing literacy of 
the population, leans toward egalitarianism. “Accessible media engender diffuse 
networks, and diffuse networks tend to equalize the social practices and values that grow 
with them” (Poe 2011, 117). The master and slave relationship becomes superficial as the 
friendship between Candide and Cacambo matures. Cacambo, too, is of mixed race, but 
part Spanish (Voltaire 1972, 299). Candide, though German and reared in a noble’s 
household, is a bastard. It is unlikely that two such people, though they might be regarded 
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as misfits, could meet each other and a friendship form in the classical world, but 
technology makes such a union possible in the 18th century. The proposal has been to 
make the connection to communication technology, but one must acknowledge the 
importance of transportation and navigation technologies that have enabled the 
exploration of the planet and the subsequent encounter with new and different human 
beings. Although Voltaire never traveled overseas, he was familiar with geography and 
colonization had invaded other cultures. Much of his knowledge had to be obtained 
through print media. 
 Another important aspect of the Candide/Cacambo friendship is in Voltaire’s 
distancing it from the classical model in ways that can be attributed to Voltaire’s 
penchant for progress. Modern man is moving away from the veneration of the re-
discovered classics. One could say that Voltaire wishes to distance himself from 
Renaissance thinking. Progress is not a rebirth but a new birth. In other words, one should 
keep only what is useful from the past and move forward. The remainder can be 
discarded; and so it would seem, might certain imperatives of the classical friendship 
model.  When Candide and Martin visit an Italian noble, Pococuranté, the senator is 
disdainful of nearly everything that is generally appreciated, including the classics. 
Pococuranté keeps Homer in his library because it is expected, and he compares the Iliad 
to a rusty medal that doesn’t serve any purpose but that one possesses as a keepsake or as 
a tribute to antiquity: “Tout les gens sincères m’ont avoué que le livre leur tombait des 
mains, mais qu’il fallait toujours avoir un dans sa bibliotèque, comme un monument de 
l’antiquité, et comme ces médailles rouiées qui ne peuvent être de commerce” (Voltaire 
1972, 348). Pococuranté explains that he reads only for himself and likes only that which 
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is useful to him. Only fools admire everything esteemed authors say: “Les sots admirent 
tout dans un auteur estimé, je ne lis que pour moi; je n’aime que ce qui est à mon usage” 
(Voltaire 1972, 349). Candide, the reader learns, has been taught never to judge anything 
for himself, and he is taken aback. Pococuranté is critical of classical literature and 
possibly literature in general unless there is something useful within: “Il n’y a dans tous 
ces livres que de vains systèmes et pas une seule chose utile” (Ibid.). Pococuranté values 
practical inventions and the rest is rubbish (Ibid.). However, Pococuranté demonstrates 
another important quality of the times: the freedom of expression. One has the right to 
write what he thinks: “Oui, il est beau d’écrire ce qu’on pense; c’est le privilège de 
l’homme” (Voltaire 1972, 350). The rules, then, for friendship, are not so rigid, and the 
utilitarian possibilities of friendship are not so unpalatable.  
Candide’s optimism does, however, gradually change. Cunégonde has always 
represented Candide’s hope, and she has always been more of an illusion than a reality. 
To him, she is pure beauty and can only be the ultimate happiness. When Candide and 
Cunégonde are finally reunited, she has transformed, which is representative of 
Candide’s perception of the world, into something less savory. Cunégonde has lost her 
beauty, and her personality is almost insupportable; but Candide marries her regardless, 
thus hanging onto hope though the world itself may seem as lusterless as Cunégonde has 
become. One must cultivate one’s own garden, as Candide learns, remaining hopeful, yet 
seeing things as they really are and with the understanding that one must work in order to 
attain something. Certainly, Candide gets plenty of help from his friends, Cacambo and 
Martin, throughout his adventures, and he cultivates those friendships. In the end, 
Candide’s circle of friends and acquaintances has begun to work together. They are 
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engaged and are becoming more satisfied people. One might see friendship in a similar 
light as something that can grow over time and is not preordained. The picaresque novel 
Guzmán de Alfarache also infers that friendship is a work in progress. Friends are 
engaged together in some sort of action, which is also true in the great hero friendships. 
Voltaire (1972) wishes to show, too, that the nobility and the clergy are excluded 
from the working association, and therefore, perhaps, from the possibility genuine human 
connectedness. Voltaire may be suggesting that their minds are corrupted beyond 
recovery. Cunégonde’s brother has fallen in with Candide’s band, but he still sees himself 
as apart and superior to the other group members despite having much for which to thank 
Candide. After everything, including Candide’s rescue of the baron brother, Cunégonde’s 
brother can still not condone his sister’s marriage to Candide. It would be beneath his 
sister to marry someone who is not of noble ancestry. Candide asks the advice of all the 
group members. The baron is turned over to certain authorities who are in pursuit of him. 
The baron, who represents the nobility, is in this way discarded by the group because he 
cannot become a cooperative, useful member.  
One should also not the connection to Molière’s Le Misanthrope (2006) in 
Candide. Candide is Alceste but without Alceste’s sense of moral righteousness and 
superiority. Simply put, Candide is likeable and Alceste is not. Candide is Dudley Do-
Right of the Canadian Mounties (ABC, NBC, CBS 1961-1970) while Alceste is Oedipus, 
or Creon in Antigone—perhaps someone to be pitied. Alceste’s hubris is what corrupts 
him. Candide is something of an innocent. Candide trusts everyone. He does not pass 
judgment on anyone while he tries to live honorably. Candide simply reacts rightly, as it 
were, because he believes that there is a reason for everything and that everything will 
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turn out for the best. Fortunately, his friends are like Philinte although never critical of 
Candide, and Candide heeds their wisdom. Cacambo and Martin are devoted friends who 
live by code of common sense. Candide has faith in them while Philinte’s sensible advice 
and approach are disdainful to Alceste. While Cacambo and Martin help Candide through 
his trials, Alceste will not compromise according to Philinte’s counsel. The land of El 
Dorado, too, could be a reference to Le Misanthrope and Alceste’s declaration that he is 
going to seek a hidden place away from vice where one is free to be an honorable man: 
Je vais sortir d’un gouffre où triomphent les vices,  
et chercher sur la terre un endroit écarté  
Où  d’être homme d’honneur on ait la liberté. (Molière 2006, 133) 
This place, an El Dorado, is a mythical one. In the end, Candide and his friends must 
integrate themselves into society. Alceste is like the baron, Cunégonde’s brother. He is 
too good for the others and therefore cannot integrate. 
 
Jeannot et Colin 
Voltaire (1972) touches on friendship in another of his short works, “Jeannot et 
Colin,” which is a story about two friends and how Jeannot’s sudden acquisition of 
wealth and position cause a schism of the friendship. The compiler of the collection in 
which the story is found refers to it as a tribute to sincere friendship (Van Den Heuvel, 
ed. 1972, 461). The story’s narrator describes the friendship of Jeannot and Colin as 
something private and familiar that one always recollects with pleasure later on: “Ils 
s’amaient beaucoup, et ils avaient ensemble de petites privautés, de petites familiarités, 
dont on se ressouvient toujours avec agrément quand on se rencontre ensuite dans le 
monde” (Voltaire 1972, 462).  
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Once fortunes change for Jeannot and he is suddenly the son of a rich man, he 
becomes a pompous ass. Colin is happy for his friend and the narrator tells the reader that 
Colin is never jealous though he admires his friend’s new clothes: “Colin admira l’habit 
mais ne fut point jaloux” (Voltaire 1972, 463). Jeannot, however, assumes an air of 
superiority over his friend. When Jeannot is called to Paris to join his parents, he looks 
down from his carriage at Colin in the manner of a sympathetic lord. Jeannot makes 
Colin feel like nothing, and Colin cries: “Colin sentit son néant et pleura” (1972, 463). 
Colin is deeply hurt that Jeannot has forgotten their friendship. 
Jeannot and his parents are easily ensnared and fleeced while living in Paris. A 
neighboring widow fastens onto Jeannot and his family in a wish to secure their wealth 
for herself. She seduces Jeannot and befriends his parents. Plans for marriage ensue. The 
wedding, however, is never realized when Jeannot and his family find themselves 
bankrupt. In desperation Jeannot turns to his former tutor who is unsympathetic, and 
Jeannot understands that he has learned nothing from him. Jeannot then turns to his 
mother’s confessor who is at first pleased to see Jeannot and inquires about his mother. 
Once the priest learns of the family’s plight, he grows indifferent and claims that it is by 
God’s grace Jeannot’s mother has been reduced to beggary, thus assuring her salvation. 
When Jeannot asks whether there’s any possibility of earthly aid, the priest bids him 
farewell, for a rich woman is waiting to be confessed. His new friends, furthermore, have 
nothing to offer him. He is treated the same by his friends as he is by everyone else. The 
marquis Jeannot is on the verge of passing out. The narrator tells us that Jeannot has 
learned more in half a day than for the rest of his life: “Le marquis fut prêt à s’evanouir; 
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il fut traité à peu pres de même par ses amis, et appris mieux à connaître le monde dans 
une demi-journée que dans tout le reste de sa vie” (Voltaire 1972, 470).  
Blind with despair, Jeannot does not notice a heavily loaded wagon approaching 
with two rustic types, a man and woman, driving it. It is Colin and his wife. Colin 
recognizes Jeannot and calls out his name. When Colin sees Jeannot, he is overcome with 
joy and leaps from the wagon, embracing his old friend. Remembering his treatment of 
Colin, Jeannot is ashamed; but Colin immediately forgives him: “Tu m’as abandonné, dit 
Colin; mais tu as beau être grand seigneur, je t’aimerais toujours” (Voltaire 1972, 471). 
One might say that like the prodigal son, the prodigal friend has returned. Although 
Jeannot abandoned Colin and is a great lord, Colin will love Jeannot always. The reader 
learns that Colin has worked hard and started up a good business. He married a rich 
merchant’s daughter, and they are happy. Once he learns of Jeannot’s misfortune, he 
immediately offers to teach Jeannot the trade and bring him into the business back where 
they grew up. “Nous travaillons beaucoup; Dieu nous bénit; nous n’avons point changé 
d’état; nous sommes heureux, nous aiderons notre ami Jeannot” (Ibid.). In short, Colin 
says that they work a lot, that God blesses them, that they haven’t changed, that they are 
happy, and that they will help their friend Jeannot. Colin adds that all the world’s 
splendors are not worth a good friend: “Toutes les grandeurs de ce monde ne valent pas 
un bon ami” (Ibid.). Jeannot, deeply moved, whispers to himself, “Tous mes amis du bel 
air m’ont trahi, et Colin, que j’ai méprisé, vient seul à mon secours” (Voltaire 1972, 
472). Colin is muttering that all his fancy friends betrayed him, and the one he was 
contemptuous of, Colin, is the only one who comes to his aid.  
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 Voltaire (1972) goes a bit beyond himself to end the story, and one might think it 
were Rousseau saying it. The reader learns that the bounty of Colin’s soul cultivates the 
heart of Jeannot who regains his natural goodness that the world had not yet totally 
extinguished (Voltaire 1972, 472). “Le bonté de l’âme de Colin développa dans le coeur 
de Jeannot le germe du bon naturel, que le monde n’avait pas encore étouffé.” Voltaire 
gives way here to the intangible, the possibility of a transcendent good, and his short tale 
of Jeannot and Colin suggests that the true friend can revive the goodness in the other, as 
that goodness was there in the first place. The story of Jeannot and Colin is an argument 
for the transcendent nature of the best kind of friendship. Only the corrupting influences 
of humanity itself can drive out the spirit of a great friendship once forged. 
 As in Candide ou L’Optimism, however, there is a new kind of friendship. The 
best of friends are not heroes or demigods. They are regular people, in the case of Jeannot 
and Colin, two small town boys who grew up together. It is the beginning of a middle 
class, a hardworking bourgeoisie who are skilled laborers and who live by common 
sense. They are engaged. The life of leisure, one might say, is detrimental to the right and 
virtuous attitudes necessary for friendship. There are not so many heroic deeds to be done 
as practical ones to be accomplished. The church and the nobility are corrupt. For 
Voltaire, the goodness and the virtue cannot emerge from those quarters; but again let it 
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Diderot and the Fortune of Friendship 
 
Diderot (1936) may have read Voltaire’s “Jeannot et Colin,” for his “Les Deux 
Amis de Bourbonne” is also about two friends who grow up together and who are not 
much more than simple peasants. In this story, Diderot includes many classic elements in 
his depiction of friendship while continuing Voltaire’s criticism of the ruling class and its 
apparatus that includes clergy and government officials among whom, for Voltaire and 
Diderot, there can be few sincere friendship bonds of the everlasting kind. 
 The staging of Olivier and Félix’s friendship is in keeping with the classical 
tradition of an almost preordained or divinely arranged friendship. The two friends are in 
fact two cousins who are born in the same house on the same day and at the same hour. 
They are the offspring of two sisters, one of whom dies in childbirth so that the two 
friends are nursed by the surviving sister and reared as brothers. They are always 
together. Each saves the life of the other. They are always looking out for each other. 
Destiny would have it that they are conscripted together, and in battle each is willing to 
sacrifice his life for his friend. One of the friends, Félix, takes a blow to the face meant 
for Olivier and remains scarred. Never does either friend brag of what he has done for the 
other. Instead, each friend sings the praises of the other. When one of the two boasts, it is 
always of the other’s deeds (Diderot 1936, 371-372). 
When both friends wish to be with the same woman, the friend who first realizes 
their mutual desire, Félix, withdraws and leaves the field open to his friend, Olivier, who, 
unaware of his friend’s feelings and action, marries the woman. Félix is unconsciously 
distressed and unhappy with life at this occurrence (Diderot 1936, 372). At first, one 
might think he is resentful and that Diderot’s story is about a great friendship gone sour 
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for the love of a woman; however, Félix is likely pained most because Olivier’s marriage 
has separated the two friends. The depressed Félix immerses himself in dangerous 
activities and becomes an arms smuggler. When Félix is captured, he is sentenced to 
hang. Olivier, learning of Félix’s plight, rushes to the magistrate. He wishes to see and 
speak to Félix before the execution. The magistrate intentionally delays Olivier so that he 
only has time to reach Félix as his neck is about to be placed in the noose. Olivier goes 
berserk. In violent combat he is able to free Félix, who escapes, but Olivier is mortally 
wounded and dumped on his own doorstep. Olivier’s last words to his wife are about 
Félix. Olivier seems satisfied to die knowing that Félix lives. Meanwhile, Félix is 
unaware of his friend’s death (Diderot 1936, 372-373). 
When Olivier dies, the story becomes Félix’s. Upon learning of Olivier’s death, 
Félix also wants to die, but then he understands that Olivier’s wife and children along 
with the widow of another faithful friend and their children need Félix. Even after his 
friends have died, Félix tries to ensure the wellbeing of the two families, and his 
relationship to the widows remains Platonic. He becomes St. Joseph, carrying out the 
duties of both father and husband without reaping any benefits. In this way, too, it can be 
said that Félix gives up his life for his friend, and even for another lesser but loyal friend 
whom Félix met while smuggling goods (Diderot 1936, 377-378).  
One of the principal qualities of the two friends is loyalty. This virtue operates 
when Félix becomes the game warden of a rich man’s estate. His employer is benevolent, 
and the two might be regarded as friends. When the owner is threatened in a property 
dispute, Félix defends him. In the scuffle Félix, who always carries his sword, cuts off 
part of the antagonist’s arm. He is eventually forced to flee to Prussia where he serves in 
  175 
le régiment de gardes, which is like a king’s personal troop, and where he is well liked by 
his comrades although he goes by the nickname, le Triste, or The Sad.  Perhaps Diderot is 
reminding the reader that Félix’s other half, his friend Olivier, is dead. Félix continues, 
however, to help Olivier’s widow from a distance (Diderot 1936, 379-380).  
Diderot allows his narrator to close the tale, and after Diderot steps in to add a 
brief critical discourse defining types of stories, he follows up with a final word on 
friendship. He posits that only people who have nothing can know true friendship 
because they have nothing but their friendship upon which to depend; such friendships 
are reliable and sure. Each friend is the fortune of the other, and hardships faced together, 
which are the truth of experience, bind the friends even more closely together. “Il ne peut 
y avoir d’amitiés entières et solides qu’entre des hommes qui n’ont rien. Un homme  
alors est toute la fortune de son ami, et son ami est toute la sienne. De là vérité 
d’expèrience, que le malheur resserre les liens” (Diderot 1936, 385). The hero friends in 
“Les Deux Amis de Bourbonne” fight and live with the same courage as Achilles and 
Patroclus, but they are not princes or leaders or demigods. They do not, furthermore, 
engage in the noblest endeavors. Félix is a smuggler, a criminal. Olivier becomes a 
criminal when he kills to save his criminal friend. Still, Olivier and Félix fit the classical 
friendship paradigm. Their loyalty to each other and Félix’s continued support of 
Olivier’s family speak for their virtue.  
In terms of communication and the effects of communication technology on 
friendship, one should register Diderot’s narrative style in “Les Deux Amis de 
Bourbonne.” The story is told entirely by letter from sister to brother, and it includes 
other letters from other persons who add to the story.  
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One of the letters, in fact, argues against venerating the friendship. It is a letter 
from the local pastor, who makes a somewhat ironic claim. Because neither friend 
expresses any religious sentiment or intent, according to him, the friendship is 
ignominious. The irony exists because of the incredible circumstances that unite the two 
friends from birth as if it the friendship were intended. The two are one from the 
beginning, born the same day at the same hour, always together, and nursed by the same 
mother they are not brothers. Augustine (2002), Aelred (2010) and even Montaigne 
(1965, 1993) submit that there must be some divine intervention. Félix and Olivier are 
inseparable friends who depend upon each other from beginning to end. When Olivier is 
killed saving Félix from the gallows, Félix continues to serve his friend loyally by caring 
for his wife and family. Both friends give their lives for each other because they are each 
other’s life.  
A faithful friend is a strong defence: and he that hath found such as one hath 
found a treasure. Nothing doth countervail a faithful friend, and his excellency is 
invaluable. A faithful friend is the medicine of life; and they that fear the Lord 
shall find him. ([NAB] Ecclesiastics VI, 14-16) 
Félix and Olivier, the friends seem to have been created for each other and placed  
together. 
Two differences from the classical friendships in literature stand out as friendship 
narratives emerge from the print era. First, one can become friends with someone outside 
his or her social milieu, Candide and Cacambo’s friendship being the best example. 
Friendship is also something for the common folk. It is no longer the thing of demigods 
and mythological heroes. Jeannot and Colin grow up together and are products of an 
emerging merchant class. Félix and Olivier are plain poor. Extraordinary friendship is not 
confined, thus, to those who are practically superhuman. 
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Print Culture: Access to Paper, Pen and Ink 
Letter writing and corresponding is an attribute of print culture, for it is during the 
print era that written communication flourishes, and this form of communication is often 
explicit in fiction literature. “Les deux amis de Bourbonnes” is a story told by letter, and 
there is also Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther (1962) that is told through 
correspondence from Werther to his friend William. Rousseau (1952) does much to 
encourage this sort of narrative with his novel Julie ou La Nouvelle Heloïse, which he 
calls “lettres de deux amants habitants d’une petite ville au pied des Alpes,” or letters of 
two lovers, inhabitants of a small town at the foot of the Alps. Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein (1976) is a letter from brother to sister and begins as the brother describes 
his expedition towards the North Pole. The brother is aboard ship and cannot, ironically, 
send his letters, so one might consider his writing almost journalistic in nature, his having 
a recipient, his sister, making it easier for him to recount events in narrative form. As the 
ship sails north, they are caught up in ice. The captain and his crew are astounded to 
encounter the lone traveler, Victor Frankenstein, on the ice. It is here that the story truly 
begins as Frankenstein tells all to the captain, the captain brother records it for his sister. 
In the end, after Frankenstein’s death, the brother has a direct discourse with the creature, 
which is where the story finally ends upon the creature’s leaving the vessel. 
 The Sorrows of Young Werther (1962) is also an expression of communication 
between to friends in the sense of sharing one’s innermost thoughts and feelings. Werther 
and Lotte participate together in poetry and literature. In effect, one could say that they 
cultivate their full sensibilities together but paradoxically sensual without the sexual. 
There is, nevertheless, proximity, despite the high state of literacy and intellectual 
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examination. Werther, in many ways, could be compared to Lotte’s canary. Werther’s 
letter to William describes sensuality without full consummation: 
“My new friend,” she said, and coaxed him onto her hand… “He is such a darling. 
Look, when I give him bread, he flutters and picks it up so neatly. And he kisses 
me. Look!” 
She held the little creature to her mouth, and it touched her beloved lips so 
sweetly, as if it could feel the bliss it was being granted. 
“Let him kiss you, too,” she said, stretching out her hand to me, with the bird on 
it. His little beak found its way from her mouth to mine, and the little peck it gave 
me was like a breath, a premonition of the delights of love.” (Goethe 1962, 90) 
Werther responds: “’I wouldn’t say that his kiss was entirely without desire,’ I said, ‘He 
seeks food, and the kiss leaves him unsatisfied’” (Ibid.). One wonders whether Lotte 
understands the symbolism and that it is too much for Werther. 
The Confusion of Marriage and Gender in Friendship 
The saddest friendship conclusion, much of it via letter, is that of Werther, and 
Goethe’s story is a response to Rousseau’s Julie (1952) and also to some of Rousseau’s 
philosophical discourse as everything falls apart for Werther. It raises several questions, 
one of which has to do with whether written correspondence can fulfill the need for 
friendship. It also takes on the difficult question of friendship possibilities between a man 
and a woman when one is unable to subdue his or her desire for total union. Finally, 
nature enters into the discourse and whether it can substitute somehow for the absence of 
companionship. 
Although Werther is in the midst of correspondence with his friend, he does not 
feel the sense of the friend’s presence, and Werther bemoans his solitude; for it gives play 
to the imagination. Werther writes:  
  179 
Nothing is therefore more dangerous than solitude. Our imagination, forced by its 
very nature to unfold, nourished by the fantastic visions of poetry, gives shape to 
a whole order of creatures of which we are the lowliest, and everything around us 
seems to be more glorious, everyone else more perfect. (Goethe 1962, 72) 
 
This passage suggests that writing cannot substitute for proximity. The ability to interact 
with others in an active interchange can thwart negative imaginings. The heavy 
ponderings of Werther, upon which he can deliberate while writing to William, cannot be 
answered quickly enough by his friend. Werther’s correspondence is more akin to an 
internal reflection than to an exchange of ideas, and his writing leads him unchecked 
down a murky corridor to eventual self-destruction, the preparation for which he 
documents. Writing proves to be negative therapy for Werther, and it would seem to 
allow Werther to defer the intervention of his friend, William. Werther’s letters have 
alarmed William to the point of taking action, and Werther acknowledges the friendship: 
“I can thank your love for me, William, for the fact that you understand me as you did. 
You are right, it is best for me to leave…but it suits me very well that you want to come 
and fetch me, only please let a fortnight pass and wait for one more letter from me” 
(Goethe 1962, 109). 
However, one should not infer that Werther’s ability to write down his thoughts 
drove him to suicide. One should enter, instead, into the problem of an unrequited love 
and the potential for difficulty in the friendship between opposite sexes, at least so far as 
Goethe and others of his time might perceive it. When Lotte marries Albert, their mutual 
friend, the friendship undergoes a challenge. Werther and Albert become more 
uncomfortable with each other as Werther wishes to be near his friend Lotte as he always 
has. Werther’s friendship crosses a boundary when he realizes that he cannot be separated 
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from her. In effect, the relationship of Werther and Lotte could be defined as something 
of a soul-mate friendship, and Werther is unnerved knowing that he can never enter into 
the fullest kind of relationship with Lotte because of her husband. Lotte tries to reason 
with Werther when she recognizes his yearning for total fulfillment and that his 
friendship for her is no longer a virtue but perhaps an excess: “’I implore you,’” she went 
on, taking him by the hand, “’practice moderation! Your mind—all your knowledge and 
talents…think of the happiness they can give you! Be more manly! Divert this tragic 
devotion from a human creature who can only pity you’” (Goethe 1962, 111). She 
suggests that the friendship has degenerated into a wish to possess the object of affection: 
“’Why me, Werther? Why me of all people, who belongs to another? Why? I fear…I fear 
that it is just the impossibility of possessing me that makes your desire for me so 
fascinating’” (Ibid.). 
Lotte, however, is not without guilt, as she reflects upon her own wish to possess 
Werther although her desire is not that of a woman for a man: “After her last talk with 
Werther, she had begun to realize how hard it would be for her to part with him and how 
much he would suffer if forced to leave her” (Goethe 1962, 114). Furthermore, she 
knows that her relationship with her husband is something different, not the kind of bond 
that she shares with Werther: “She was accustomed to sharing everything that interested 
her with him, and his loss threatened to tear a gap into her life that she feared could never 
again be closed. If only she could have turned him into a brother at this point, how happy 
it would have made her!” (Goethe 1962, 114-115). The connection between Werther and 
Lotte is powerful, special, but wedlock disrupts it. Lotte’s husband, Albert, cannot 
replace what Werther gives her, but Werther cannot replace the husband:  
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As a result of these reflections she began to realize, without admitting to herself 
too clearly, that it was her secret but sincere desire to keep him for herself. At the 
same time she told herself that she couldn’t keep him, she had no right to. Her 
lovely spirit, usually so light and so easily able to help itself, suddenly felt the 
pressure of a melancholy to which all prospects of happiness were closed. 
(Goethe 1962, 115) 
 
One is left with the question of whether or not the consummation of the friendship as a 
marriage between man and woman could have alleviated all suffering and made both the 
lives of Werther and Lotte blissful, but Lotte was never able to envision Werther in that 
way while Werther seems uncontrollably propelled in that direction, against his will. 
Werther, in a final letter to Lotte before his suicide, allows himself full freedom of 
expression: 
And what difference does it make that Albert is your husband? Husband—that’s a 
word for this world, and in this world it’s a sin that I love you and would wrench 
you out of his arms into mine. A sin? Very well then, and I punish myself for it. I 
have tasted this sin in all its divine rapture. I have sucked its balm and strength 
into my heart. From now on you are mine—mine, Lotte! I go on ahead to my 
Father. To Him I will complain, and He will comfort me until you come, and I fly 
to meet you and enfold you and remain at your side in the sight of Infinite God in 
one eternal embrace. (Goethe 1962, 124) 
The dilemma becomes entirely Lotte’s. She must be frank and true to her husband, but it 
means losing Werther: “Again and again her thoughts reverted to Werther, who was lost 
to her, whom she could not abandon, yet, alas, had to abandon, to whom—once he had 
lost her—nothing was left” (Goethe 1962, 125).  
 The fictional Alceste in Le Misanthrope (2006) breaks ranks with his 
contemporaries and claims to be leaving to find his El Dorado. Rousseau (2012), in Les 
Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, also gives up on society in a real experiment, but 
instead of El Dorado, he finds solace in nature as a lone traveler, free of human 
encumbrances. Neither the fictional Alceste nor Rousseau commits suicide. Alceste still 
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has hope, although El Dorado is mythical, and Rousseau, alone in nature, finds 
forgetfulness:  
Les jours où je ne vois personne, je ne pense plus à ma destinée, je ne la sens 
plus, je ne souffre plus, je suis heureux et content sans diversion, sans 
obstacle....Le trouble de mon coeur disparaît avec l’objet qui l’a causé et je 
rentre dans le calme aussitôt que je suis seul....Et sitôt que je me vois sous les 
arbres, au milieu de la verdure, je crois me voir dans le paradis terrestre. 
(Rousseau 2012, 150-151) 
 
[The days when I see no one, I do not think of my destiny, I don’t feel it anymore, 
I suffer no more, I am happy and content without diversion, without obstacle…the 
troubles of my heart disappear with its cause [society] and I enter into a calmness 
as soon as I am alone…and as soon as I am under the trees, in the middle of the 
greenery, I believe myself to be in earthly paradise.] 
 
Werther is incapable of such a retreat. In his despair he talks in one of his letters to his 
friend William about human powerlessness and nature’s personality:  
Who can say, ‘That’s how it is!’ when all things are transient and roll away with 
the passing storm, and one’s powers so rarely suffice to one’s span of life but are 
carried off in the torrent to sink and to be dashed against the rocks? There is not a 
moment in which one is not a destroyer and has to be a destroyer (Goethe 1962, 
65).  
 
Furthermore, referring to nature, he writes: “My heart is undermined by the consuming 
power that lies hidden in the Allness of nature….I can see nothing but an eternally 
devouring, eternally regurgitating monster” (Goethe 1962, 65). Nature’s beauty and 
serenity instead give way, and nature’s images contribute “aux idées de suicide” (Erik 
Leborgne 2012, 191). Nature cannot substitute for the embrace of another human being.  
The jilted lover is the person alone, and his or her suicide is a familiar theme. The irony 
remains, however, of Werther’s general disenchantment with society and his disgust at 
the need to compromise with its rules: “Le désespoir amoureux va de pair avec le 
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désenchantement du monde et le dégoût profond des compromis imposé par la société” 
(Ibid.). 
The separateness of friendship and marriage are hardly questioned by the 
ancients. The early moderns often seem to raise the question without realizing it. The 
tenability of solitude has become a debatable topic where once it was loathsome for a 
person to be alone. Nature was once a mysterious place where dragons might be 
disturbed. Rousseau (2012) calls it paradise on earth and human science views it as a 
great though still dangerous playground by the end of the 18th century. It is no longer 
something to be wondered at for the entrepreneur. It is something to be overcome and 
exploited.  
Samuel Johnson (2006) can serve as another spokesperson for the 18th century as 
he responds to the question of solitude and to a lesser degree to that of nature. For 
Johnson, such questions have to do more with belief than with truth. In his philosophical 
fiction, The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia the protagonists visit a hermit’s cave 
and the hermit, who has “lived fifteen years in solitude” shares his thoughts on living 
alone, and he begins with his reasons for choosing separation as a relatively young 
military officer: “I resolved to close my life in peace, having found the world full of 
snares, discord and misery” (Johnson 2006, 460). The hermit, at first, delights in: “the 
sudden change of the noise and hurry of war, to stillness and repose” (Ibid.). When the 
“novelty” dissipates, he turns to the study of the plants and minerals around him, but that 
activity he says “has now grown tasteless and irksome” (Ibid.). Like Werther, the hermit 
has grown susceptible, in his solitude, to his imagination, and he is, perhaps, at same time 
an Alceste grown old:  
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My mind is disturbed with a thousand perplexities of doubt, and vanities of 
imagination, which hourly prevail upon me…I am sometimes ashamed to think 
that I could not secure myself from vice, but by retiring from the exercise of 
virtue, and begin to suspect that I was rather impelled by resentment, than led by 
devotion, into solitude…In solitude, if I escape the example of bad men, I want 
likewise the counsel and conversation of the good. I have been comparing the 
evils with the advantages of society, and resolve to return into the world 
tomorrow. The life of a solitary man will be certainly miserable, but not certainly 
devout. (Johnson 2006, 460) 
 When Resselas returns from his visit with the hermit, he visits an assembly of  
“learned men” and shares the hermit’s reasoning. One of the philosophers, perhaps 
 Rousseau, latches onto the topic of nature:  
The way to be happy is to live is to live according to nature, in obedience to that 
universal and unalterable law with which every heart is originally impressed; 
which is not written on it by precept, but engraven by destiny, not instilled by 
education, but infused at our nativity. He that lives according to nature will suffer 
nothing from the delusions of hope, or importunities of desire: he will receive and 
reject with equability of temper; and act or suffer as the reason of things shall 
alternately prescribe. (Johnson 2006, 463) 
When Prince Resselas asks to “know what it is to live with nature,” the response becomes 
almost incoherent, and the prince finds that: “this was one of the sages whom he should 
understand less as he heard him longer” (Johnson 2006, 463). Had the prince been able to 
visit Thoreau at Walden Pond, perhaps he would have been able to continue the 
discussion about solitude, nature and friendship.  
 Print culture has decidedly expanded the borders of friendship and created new 
discourse. Nineteenth century writers and thinkers will refine the discourse and add 
considerably to the friendship discussion, but the 19th century is principally the solid 
body of the print era, which extends into the 20th century. The classical-Christian 
friendship paradigm survives although it undergoes considerable refinement. In fiction 
literature, great friendships continue to showcase the best human qualities.  




The Classical-Christian Friendship at the Apex of Print Culture 
 
 
The 19th century into the early 20th century is arguably the time range between 
which the fullest influence of print media occurs as most of Western civilization becomes 
a mature print culture; for the incursion of other media, or new media, remains nominal.  
The telegraph and the telephone are still comparative toddlers although the telegraph 
accelerates print culture. Film is still in incubation as the world enters the 20th century. 
The most discernable alteration to print culture might derive from the medium of 
photography. As the telegraph and telephone heat up print media by allowing news to 
travel faster, so does the printed picture put one sense, sight, in higher definition, thus 
raising the temperature: “A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in ‘high 
definition.’ High definition is the state of being well filled with data. A photograph, 
visually, is high definition” (McLuhan 1964, 36). Print media becomes more concretely 
visual by the infusion of photographs, especially in periodicals. Photographs might seem 
to be more factual than the images that can be generated by the artist, draftsman, or even 
the engineer. For instance, McLuhan (1964) calls cartoons “low definition simply 
because very little visual information is provided” (1964, 36). In other words, the receiver 
is left with more to infer and interpret than he or she might be if viewing a photograph, 
and obviously much more to infer without any visual imagery and the sometimes 
challenging task of decoding only language symbols.  Readers of newspapers and 
magazines find images added to the code as the 19th century progresses. Friendship, 
however, in the classical style, with all its requirements, holds the road admirably across 
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another media bridge and into the 20th century. Its survival, furthermore, continues to 
prompt increasingly important discussions about solitude and gender.  
 A good laboratory for discussions of friendship is North America, for it is a place 
where European theories are forcefully applied and where, paradoxically, there is a 
powerful striving to break from European thinking and to build something unique: “The 
persons are such as we; the Europe an old faded garment of dead persons; the books their 
ghosts” (Emerson 1993, 49). Emerson’s tone, by White’s analysis, might seem both 
romantic and, subsequently, anarchist (2014, 29). It is a “repudiation of the Ironic 
attitude” (White 2014, 38). White does well to express Emerson’s thinking and the 
romantic position as it counters the rationalist, ironic view. It is the song of the self-
reliant posture of an individual living honorably and making his or her proper decisions:  
There was a sense in which one could legitimately maintain that man [the 
individual] was both in nature and outside it, that he participated in the natural 
process, but that he could also transcend that process in consciousness in, assume 
a position outside it [as Rousseau had done (2012)] and view the process as 
manifested in those levels of natural integration which were demonstrably non- or 
prehuman. (White 2014, 45-46) 
 
The transcendentalist position is integrating and metaphorically the concept is that of 
synecdoche, when the metaphor represents essences rather than parts. Therefore, “claims 
to an essential ‘realism’ were at once epistemological and ethical (White 2014, 46). The 
individual, by living rightly, has great power to “know ‘reality’” (Ibid.). The Classical-
Christian friendship model crosses the Atlantic with the first Europeans, and Emerson’s 
poem, “Friendship,” records its arrival: 
A ruddy drop of manly blood 
The surging sea outweighs, 
The world uncertain comes and goes, 
The lover rooted stays. 
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I fancied he was fled, 
And, after many a year, 
Glowed unexhausted kindliness 
Like daily sunrise there. 
My carefree heart was free again,-- 
O friend, my bosom said, 
Through thee alone the sky is arched, 
Through thee the rose is red, 
All things through thee take nobler form, 
And look beyond the earth, 
And is the mill-round of our fate 
A sun path in thy worth. 
Me too thy nobleness has taught 
To master my despair; 
The fountain of my hidden life 
Are through thy friendship fair. (Emerson 1993, 39) 
 
Emerson’s poem would seem to suggest the turbulence of the new world when with the 
vast distances it might be difficult to stay near to one’s friend. As in Goethe (1962) and 
Shelley (1976), one’s life may be shared through letter writing, and with print culture 
comes a growing literacy that can enable written communication: “The scholar sits down 
to write, and all his years of meditation do not furnish him with one good thought or 
happy expression; but it is necessary to write a letter to a friend,--and, forthwith, troops of 
gentle thoughts invest themselves on every hand, with chosen words” (Emerson 1993, 
39-40). 
 While distance and literacy factor into friendship possibilities, some of the 
essential criteria are unchanged in Emerson’s adaptation, and he does not question 
whether the eternal characteristics of the best kind of friendship are transcendent: “The 
laws of friendship are austere and eternal” (Emerson 1993, 43). In fact, Emerson 
explicitly revives the notion that the true friendship is a metaphysically orchestrated 
virtuosity: 
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My friends have come to me unsought. The great God gave them to me. By oldest 
right, by the divine affinity of virtue with itself, I find them, or rather not I, but the 
Deity within me and in them cancels the thick walls of individual character, 
religion, age, sex, circumstance at which he usually connives, and now make 
many one. High thanks I owe you, excellent lovers, who carry out the world for 
me to new and noble depths, and enlarge the meaning of all my thoughts. 
(Emerson 1993, 41) 
 
The law of reciprocity and oneness persists, “I must feel pride in my friend’s 
accomplishments as if they were mine,--and a property in his virtues” (Emerson 1993, 
41). However, there is an important breaking of ranks with the early friendship scholars. 
Emerson (1993) opens up the possibility of friendship with many rather than few, as he 
refers to these friends in the plural, and he also “cancels the thick walls of individual 
character, religion, age, sex, circumstance” (41). One might find the classical friendship 
paradigm as difficult to sustain with a greater number of friends, yet Emerson seemingly 
refuses to lower standards and suggests, instead, that the individual is at fault if he is not 
able to treat all his friends equally and see them as equals. Emerson is, perhaps, the 
idealistic new American voice. He is cognizant of the origins of friendship, yet he may 
also sense that the new nation is a conglomeration of many different people whose roots 
could be many and varied:  
I ought to be equal to every relation. It makes no difference how many friends I 
have, and what content I can find in conversing with each, if there be one to 
whom I am not equal. If I have shrunk unequal to one contest, the joy I find in all 
the rest becomes mean and cowardly. (Emerson 1993, 43).  
 
Emerson (1993) regards the failure to treat all his friends equally as vice, for his pleasant 
interaction with “the rest becomes mean and cowardly” (43).  
Although Emerson (1993) opens the door to all in friendship and seems to expand 
the possibility of having a number of great friends, he also makes it clear that each 
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friendship is particular. Emerson emphasizes the need for one-to-one communication 
between best friends in an age of print media and letter writing:  
I please my imagination more with a circle of godlike men and women variously 
related to each other, and between whom subsists a lofty intelligence. But I find 
this law of one to one peremptory for conversation, which is the practice and 
consummation of friendship. (Emerson 1993, 46) 
 
The discourse can take the form of both oral and written communication between friends, 
and for its depth of possibility, Emerson (1993) credits writing in friendship: “The hues 
of the opal, the light of the diamond, are not to be seen, if the eye is too near. To my 
friend, I write a letter, and from him I receive a letter…It is a spiritual gift worthy of him 
to give, and of me to receive” (48). The letter is a gift of the mind in a different way. 
Emerson (1993), though he may be in the good company of several, finds the social 
conventions to be limiting when two friends have communion: “Now this convention, 
which good sense demands, destroys the high freedom of conversation, which requires an 
absolute running of two souls into one” (46). 
Emerson (1993) views the best kind of friendship as more than an intellectual 
endeavor: “It is foolish to be afraid of making our ties too spiritual, as if so we could lose 
any genuine love” (49). There is a friendship ethic and a spiritual necessity for the 
superior friendship. It is a tough order, but with God’s help, for, “Love…is the essence of 
God (Emerson 1993, 43)” it is possible to recognize the true friend: “Let us approach our 
friend with an audacious trust in the truth of his heart, in the breadth, impossible to be 
overturned, of his foundations” (Ibid.). “Friendship,” therefore, for Emerson (1993), 
“requires a religious treatment. We talk of choosing our friends, but friends are self-
elected. Reverence is a great part of it” (47). 
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 To the classical friendship paradigm, Emerson adheres almost religiously in that 
one must be virtuous and true to oneself in order for friendship to be possible. Like 
Rousseau (2012), Emerson (1993) believes that society can become a wrecking ball, and 
within the social context he views solitude as a necessity in order for the individual to 
ground himself properly: “We must be our own before we can be another’s…Yet the 
least defect of self-possession vitiates, in my judgment, the entire relation” (48).   
Thomas Merton (1955) sets some interesting parameters for solitude, and he is 
more explicit, or perhaps more accessible to the 21st century reader, than is Rousseau or 
Emerson. First, he believes that everyone should realize the need for solitude and to 
accept its necessity. Merton’s point of view is a metaphysical one. He believes in a 
creator and that this creator is the ultimate good. There is, therefore, a spiritual 
component to one’s life, and he or she finds that element within the self. Solitude is a key 
component of the individual person: “A person is a person insofar as he has the secret and 
is a solitude of his own that cannot be communicated to anyone else” (Merton 1955, 
244). Solitude, for Merton, is necessary.  
The danger is in what Merton (1955) calls “false solitude” (247). Society is a 
player for it contributes to such a possibility. The false solitude emerges with the person 
“who has been denied the right to become a person,” and this person “takes revenge on 
society by turning his individuality into a destructive weapon” (Merton 1955, 247-248). 
Frankenstein’s creature is literally refused the opportunity to become a person. He thus 
becomes a menace to society. He destroys the life of his creator, Victor Frankenstein: 
“Maddened by his own insufficiency, the proud man shamelessly seizes upon 
satisfactions and possessions that are not due him, that can never satisfy him, and that he 
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will never really need” (Merton 1955, 248-249). One should recall that, though the 
creature is hideous to behold, he is otherwise superior to the human being, and he knows 
it. 
In a more realistic sense, one could even suggest that Rousseau (2012) succumbs 
somewhat to a form of prideful false solitude as he uncouples from society, especially if 
one concludes that Rousseau remains melancholic. Rousseau, believing that he is under 
continual personal attack and relentless critical scrutiny, no longer attempts to contribute 
anything back to society and is not receptive to, is even paranoid of, any sort of outreach 
from his peers. In Rousseau’s “Neuvième promenade,” When “M. P.” arrives at 
Rousseau’s to share the eulogy of someone who is apparently a mutual friend or 
acquaintance, Rousseau takes a part of the eulogy as an insinuation against him by the 
author of the eulogy. Thus interpreted, Rousseau defends his prior actions and attempts to 
prove what he has perceived as the accusation within the eulogy false (Rousseau 2012, 
155-156). One should keep in mind that Rousseau isn’t even present at the funeral. 
Merton finds this attitude dangerous: 
False solitude separates a man from his brothers in such a way that he can no 
longer effectively give them anything or receive anything from them in his own 
spirit. It establishes him in a state of indigence, misery, blindness, torment, and 
despair. (Merton 1955, 248) 
 
Rousseau (2012) devotes full promenades or walks to defending his ability to love his 
fellow human being and to being charitable, in his Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, 
particularly in the “Sixième promenade.” Merton might interpret Rousseau’s attitude as 
the problem of one’s having the proper love of self: “These, then, are the ones who 
isolate themselves above the mass of men because they have never learned to love either 
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themselves or other men” (Merton 1955, 249). In Rousseau’s defense, however, he will 
attack this problem and seems conscious of his weakness; he believes his heart guides 
him towards Merton’s right, or true solitude:  
One of the secrets of spiritual perfection is to realize that we have this mixture 
[hatred with love] in ourselves, and to be able to distinguish one from the 
other….Therefore, as long as our solitude is imperfect it will be tainted with 
bitterness and disgust, because it will exhaust us in continual conflict. (Merton 
1955, 250-251) 
 
 One could claim here that Thoreau (1960), who follows Rousseau very closely, 
has been more successful in reaching the garden of the right kind of solitude of which 
Merton (1955) speaks. Thoreau, however, does not sever human companionship in the 
same way that Rousseau does. While Rousseau feels driven to solitude, Thoreau’s 
disconnect is not resignation: “I did not wish to live what was not life, living is so dear; 
nor did I wish to practise resignation, unless it was quite necessary” (Thoreau 1960, 96). 
The true solitude of which Merton speaks suggests a clarity of thought and action that is 
not against humanity and other living human beings but that allows one to achieve an 
outside observer’s assessment and a better understanding of one’s relationship to the 
social whole. The person who reaches such an ultimate end in solitude must be rare 
indeed, for he or she is highly objective yet a highly independent individual: 
If I cannot distinguish myself from the mass of other men, I will never be able to 
love and respect other men as I ought. If I do not separate myself from them 
enough to know what is mine and what is theirs, I will never discover what I have 
to give them, and never allow them the opportunity to give me what they ought. 
(Merton 1955, 247)  
 
 It would seem that when people are genuinely lonely but not necessarily prideful, 
they lose their sense of meaning in life. Aside, then, from their survival instincts, or if one 
is not driven entirely by worldly or material considerations, what motivates a person to 
  193 
live life or to participate in human activities? What is, in a person’s life, his or her best 
reason for being? Merton (1955) says that it is love and that it is hope, and he is always 
critical of those who choose the wrong kind of solitude, which is the wrong kind of love:  
Because it [love] is an inescapable sin, it is also hell. But this too is only a 
disguised form of Eros—Eros in solitude. It is the love that is mortally wounded 
by its own incapacity to love another, and flies from others in order not to have to 
give itself to them. Even in its solitude this Eros is most tortured by its 
inescapable need of another, not for the other’s sake but for its own fulfillment! 
(Merton 1955, xix) 
 
 When in despair, one wants to believe that things can improve, and in order for 
some improvement to occur, the person must assign him or herself some value. In fact, an 
individual needs to be able to love oneself properly. In the enterprise of finding worth 
within oneself, or self-love, Rousseau (2012 distinguishes between self-esteem and 
conceit: 
L’estime de soi-même est le plus grand mobile des âmes fières; l’amour propre, 
fertile en illusions, se deguise et se fait prendre pour cette estime; mais quand la 
fraude enfin se découvre et que l’amour-propre ne peut plus se cacher, dès lors il 
n’est plus à craindre et quoiqu’on l’étouffe avec peine on le subjugue au moins 
aisément. (Rousseau 2012, 146) 
 
The individual must get past his or her vanity, which, to Rousseau, has more to do with 
external criteria than internal ones. Self-esteem, for Rousseau, is the best self-love, and it 
cannot be gotten artificially or superficially. Society, the external, cannot provide one 
with the proper sense of self-worth necessary for the best kind of friendship. For Merton, 
too, there is a right way and a wrong way to love oneself. Merton (1955) goes one step 
farther than Rousseau: “We cannot love ourselves unless we love others, and we cannot 
love others unless we love ourselves. But a selfish love of ourselves makes us incapable 
of loving others” (xx). The suicidal danger for Merton (1955) is in a frustrated or 
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misguided self-love “that has turned into self-hatred and which, in adoring itself, adores 
the monster by which it is consumed” (xxi). 
 Thoreau (1960, 1991) is the lover of solitude and her principal standard bearer, 
yet Thoreau extols friendship similarly to Emerson (1993); in fact, he perhaps trumpets 
more loudly the notes of one’s seeking an immortal truth in friendship: “All men are 
dreaming of it, and its drama, which is always a tragedy, is acted out daily. It is the secret 
of the universe” (Thoreau 1991, 513). Aelred, one recalls, believes that friendship, the 
best kind, is the closest facsimile to what it is for a human being to perceive God:  
Thus rising from the holy love with which a friend embraces a friend to that 
which friend embraces Christ, one may take the spiritual fruit of friendship fully 
and joyfully into the mouth, while looking forward to all abundance in the life to 
come. (Aelred 2010, 126.134) 
 
Thoreau writes, in “A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers”: 
 
Between whom there is a hearty truth, there is love; and in proportion to our 
truthfulness and confidence in one another, our lives are divine and miraculous, 
and answer to our ideal. There are passages of affection in our intercourse with 
mortal men and women, such as no prophecy had taught us to expect, which 
transcend our earthly life, and anticipate Heaven for us. (Thoreau 1991, 515) 
 
 While experiencing each as another self, Thoreau reminds the friendship seeker, 
too, that friends are individuals and that they should inspire each other to be the best that 
they can:  
The dull distinguish only races or nations, or at most classes, but the wise man, 
individuals. To his Friend a man’s peculiar character appears in every feature and 
in every action, and it is thus drawn out and improved by him… (Thoreau 1991, 
515) 
 
The spirit of solitude, thus, is folded into the paradigm for the 19th and 20th century 
thinkers as well as it is clear from the beginning that each friend must be an individual, a 
virtuous truth seeker and exceptional human being in his or her own right. Solitude 
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emerges, beginning with Rousseau (2012), as a way for the individual to detoxify oneself 
from society’s metaphorical drugging. Friendship can be at the core of one’s humanity, 
naturally, whether one thinks of nature in the spiritual or the physical, though not 
necessarily carnal, sense. The transcendentalists like Emerson and Thoreau believe that 
the natural is good, and society can taint the individual. Solitude, therefore, is a way to 
seek the good and true internally, and Thoreau is the epitome of Emerson’s self-reliant 
person seeking and perhaps successfully finding such purgation. The purified person 
Thoreau writes:  
I have never felt lonesome, or in the least oppressed by a sense of solitude, but 
once, and that was a few weeks after I came to the woods, when, for an hour, I 
doubted whether the near neighborhood of man was not essential to a serene and 
healthy life. To be alone was something unpleasant. But I was at the same time 
conscious of a slight insanity in my mood, and seemed to foresee my recovery. 
(Thoreau 1960, 92)  
 
Although Thoreau may have found solitude companionable, most could argue that he is 
in the minority and that, consequently, friends are necessary, and that absolute solitude is 
death-like. In fact in regards to solitude, Thoreau himself writes:  
Sometimes, when I compare myself with other men, it seems as if I were more 
favored by the gods, beyond any deserts that I am conscious of; as if I had a 
warrant at their hands that my fellows have not, and were especially guided and 
guarded. (Thoreau 1960, 92)  
 
With the proper dose of solitude, then, one is ready for the best kind of friendship. 
Thoreau (1960, 1991) may have been an exception in his need for sustained 
human contact, but in this assertion one should make an important distinction between 
solitude and loneliness. Thoreau has an inkling of the kind of isolation possible within 
large print cultures. One’s close relationships and friendship bonds, consequently, ought 
to become more precious; but Thoreau also suggests that too much contact with others, 
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the people for whom one may care deeply, can cause a loss of respect for them, so some 
distancing can be beneficial: 
Society is commonly too cheap. We meet at very short intervals, not having had 
time to acquire any new value for each other. We meet at meals three times a day, 
and give each other a new taste of that old musty cheese that we are. (Thoreau 
1960, 95) 
 
Thoreau (1960, 1991), however, surely perceives solitude and loneliness 
differently. When Thoreau makes his Cape Cod journeys, he is accompanied on one of 
those by a friend. Furthermore, Thoreau isn’t so alone at Walden Pond: “When I return to 
my house I find that visitors have been there and left their cards, either a bunch of 
flowers, or a wreath of evergreen, or a name in pencil on a yellow walnut leaf or chip” 
(1960, 91). Thoreau, the minimalist, also extends his furnishings to others: “I have three 
chairs in my house; one for solitude, two for friendship, three for society” (Thoreau 1960, 
97). Solitude and friendship would seem to be preferable, but society is not excluded. 
 
Nineteenth Century American Tales 
 
Mark Twain (1993, 1999) develops an important friendship in The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn between Huck and Jim, an escaped slave. This friendship represents 
the possibility for friendship outside the boundaries of race and age as Huck and Jim face 
many adventures together. It is clear, however, from Huck’s narration that the 
relationship evolves from being one of mutual aid or sympathy into a synthesis of being 
(Davis Wood 2012, 83). Both characters are trying to escape, each from a different kind 
of slavery, and the empathy that develops leads to a sense of equality: “Huck’s 
experience of “pseudoenslavement” puts him on as close to equal footing with Jim as he 
is ever likely to be and thus prepares the ground on which his synthesis with Jim 
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develops” (Davis Wood 2012, 84). This synthesis is expressed through Huck’s gradual 
pronoun shift from the first person singular to the first person plural. The equality grows 
as Huck “allows Jim to speak; more important, he allows Jim to speak at greater length 
than himself and without interruption or correction, even though Jim’s words amount to a 
rebuke of Huck” (David Wood 2012, 84). Once the I is fully replaced by the we in 
Huck’s narrative, “Huck and Jim now are one, as Huck has assumed that Jim sees what 
he himself sees and that he can accurately detail what Jim sees simply by detailing what 
he too has just seen” (Davis Wood 2012, 85).  
One is reminded of Candide and Cacambo in Voltaire’s Candide (1972). Candide 
and Cacambo although two men, are master and servant and of different ethnicity, but 
during their travels, particularly to El Dorado, it is Cacambo who takes the lead because 
he speaks the language, and the narrator begins to refer to the two as one. Likewise, as 
Huck and Jim persist through their adventures, they regard themselves as being one unit: 
Huck says, “We all got home safe” ([1999] 62). By “safe,” he does not simply 
mean “uninjured”; he means safe in a way that encompasses the particularities of 
Jim’s situation as well as his own…Not having any accidents is Huck’s own 
individual criterion for safety, but not seeing anybody—and not being seen in 
turn—is Jim’s criterion, since he can remain free only as long as he remains 
unseen by others who would reenslave him. Huck…recognizes the mutual 
dependency that exists between Jim and himself despite their individual 
differences: if either one is endangered, both of them are. (Davis Wood 2012, 85-
86) 
 
For Huck, however, the friendship does not quite reach the sanctity of permanence, and 
one could suggest that Huck’s youth, the possibility that Huck is not quite mature enough 
for the fullest kind of friendship, makes it possible for society to undo the bond that 
formed between Huck and Jim. Surely, Huck feels a deep affection for Jim and tries to 
rescue him when the two confidence men who are accompanying them manage to have 
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Jim captured and collect a reward. Huck reacts: “Jim was gone! I set up a shout—and 
then another—and then another one, and run this way and that in the woods, whooping 
and screeching, but it wasn’t no use—old Jim was gone. Then I set down and cried: I 
couldn’t help it” (Twain 1993, 360). Their friendship would seem to be reciprocal, as 
Huck sums up their adventures and things each has done for the other (Twain 1993, 361-
362). Davis Wood (2012) notes that, “The differences between Huck’s enslavement and 
Jim’s enslavement are of course irresolvable insofar as Huck and Jim occupy different 
and unalterable positions within a system of institutionalized race slavery” (86). 
 Although Huck does not wish to see Jim captured, he sees his helping Jim as 
something criminal; he has been educated to see it even as a crime against heaven. To 
save Jim from his capturers, he decides it is best to write Jim’s slave owner so that she 
might reclaim him, and Huck is temporarily assuaged:  
I felt good and all washed clean of sin for the first time I had ever felt so in my 
life, and I knowed I could pray now. But I didn’t do it straight off, but laid the 
paper down and set there thinking—thinking how good it was all this happened 
so, and how near I come to being lost and going to hell. (Twain 1993, 361) 
 
Huck, however, chooses not to send the letter, and he vows to steal Jim back, deciding to 
become a sinner instead: “’All right, then, I’ll go to hell’—and tore it up…And for a 
starter, I would go to work and steal Jim out of slavery again” (Twain 1993, 362). In 
other words, Huck is still struggling with the concept of Jim as a full human being totally 
equal to him. Emerson (1993) alludes to Huck’s dilemma: “But to most of us society 
shows not its face and eye, but its side and back. To stand in true relations with men in a 
false age is worth a fit of insanity, is it not?” (45). Certainly, Huck and Jim have built a 
friendship that “is essentially between individuals; the moment two men are friends they 
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have in some degree drawn apart together from the herd” (Lewis 2012, 58). Huck is still a 
boy, so to a lesser degree is it possible for him to withdraw in such a way. Finally, Huck 
has to give up on Jim, and he moves forward in his new friendship with someone his own 
age and race as he seems to fall in step with the white of society of which he is a part:  
Huck once again narrates the story in the second-person [first person] plural—
“We stopped talking,” he says, “and got to thinking” (241)—but this time, the 
other person implicated in the “we” is not Jim but Tom. The synthesis of old has 
irrevocably collapsed, and a new one has emerged in its place. (Davis Wood 
2012, 86) 
 
 The law, human law, once it is widely available and comprehensible, both in print 
and in manuscript form, has become something extraordinarily powerful. People’s lives 
and their moral judgment are largely determined by it. Furthermore, memories are 
preserved in the documents that people have generated, either as personal, private 
writing, in public writing, or in letterform. Bartleby, Melville’s scrivener (2015), and 
Gogol’s Akaky Akakievitch (2007), a copyist, in “The Overcoat” would seem to be 
products of the new world in the way that print society can desolate its isolated members. 
Both Bartleby and Akaky are human copying machines in an age before typewriters and 
photocopiers, and these two men find themselves devastatingly alone. The two men 
would seem to be misfits; and without companionship, they are destroyed or in some way 
destroy themselves. In the case of Bartleby, perhaps it is the “fit of insanity” in order “to 
stand in true relations with men in a false age” (Emerson 1993, 45). 
 There are many ways to study Melville’s “Bartleby, the Scrivener.” There is a 
heavy penchant toward an allegorical reading. As an example of friendship and 
communication, however, the story’s literal aspects shall be examined, for Bartleby’s 
story is set within the age of print. Certainly, his livelihood is the written word and his 
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job depends on literacy. The issue is not so much one of substance, however; it is, rather, 
one of production. The print era is an age of duplication, and one might ponder whether 
some element of humanity is lost in the process. In many cases, the more copies there are 
of something, the less value that thing would seem to have. Copying means that there is 
less chance of losing something completely. There is some connection to this 
circumstance in Bartleby’s case although Bartleby is working with originals within a 
complex written system within an era of additive networks. Data are retained. Bartleby, 
the reader is told, may have worked in the postal service’s “dead letter” department. 
Letters were written but never received because the recipients had either disappeared or 
died; these letters would be the ones with no return or forwarding addresses. Bartleby 
may have been confronted with letters that undermined historical context. According to 
Marshall Poe (2011), “People in additive networks are constantly confronted with the 
human past, and especially in writing. Because of this fact, time horizons begin to recede 
and the past, present, and future become separate, alterable entities” (143). Bartleby’s 
past is unavailable as the narrator cannot ascertain anything about him: “I believe that no 
materials exist for a full and satisfactory biography of this man…What my own 
astonished eyes saw of Bartleby, that is all I know of him, except, indeed, one vague 
report” (Melville 2015, 512). Bartleby exists without a past, he takes no interest in the 
present, and he does not appear to contemplate the future. When Bartleby speaks, the 
narrator tells the reader, “he never spoke but to answer” (Melville 2015, 523). The 
narrator continues, “I had never seen him reading—no, not even a newspaper” (Melville 
2015, 523-524). Bartleby is like a dead letter that no longer has a destination but that 
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emerged somewhere from the past without the possibility of returning. The printing press 
can create such a system:  
Print, then, is a low velocity medium. Low-velocity media give rise to monologic 
networks, which is to say that traffic over them tends to move in one 
direction…This is to say they blunt the natural impulse of humans to exchange 
information rapidly and, in its place, impose a unidirectional structure on 
communications. (Poe 2011, 136) 
 
Bartleby would seem to be conditioned to this type of system. One-to-one oral 
communication is both restrained and formal with a clear pattern of exchange expected 
depending on social circumstances. Bartleby’s employer, the lawyer and storyteller, 
struggles to communicate with Bartleby. 
 Bartleby’s solitude is in some ways similar to Grendel’s and also to that of 
Frankenstein’s creature. At least Grendel has a mother, and a purpose, though a beastly 
one. Although the creature in Shelley’s Frankenstein (1976) is totally isolated, without 
parents or a past, he is still driven forward; first, by the possibility that he might receive a 
companion; then, by his need for revenge when he is not granted one. Bartleby, unlike the 
other two, is not forced to live apart from society. He is, instead, a part of the machine 
that manufactures business and legal documents. In fact, Bartleby works in a machine-
like fashion: “At first Bartleby did an extraordinary quantity of writing…He ran a day 
and night line, copying by sunlight and by candle-light…But he wrote on silently, palely, 
mechanically” (Melville 2015, 516-517). Bartleby apparently feels his remoteness among 
men. Again, there is the idea of substance and quality over quantity. Thoreau (1960) 
seems to have an understanding of Bartleby’s condition: “We are for the most part more 
lonely when we go abroad among men than when we stay in our chambers…Solitude is 
not measured by the miles of space that intervene between a man and his fellows” (95). 
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 Grendel and Frankenstein’s creature resist their isolation violently. Bartleby, on 
the other hand, as a working member of society, resists his aloneness passively, to the 
consternation of the narrator, his employer: “Nothing so aggravates an earnest person as a 
passive resistance” (Melville 2015, 519). Like Frankenstein toward his creature, however, 
the narrator finds pity and compassion for Bartleby difficult. As Grendel and the creature 
would be abhorrent, so would be Bartleby:  
My first emotions had been those of pure melancholy and pity; but just in 
proportion as the forlornness of Bartleby grew and grew to my imagination, did 
that same melancholy merge into fear, that pity into repulsion. So true it is, and so 
terrible too, that up to a certain point the thought or sight of misery enlists our 
best affections; but, in certain special cases, beyond that point it does not. 
(Melville 2015, 524) 
 
Bartleby is an outcast and largely ignored until his eccentricities begin to interfere with 
the social norms and economic structure where he is immersed. Compassion for Bartleby 
cannot run deep enough, and his former employer feels compelled to move, since 
Bartleby will not leave, when Bartleby begins to negatively impact his affairs. He bids 
farewell to Bartleby in his former lodgings and then is asked to answer for Bartleby’s 
presence in that building. Society, it would appear, holds Bartleby’s boss in some way 
responsible for Bartleby. The reader, however, may be torn as to what extent the lawyer 
is Bartleby’s keeper. Certainly, there is metaphor and perhaps some allegory, but one can 
also handle the characters literally. The lawyer has tried to be reasonable and charitable, 
and herein one can perceive a distinction between charity and friendship and ask the 
question of whether it is friendship that Bartleby needs above charity and whether 
friendship is beyond the point of feasibility, particularly for Bartleby. If one believes that 
the lawyer might be remiss, one can also claim that Bartleby is unable to reach out or to 
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meet the lawyer halfway and that there is no possibility for the reciprocity that friendship 
requires; thus, only charity is possible, and charity would seem to be unacceptable to 
Bartleby, yet Bartleby persists:  
“Why,” I added, unaffectedly starting, “you have not even touched that money 
yet,” pointing to it, just where I had left it the evening previous. 
  He answered nothing. 
“Will you, or will you not, quit me?” I now demanded in a sudden 
passion, advancing close to him. 
“I would prefer not to quit you,” he replied, gently emphasizing the not.  
(Melville 2015, 529) 
 
This point is emphasized: “Bribes he leaves under your own paper-weight on your table; 
in short, it is quite plain that he prefers to cling to you” (Melville 2015, 531). 
 Perhaps it is that Bartleby is asking for something that the lawyer cannot give. C. 
S. Lewis (2012) calls friendship “the least natural of loves; the least instinctive, organic, 
biological, gregarious and necessary…It is essentially between individuals; the moment 
two men are friends they have in some degree drawn apart together from the herd” (58). 
Bartleby correctly perceives his employer’s attempts at both charity and friendship as 
self-serving. The lawyer feels that his reputation may be at stake. Bartleby has become a 
public problem. He makes a final attempt, that one might call charitable, before Bartleby 
is removed to “the Tombs,” or prison, as a vagrant: 
“Bartleby,” said I, in the kindest tone I could assume under such exciting 
circumstances, “will you go home with me now—not to my office, but my 
dwelling—and remain there till we can conclude upon some convenient 
arrangement for you at hour leisure? Come, let us start now, right away.” 
“No: at present I would prefer not to make any change at all.”  
(Melville 2015, 534) 
 
Neither Bartleby nor the lawyer comes near to bridging the gap of “that luminous, 
tranquil, rational world of relationships freely chosen” (Lewis 2012, 59). Lewis (2012) 
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further suggests that even true charity is not adequately covered. The lawyer never quite 
reaches the point of Lewis’s idea of love: “Just so, our ‘decency and common sense’ 
show grey and deathlike beside the geniality of love” (117).  
Bartleby remains insistent upon something greater than a surface offering. When the 
narrator, the lawyer, converses with Bartleby for the last time at “the Tombs,” Bartleby 
says to him, “I know you,” he said, without looking around,--“and I want nothing to say 
to you” (Melville 2015, 535). Yet, upon leaving, when asked, “Is that a friend of yours?” 
(Ibid.), the lawyer answers, “Yes” (Ibid.). Lewis (2012) would claim, and perhaps 
Bartleby might realize (as something other than an allegorical figure) that the lawyer 
keeps the wall up, and that to love truly is to allow an opening in the wall: “To love at all 
is to be vulnerable” (121). Bartleby, as his condition worsens, in the office on Wall 
Street, and Bartleby has only a wall to look at through his window, simply stands at the 
window and stares at the wall: “The next day I noticed that Bartleby did nothing but stand 
at his window in his dead-wall revery” (Melville 2015, 526). 
 Again departing from the allegorical, one can find in Melville’s Bartleby the same 
condition that Sartre’s Roquentin experiences in La Nausée (1938).  Bartleby’s condition 
would seem to be one of an absence; friendship and charity are denied him, or those 
things he denies himself, for the knowledge that what he seems to desire for his own 
salvation, an extraordinary love, is either unattainable or non-existent—a wall of sorts. 
Bartleby does not turn to God, and the lawyer, as humanity’s representative, fails him. 
Sartre’s character comes to the same realization, although he is not a seeker in the same 
sense as Bartleby might be.  Roquentin is more self-aware and not allegorical like 
Bartleby. While Melville never allows entry to Bartleby’s thoughts, Sartre provides the 
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entirety of his character’s thought processes. Roquentin, in La Nausée, steadily detaches 
himself from society. “Moi, je vis seul, entièrement seul. Je ne parle à personne, jamais; 
je ne reçois rien, je ne donne rien” (Sartre 1938, 19). Roquentin lives completely alone, 
he speaks to no one, ever; he receives nothing and he gives nothing. When one is thus 
isolated, according to Sartre’s Roquentin, he loses the ability to tell a story, and what he 
calls life’s verisimilitude disappears along with one’s friends (Sartre 1938, 20). The 
inability to tell a story is similar to Bartleby’s possible connection to work in the dead 
letter department of the postal service. There is no story to tell once the story has ended. 
Nevertheless, Roquentin is not prepared for such aloneness and hunts for refuge in the 
company of other people (Sartre 1938, 21). He, however, gradually concludes that others 
cannot help him and that he has no sanctuary. He begins to slip away: “Je glisse tout 
doucement au fond de l’eau, vers la peur” (Ibid.). Roquentin is becoming afraid because 
no one can rescue him and he cannot find any reason to exist beyond his biological needs. 
Roquentin realizes that his solitude has contributed to his confusion. Being alone disturbs 
him: “Pour la première fois cela m’ennuie d’être seul. Je voudrais parler à quelqu’un de 
ce qui m’arrive avant qu’il soit trop tard” (Sartre 1938, 22). Roquentin will begin to 
dissociate himself with what is specifically human and will eventually begin to blend 
himself into any material object. He does not distinguish one object or being as having 
any ascendancy over another. Roquentin fails to choose meaning or for himself to create 
meaning. The figure of Roquentin, the individual Roquentin, begins to vanish. Bartleby 
simply dies. 
 Does one become less human as he or she sinks deeper into solitude? Peter Berger 
in The Sacred Canopy (1967) claims that human beings cannot function outside society 
  206 
and that absolute isolation is all but impossible, for there can be no sense of meaning in 
such circumstances. Berger does well to explain Roquentin’s condition as Roquentin 
loses his belief in any sort of social reality. Roquentin begins to view society as a human 
attempt to construct meaning. As an artificial construct, society seems absurd to him. 
Roquentin’s belief in this absurdity leads to his unraveling: 
Men are congenitally compelled to impose a meaningful order upon reality...To 
be separated from society exposes the individual to a multiplicity of dangers with 
which he is unable to cope by himself, in the extreme case to the danger of 
imminent extinction. Separating from society also inflicts unbearable 
psychological tensions upon the individual, tensions that are grounded in the root 
anthropological fact of sociality. The ultimate danger of such separation, 
however, is the danger of meaninglessness...in which the individual is submerged 
in a world of disorder, senselessness and madness. (Berger 1967, 22) 
 
Melville (2015), in “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” finds this lamentable. To conclude the 
story, upon finding that Bartleby has died from starving himself, the lawyer exclaims, 
“Ah Bartleby! Ah humanity!” (537). Friendship is one of the great possibilities, and 
neither Bartleby nor Roquentin experience it. Bartleby dies in a fetal position.  
We are born helpless. As soon as we are fully conscious we discovery loneliness. 
We need others physically, emotionally, intellectually; we need them if we are to 
know anything, even ourselves. (Lewis 2012, 2) 
 
 The literature of the 19th and 20th centuries is not bereft of great friendships. In 
fact, the creator of Bartleby also, masterfully, assembles one of the greatest classical 
friendships in American literature. It is the friendship of Ishmael and Queequeg in Moby 
Dick (1993), published a couple years before “Bartleby, the Scrivener.” Wrought within 
an American context, the two men are brave adventurers who stand together apart from 
the other sailors and whalers. Each is an independent and intriguing individual, yet the 
  207 
friendship expresses Emerson’s Americanism and the possibilities for friendship between 
people of different races, cultures and religions. 
 When two men are virtuous, they are able to overcome ignorance, and the will 
becomes the pick that opens the lock. While Queequeg already seems willing, Ishmael 
must reason things out. At first, he is afraid of Queequeg: “I am no coward, but what to 
make of this head-peddling purple rascal altogether passed my comprehension.” Ishmael 
continues, “Ignorance is the parent of fear” (Melville 1993, 10). It begins with empathy 
the acknowledgement of equality: 
“What’s all this fuss I have been making about,” I thought to myself—“the man’s 
a human being just as I am: he has just as much reason to fear me as I have to be 
afraid of him. Better sleep with a sober cannibal than a drunken Christian.” 
(Melville 1993, 11) 
 
 Queequeg, having the right kind of self love, already seems to hold an intrinsic 
understanding that the two men will became bosom friends: “For though I tried to move 
his arm—unlock his clasp—yet, sleeping as he was, he still hugged me tightly, as though 
naught but death should part us twain” (Melville 1993, 12). Death it is that will indeed 
part the two. Ishmael cannot quite find such a natural comfort so quickly: “At length, by 
dint of much wriggling, and loud and incessant expostulations upon the unbecomingness 
of his hugging a fellow male in that sort of style, I succeeded [in being released]” 
(Melville 1993, 12). One should be careful to note, furthermore, that there is no question 
of homosexuality in the relationship. Although the men show affection for each other, it 
is not Eros.  
 Ishmael recognizes Queequeg when he finds him alone after attending a chapel 
service, at which Queequeg was present but did not stay for the benediction: “You cannot 
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hide the soul. Through all his unearthly tattooings, I thought I saw the traces of a simple 
honest heart” (Melville 1993, 23).” Melville, through his narrator Ishmael, paints a vivid 
picture of the noble savage, and these qualities, Ishmael admires:  
There was something almost sublime in it. Here was a man some twenty thousand 
miles from home, by the way of Cape Horn that is—which was the only way he 
could get there—thrown among people as strange to him as Jupiter; and yet he 
seemed entirely at his ease; preserving the utmost serenity; content with his own 
companionship; always equal to himself. (Melville 1993, 23) 
 
Queequeg seems to be the opposite of Bartleby; Queequeg is completely 
untainted by civilized society, confident in himself, and fully capable of experiencing and 
evaluating life and the people he encounters directly. He is something like the Emile that 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau may have imagined. Bartleby cannot look at life directly and 
stares into a wall. Bartleby cannot open his heart, even monetarily, to the lawyer’s offer 
of pseudo-charity. Queequeg is self-reliant because his own sense of self is secure. 
Ishmael’s clear perception of Queequeg will make the extraordinary friendship possible: 
I felt a melting in me. No more my splintered heart and maddened hand were 
turned against the wolfish world. The soothing savage had redeemed it. There he 
sat, his very indifference speaking a nature in which there lurked no civilised 
hypocrisies and bland deceits. (Melville 1993, 24) 
 
Queequeg also recognizes Ishmael but much more easily and completely: 
 
He seemed to take to me quite as naturally and unbiddenly as I to him; and when 
our smoke was over, he pressed his forehead against mine, clasped me round the 
waist, and said that henceforth we were married; meaning, in his country’s phrase, 
that we were bosom friends; he would gladly die for me, if need should be. In a 
countryman, this sudden flame of friendship would have seemed far too 
premature, a thing to be much distrusted; but in this simple savage those old rules 
would not apply. (Melville 1993, 24) 
 
What Bartleby lacks, Queequeg and Ishmael have: faith, hope and friendship. Both 
Ishmael and Queequeg, although of different belief systems, believe in the supernatural, 
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and Ishmael is able to justify his acceptance of Queequeg’s religious beliefs and to assist 
in his form of worship, just as Queequeg had been present at the chapel ceremony: “But 
what is worship?—to do the will of God—that is worship. And what is the will of 
God?—to do to my fellowman what I would have my fellowman to do to me—that is the 
will of God” (Melville 1993, 24). It might be suggested from this passage that the 
friendship is divinely inspired in some way and that both friends have a feeling about it. 
The friendship is ultimately sealed: “I was only alive to the condensed confidential 
comfortableness of sharing a pipe and a blanket with a real friend” (Melville 1993, 25). 
Ishmael and Queequeg arrive at a blending of the souls, for each can see the truth within 
himself. Unlike Huck, Ishmael has reached the point of maturity necessary to engage in 
such a friendship, and the friendship holds true until the death of Queequeg: “’I’m not 
green’”(Melville 1993, 8). 
 Like the classical friendship heroes, the two men express their friendship openly, 
as two proud and virtuous men are able to do, but unlike the less virtuous pair in the 
picaresque novel Guzmán de Alfarache (1987). It is, perhaps, something of a new 
precedent in literature, for Ishmael tells the reader that onlookers find the friendship 
unusual. They are not accustomed to two people of completely different backgrounds 
becoming such fast friends: “As we were going along the people stared; not at Queequeg 
so much—for they were used to seeing cannibals like him in their streets,--but at seeing 
him and me upon such confidential terms” (Melville 1993, 27).  
 Melville (1993, 2015), in his depictions of aloneness and of friendship, could be 
suggesting that the urban man, the person living in the city, is less capable of 
experiencing the best kind of friendship, and the reader witnesses Bartleby’s despair; but 
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it is not a new lesson. Voltaire’s Jeannot, too, is corrupted by worldly influences, and he 
leaves the countryside and his friend Colin. In Paris, he finds no true friends, only the fair 
weather kind or those who would cheat him out of his sudden wealth. The best kind of 
friendship, to this point, would seem to take place in the open air as men try to 
accomplish noble tasks together and share a force of conviction. Or they are industrious. 
Voltaire would seem a bit more progressive and realistic in the idea of a wholesome life 
and friendship founded on sound principles and hard work. The friends are nearer to 
lifelong business partners. Candide and his friends come down to earth at the end of 
Candide ou l’Optimisme (1972). 
 
Operating into the 20th Century 
 
 Willa Cather’s Death Comes for the Archbishop (1990) defines the best kind of 
friendship possible according to almost every principle of the classical model, touching 
on practically every aspect of friendship so far contemplated in this exposition. 
Significantly, one should note that the author is a woman. She pens a near perfect yet 
plausible friendship between men in all its beauty and complexity. This friendship story 
also exposes the modes of communication mastered and used in the middle 19th century 
by which friends communicated. Cather relates the value and importance of language in 
discovering new friends. Death Comes for the Archbishop, furthermore, highlights 
friendship’s flourishing free of the worldly factors associated with the industrial 
revolution and the apparatus necessary to support it within growing population centers. 
Latour and Vaillant, the two great friends, are never found staring blankly through 
windows at brick walls like the poor scrivener, Bartleby.  
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Nature, in fact, is revered in Cather’s novel, and it is a constant presence. She 
succeeds in capturing both Chief Seattle’s understanding of the differences between 
Native-American and European cultures and the nature’s possibilities as an aid to 
humanity understanding itself. Father Latour reflects upon the canyon that divides the 
two cultures as he observes his Native-American guide and friend: “There was no way in 
which he could transfer his own memories of European civilization into the Indian mind, 
and he was quite willing to believe that behind Jacinto there was a long tradition, a story 
of experience, which no language could transfer to him” (Cather 1990, 92). The mindset 
is based on an oral tradition. Another friend of the French priests is the American hero 
Kit Carson, and Cather comments interestingly about this man’s education:  
That he was illiterate was an accident; he had got ahead of books, gone where the 
printing press could not follow him…often in the service of brutal and desperate 
characters—he had preserved a clean sense of honour and a compassionate heart. 
(Cather 1990, 76-77) 
 
The French missionary Father Latour learns much from Eusebio, his Native-American 
friend: 
Travelling with Eusebio was like travelling with the landscape made 
human…When he left the rock or tree or sand dune that had sheltered them for 
the night, the Navajo was careful to obliterate every trace of their temporary 
occupation…Father Latour judged that, just as it was the white man’s way to 
assert himself in any landscape, to change it…it was the Indian’s way to pass 
through a country without disturbing anything; to pass and leave no trace, like a 
fish through the water. (Cather 1990, 232-233) 
 
The friendship between Latour and Eusebio is much more silent and understood. When 
Latour learns that Eusebio’s son has died, he journeys to be with his friend: 
At first he [Eusebio] did not open his lips, merely stood holding Father Latour’s 
very fine white hand in his fine dark one, and looked into his face with a message 
of sorrow and resignation in his deep-set, eagle eyes. A wave of feeling passed 
over his bronze features as he said slowly:  
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  “My friend has come.” 
  That was all, but it was everything; welcome, confidence, appreciation.  
(Cather 1990, 220) 
 
Cather draws another picture of the noble savage as a dear friend that the European has 
difficulty comprehending and therefore, perhaps, accepting:  
They [Native-Americans] seemed to have none of the European’s desire to 
“master” nature, to arrange and re-create. They spend their ingenuity in the other 
direction; in accommodating themselves to the scene in which they found 
themselves. This was not so much from indolence, the Bishop thought, as from an 
inherited caution and respect. (Cather 1990, 233). 
 
One might conclude that the Native-American would treat friendship in the same way, 
and that friendship in the classical sense can begin when two good people meet. Bishop 
Latour experiences such a thing when he meets Kit Carson for the first time: “As he stood 
there in his buckskin clothes one felt in him standards, loyalties, a code which is not 
easily put into words but which is instantly felt when tow men who live by it come 
together by chance” (Cather 1990, 75). 
 The Bishop, too, forms a friendship with a kind Spanish-American, who is 
described as “a man who cherishes his friends” (Cather 1990, 178). Knowing of the 
Bishop’s wish to build a cathedral, he pledges that it shall be accomplished, for “Olivares 
was the sort of man who liked to help a friend accomplish the desire of his heart” (Cather 
1990, 179).  
However, the New Mexico friendships are secondary to the ongoing story of the 
two French missionary priests. The two priests are not unlike another great French pair, 
Charlemagne’s vassals Roland and Oliver. While Roland and Oliver cut down the so-
called enemies of Christ, Latour and Vaillant set out to collect souls for salvation. Both 
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pairs have a purpose and determination, a sense of mission, that their friendships help 
them to accomplish. In all cases, the friends flourish to the greatest extent possible. 
Beside him [Latour] rode Father Joseph Vaillant, his boyhood friend, who had 
made this long pilgrimage with him and shared his dangers. The two rode into 
Sante Fé together, claiming it for the glory of God. (Cather 1990, 22) 
 
 Father Jean Marie Latour and Father Joseph Vaillant are together for most of their 
lives beginning with their meeting in the seminary. The two are quickly drawn to each 
other, yet they are the opposites that each one needs in order to fulfill their destinies. One 
wonders whether a divine hand steers the two together, harkening back to St. Augustine’s 
belief that the superb friendship is God’s intention.  
“Doctrine is well enough for the wise, Jean; but the miracle is something 
we can hold in our hands and love.” 
It was just this in his friend that was so dear to him. “Where there is great 
love there are always miracles,” he said at length. “One might almost say that an 
apparition is human vision corrected by divine love. I do not see you as you really 
are, Joseph; I see you through my affection for you.” (Cather 1990, 50) 
 
There is no doubt that both the priests and the new friends that they make are 
honorable men. Each friend exhibits nothing less than heroic qualities yet they are not 
demigods. The reader is early introduced to Father Latour’s attributes as he is 
recommended for service in the New Mexico territory: “The new vicar must be a young 
man, of strong constitution, full of zeal, and above all, intelligent…He must be a man to 
whom order is necessary—as dear as life” (Cather 1990, 8). 
 While Latour, in physical appearance, is more typical of the imagined hero, 
Vaillant is his opposite; yet Vaillant is quickly identified by his internal fortitude: “If the 
Bishop returned to find Santa Fé friendly to him, it was because everybody believed in 
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Father Vaillant—homely, real, persistent, with the driving power of a dozen men in his 
poorly built body” (Cather 1990, 38).  
 Death Comes for the Archbishop is a novel replete with things symbolic of the 
great friendship between Latour and Vaillant. Beyond their being priests and on what 
both regard as a lifelong spiritual mission, it is clear that Latour and Vaillant are priests 
whose vows are sacred to them. Cather symbolizes their devotion and celibacy through 
the two white mules that a good Catholic Mexican rancher gives Vaillant as gifts:  
With his own hand he led them out of the stable, in order to display to 
advantage their handsome coats,--not bluish white, as with white horses, but a 
rich, deep ivory, that in shadow changed to fawn-colour. Their tails were clipped 
at the end into the shape of bells. 
“Their names,” said Lujon, “are Contento and Angelica, and they are as 
good as their names. It seems that God has given them intelligence. When I talk to 
them, they look up to me like Christians; they are companionable. They are 
always ridden together and have a great affection for each other.” (Cather 1990, 
59-60) 
 
The friends trust each other unquestioningly. Latour has the vision, and Vaillant 
follows blindly:  
Father Latour rode first, sitting straight upon his mule, with his chin lowered just 
enough to keep the drive of the rain out of his eyes. Father Vaillant followed, 
unable to see much,--in weather like this his glasses were of no use, and he had 
taken them off. He crouched down in the saddle, his shoulders well over 
Contento’s neck. (Cather 1990, 64) 
 
 The friends, furthermore, inspire and push each other:  
 
  “The mules are certainly very tired, Joseph. They ought to be fed.” 
“Push on,” said Father Vaillant. “We will come to shelter of some kind 
before night sets in.” (Cather 1990, 66) 
 
The friends always trust and have faith in each other. In one of his letters, Latour 
writes freely, when speaking of Vaillant: “But he has never failed me in anything yet” 
(Cather 1990, 36). And, he never does. Vaillant is just as sure of Latour. He never 
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questions him: “The Bishop did not disclose his objective and the Vicar asked no 
questions” (Cather 1990, 238). 
In the best kinds of friendship, each friend can know the other’s heart, and they 
share their visions with each other. When Latour reveals his intentions for a cathedral, 
Vaillant holds back, as he glimpses a stain of hubris in Latour’s desire. Vaillant, whose 
nickname is Blanchet (Whitey…white as in pure), acts in this instance as Latour’s 
conscience without uttering a word; and Latour does not conceal anything from his 
friend: “The Cathedral is near my heart, for many reasons” (Cather 1990, 242-243). 
Latour continues: “I hope that you do not think me very worldly” (1990, 243).  
Father Vaillant, in his absorption in their mission, is not so discerning when it 
comes to the deep need and affection that Father Latour has for him. Latour is stung by 
his friend’s eagerness to begin a new evangelization that will part to the two friends:  
As a Bishop, he could only approve Father Vaillant’s eagerness to be gone, and 
the enthusiasm with which he turned to hardships of a new kind. But as a man, he 
was a little hurt that his old comrade should leave him without one regret. (Cather 
1990, 249) 
 
Vaillant thinks that his friend is simply a strong and sure agent of Providence, and that 
his being present and ready to be sent on the new mission has a divine reason: “’I often 
think, Jean, how you were an unconscious agent in the hands of Providence when you 
recalled me from Tucson’” (Cather 1990, 250). Father Vaillant seems never to have 
doubted the strength of his friend. Latour, of course, cannot withhold the truth: “’I sent 
for you because I felt the need for your companionship,’” he tells Vaillant. “’I used my 
authority as Bishop to gratify my personal wish.” And: “’That was selfish, if you will, but 
surely natural enough’” (Cather 1990, 251). Latour suddenly understands: “Now it came 
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over him in a flash, how the Bishop had held himself aloof from his activities; it was a 
very hard thing for Father Latour to let him go; the loneliness of his position had begun to 
weigh on him” (Ibid.). The symbolic mules further sustain Latour’s pain at his friend’s 
departure: 
“But if you take Contento, I will ask you to take Angelica as well. They 
have a great affection for each other; why separate them indefinitely? One could 
not explain to them. They have worked long together.” (Cather 1990, 252) 
 
When the Bishop tells Vaillant to take both mules, Vaillant, who has been writing a letter, 
and although devoted to their mission above all, feels for his friend:  
The Bishop saw a drop of water splash down upon the violet script and spread. He 
turned quickly and went out through the arched doorway. (Cather 1990, 252-253) 
 
 The two friends, during what shall be their final reunion, are able to verbalize the 
completeness of their lives as they have striven to accomplish their mission:  
“We have done the things we used to plan to do, long ago, when we were 
Seminarians,--at least some of them. To fulfill the dreams of one’s youth; that is 
the best that can happen to a man. No worldly success can take the place of that.” 
(Cather 1990, 259) 
 
The story Death Comes for the Archbishop also includes the communication 
possibilities of the 19th century as the story is set in an age before the widespread 
availability of electronic or visual media, yet language and writing play a significant part 
in the lives of the two priests. Both men speak several languages, French being their 
native language; but having been missionaries in Ohio, they are able to speak English; 
and to revive the church in New Mexico, Latour and Vaillant learn Spanish: “For years 
they had made it a practice to speak English together, except upon very special occasions, 
and of late they conversed in Spanish, in which they both needed to gain fluency” (Cather 
1990, 39). 
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Written correspondence is also critical to the friends although they are not 
necessarily writing to each other. Father Vaillant is able to stay close with his family 
through letter writing, particularly with his sister Philomène, who is a nun still in France. 
When Father Latour returns to France temporarily, he is able to visit Philomène, and one 
of the young sisters shares how precious Father Valliant’s letters are to all the sisters:  
She told him also how precious to them were Father Vaillant’s long letters, letters 
in which he told his sister of the country, the Indians, the pious Mexican women, 
the Spanish martyrs of old. These letters, she said, Mother Philomène read aloud 
in the evening. (Cather 1990, 181) 
 
It is with a letter that Bishop Latour calls back his Vicar, Father Vaillant, when he is in 
need of him, and it is during his times of reflection and solitude that one finds Bishop 
Latour writing, “long letters to his brothers and to old friends in France” (Cather 1990,  
228).  
 The story of Jean Marie Latour and Joseph Vaillant is a fit ending for one who is 
seeking a classical-Christian friendship in 20th century literature that meets or exceeds all 
the requirements of the classical-Christian model as it traverses the manuscript and print 
eras. To this point, friendship remains a rock similar to how the narrator, from Father 
Latour’s point of view in Death Comes for the Archbishop, explains the home of the 
Ácoma Native-Americans: 
The Ácomas, who must share the universal human yearning for something 
permanent, enduring, without shadow of change,--they had their idea in 
substance. They actually lived upon their Rock; were born upon it and died upon 
it. (Cather 1990, 98) 
 
The cathedral that the Archbishop succeeds in having built in Santa Fé is indeed symbolic 
of the friendship he has experienced with his great friend Joseph Vaillant. When the 
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Archbishop dies, he returns to the moment when he was encouraging his friend to make 
their lifelong journey together: 
But in reality the Bishop was not there at all; he was standing in a tip-tilted green 
field among his native mountains, and he was trying to give consolation to a 
young man who was being torn in two before his eyes by the desire to go and the 
necessity to stay. He was trying to forge a new Will in that devout and exhausted 
priest. (Cather 1990, 297) 
 
It would seem that extraordinary people are purposeful and virtuous. The have missions 
to accomplish and build their castles, or cathedrals, as it were. It is clear that many great 




















The Ongoing Operation of the Classical-Christian Friendship 
 
 
Father Latour’s (Father Tower’s) cathedral stands as another turret along a long 
line of great friendship narratives and epic poems that bring the classical-Christian 
friendship paradigm alive. Twentieth century theorists like C. S. Lewis (2012) and 
Thomas Merton (1955) apply mortar and paint to reinforce and restore such fortifications 
as electricity powered new media fusillade friendship notions with accelerated visual 
imagery and surround sound that exceed natural sensory perception. Although numerous 
adjustments have been made to the friendship ideal, one of the most fundamental 
adaptations incorporated into the structure with the rise of Christianity was the belief that 
great friendships are divinely inspired; and the 20th century defenders hold to the near 
supernatural quality of the superior friendship.  
The mission objectives were to discover whether there is a transcendent 
understanding of the best kind of friendship, whether such an outstanding idea of 
friendship undergoes any sort of transformation as it confronts changing communication 
technologies that enable friends to discourse with each other via the new media, and 
whether the best kind of friendship might be influenced by changing media, either 
directly or indirectly, as social intercourse is jostled by the new communication 
technologies; thus, the creators of friendship narrative experience the changing 
mindscapes and respond accordingly. This exploration concerned itself with the 
characters, the creators, and the thinkers who exemplified, invented, and explained the 
great friendship. Certainly, one must conclude that there has been a transfer of the myths, 
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legends and paradigms regarding the best kind of friendship despite evidence that media 
can physically change the human brain (Dehaene 2009). In other words, the classical-
Christian paradigm of friendship continues to operate. This expedition has followed the 
well-traveled path from what is known of the oral tradition and through the age of print 
into the 20th century arriving at the foot of the age of audiovisual media if one were to 
continue chronologically to examine media impact. 
What was found to be a good gauge of friendship and its connection to 
communication media is the measure of whether an opposite of friendship is more 
prevalent than it was in previous ages, and such a measurement was taken; for one of the 
opposites is isolation, the consequence being that of loneliness rather than friendship. 
There are many possible hypotheses. For instance, it could be that both isolation and the 
best kind of friendship have increased with the introduction of new communication 
technologies. Marshall McLuhan (1964) claims that, “It is the medium that shapes and 
controls the scale and form of human association and action” (24). Solitude itself, 
however, has become far more acceptable. The loner is no longer a monster as he was 
before the rise of print media. 
 Thomas Merton (1955) oversees a tidy courtyard within the walls of the 
friendship fortress as he carefully prunes friendship principles into the highly 
recognizable virtues of his predecessors. This mission ends, therefore, where Thomas 
Merton redefines the friendship paradigm in 1955, and one finds that he has made few 
changes to the flora since the beginning. First, he does not accept total hermitage as an 
option and resumes the need for love and companionship, which he regards as the major 
reason that one’s life has meaning. It is when one is able to achieve such a love that a 
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person finds life most fulfilling: “True happiness is found in unselfish love, a love which 
increases in proportion as it is shared” (Merton 1955, 3).  The more such a love is shared, 
the better it gets. There are people who one esteems, values, and loves more than he or 
she might cherish the rest of the world’s human inhabitants. Among that special group of 
people is the true friend.  
 The first step, then, is to reassess what friendship is in order to evaluate the 
changes. The first visible track is the love trail, and Thomas Merton (1955) shall act as 
the principal guide. The trail he discloses is an arduous one.  The dilemma is the idea that 
love itself can be enigmatic, and Merton seems to rely heavily upon celestial navigation: 
Love is patient, love is kind. It is not jealous, [love] is not pompous; it is not 
inflated, it is not rude; it does not seek its own interests, it is not quick-tempered, 
it does not brood over injury, it does not rejoice over wrongdoing but rejoices 
with the truth.  It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, and endures 
all things. (First Corinthians 13, 4-7 NAB) 
  
 Love is usually identified by its unselfish nature to be good to others, but to be so 
the proper self-love is necessary. With the idea of an unselfish love comes the idea that it 
should be shared freely (Merton 1955, 3). Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2012) would likely 
agree that once something becomes a duty and is not given of one’s free will, it lacks the 
best kind of intensity: 
Tant que j’agis librement je suis bon et je fais que du bien; mais sitôt que je sens 
le joug, soit de la nécessité soit des hommes, je deviens rebelle ou plutôt rétif, 
alors je suis nul [incapable of action, of doing good]. (Rousseau 2012, 119) 
 
Thoreau (1960, 1991), too, bucks at trying to do good for one’s fellow human being out 
of a sense of duty: “His goodness must be a partial and transitory act, but a constant 
superfluity, which costs him nothing and of which he is unconscious” (Thoreau 1960, 
57). And, Thoreau (1960) rejects the idea of commitment: “As long as possible, live free 
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and uncommitted” (61). One, therefore, should choose his or her friends freely. 
Friendship should not be a matter of strict obligation for it to be the superior kind. The 
individual should always keep the right to choose. 
 Another requirement of friendship is that it should be reciprocated, as love should 
be: “Hence the paradox that unselfish love cannot rest perfectly except in a love that is 
perfectly reciprocated” (Merton 1955, 4). Thus two friends must love each other 
unselfishly and freely, and each gives to the other reciprocal affection and understanding. 
Friendship is a two way street. Friendship must be reciprocal, and the best kind is a 
circular reciprocity, without a clear starting point or ending point. Although the human 
circle may be flawed, there is still the attempt. There is no differentiation in the good 
between the friends. The love that they have for each other is one love: “Love shares the 
good with another not by dividing it with him, but by identifying itself with him so that 
his good becomes my own” (Ibid.). 
 Those people who lack virtue, however, cannot achieve the best kind of 
friendship. One of the principal qualities of virtue is truth:  
To love others well we must first love the truth....The truth I love in loving my 
brother cannot be something merely philosophical and abstract. It must be at the 
same time supernatural and concrete, practical and alive. (Merton 1955, 6-7) 
 
Merton hoists love and friendship to a supernatural level. Since such rules might seem 
difficult for the atheist, the attainment of such a friendship as Merton describes is all but 
impossible for that person since supernatural concepts must be made into tangible 
possibilities. The terms “concrete,” “practical” and “alive,” however, do make sense even 
for the most dogmatic positivist; and one could easily submit that the atheist who follows 
the principles is simply unaware of the supernatural presence. 
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 The traveler must successfully navigate the idea of individuality in friendship. 
Merton (1955) is consistent in creating room for the necessary solitude that makes each 
person unique: “A selfish love seldom respects the rights of the beloved to be an 
autonomous person” (9). The love of friendship needs to be unselfish. Today one might 
call it respecting another’s space, even if that person is a beloved friend. Such an 
unselfish friendship cannot be about control. The selfish friend needs his friend for his or 
her own pleasure and purposes. The reciprocity is lost, and the truth is only important 
insofar as it benefits the selfish friend. Merton (1955) calls it taming a friend, or keeping 
him prisoner (10). The selfish friend does not want his or her friend to be autonomous. 
He will, in fact, make “unlimited concessions” (Ibid.) in order to retain control. Truth 
must supersede other considerations. If both friends are virtuous and truthful, the ideal of 
true friendship can stand: “If I love my brothers according to the truth, my love for them 
will be true not only to them but to myself” (Ibid). Father Latour in Death Comes for the 
Archbishop (1990) lets his great friend Father Vaillant go, demonstrating his 
consciousness of the need for Father Vaillant’s own self affirmation. The friends realize 
their best in each other, but they are also able to realize their personal best. 
 A final obstacle along the tangled path of love has to do with quantity. Although it 
might appear that some people have a greater capacity to love than others, the high 
principles of friendship love demand extraordinary effort and energy. Merton (1955) will 
argue that the number the individual can include among the truest and best kind of friend 
must necessarily be a small group: “But certain ones, very few, are our close friends. 
Because we have more in common with them, we are able to love them with a special 
selfless perfection, since we have more to share” (12). It should be added that one might 
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be able to love many, but for the ultimate friendship to exist, the special love of friends 
must be at two-way street and the same kind of love, making it that much more difficult 
to attain.  
 It should now be understood that human companionship is for most of humanity 
quite necessary. In order to be most content and happy, one needs to love, to be loved and 
to have good friends. The paradigm so far established for such outstanding friendships is 
challenging and requires great dedication and moral integrity. The fictional friends 
depicted in this examination, for the most part, are in possession of the paradigm, and the 
classical-Christian friendship operates through history and as it confronts changing media 
dynamics. The goal remains, however, to uncover whether such a paradigm will continue 
to operate as it encounters the changing mindscape of friendship communication 
possibilities brought about by evolving technologies and whether fictionalized depictions 
of friendship have, consequently, changed.  
 Probably the most significant modification to the classical-Christian friendship 
narrative is in its departure from the hero friendships and from friendships between 
people who come from the same cultures or social classes. As long as all the qualities for 
friendship reside within the individuals, it does not matter from where they come. 
Friendship possibilities are thus expanded. Candide and his servant Cacambo become 
best friends, equals, although they have little in common. They are not of the same race 
or culture. Ishmael and Queequeg, too, come from completely different places. Even 
Father Latour and Father Vaillant are in many ways different from each other. They 
differ greatly from the first hero friends whose raw physical might is compared. The 
thing that all the friends seem to retain, however, aside from their virtuous qualities, is 
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their sense of a common mission, and the friends typically strive to accomplish their 
mission together. Friends are together in action. 
 What might be lacking, however, is the possibility of a close, platonic friendship 
between the sexes, at least in the literature examined during this expedition, and the 
theorists would seem to make little room for it as well; yet women like Katherine Philips, 
writing in the 17th century, and Willa Cather in the early 20th century show a complete 
understanding of the classical paradigm as reflected in Philips’ correspondence and 
poetry, and certainly in Cather’s case with the publication of Death Comes for the 
Archbishop. Simone de Beauvoir (1949) well explains the reasons for the lack of equality 
that has existed between the sexes for such a long time and that may have prevented 
friendship. When Merton and Lewis write about love and friendship, their texts are 
published even before the Civil Rights Movement occurs in the United States. It would 
seem that friendship between a man and a woman becomes complicated as the potential 
for physical intimacy increases; and the purest, best kind of friendship, though 
affectionate, excludes erotica, according to the classicists, although Montaigne (1965, 
1993) ponders the idea of that sort of completeness:  
If such a relationship, free and voluntary, could be built up, in which not only 
would the souls have this complete enjoyment, but the bodies would also share in 
the alliance, so that the entire man would be engaged, it is certain that the 
resulting friendship would be fuller and more complete. (Montaigne 1993, 136) 
 
Marriage and friendship, therefore, are separate things for the classicists although 
marriage and friendship will contain many elements of each other. If one wishes to 
continue the trek into contemporary friendship fiction, especially in writing that makes a 
strong case for mundane realism in what constitutes friendship action, it would seem that 
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friends are often engaged in entertainment as their mission, while marriage, it could be 
argued, is a much more serious goal in terms of creating a life together and perhaps 
rearing children. 
 The short story, “Cathedral,” by Raymond Carver (2015), is a fine expression of 
the new difficulties that friendship might encounter in a contemporary era when new 
media stimulate the mind and the senses in new ways.  Carver offers a friend character 
who, in an audiovisual age, is compelled to communicate orally; yet this persona is able 
to extend his network range and maintain his friendship through other than print 
technologies, relying upon telephone, amateur radio and audiocassette tapes. He remains, 
however, connected to the visual era in which he lives, and he is also subject to print 
media, but he must ingest their information through someone else’s eyes, and the best 
lenses he might have are those of a friend.  
Robert is the friend of the storyteller’s wife whom Robert met when she answered 
his advertisement for a reader before her marriage to the narrator but while she was 
immersed in her first marriage. It can be inferred that the friendship between the man and 
the woman stayed platonic as the woman had to leave the job when her first husband, a 
military man, was transferred. Robert winds up marrying his new reader, but the two 
friends continue their relationship via audiocassette tape. The woman has divorced her 
first husband and married the narrator when Robert comes to pay a personal visit to his 
friend soon after the death of his wife. 
Aside from the manner by which the two friends have communicated and kept the 
friendship alive through the exchange of audiocassette tapes as a way of sharing their 
individual narratives, there is the dilemma of how the male-female friendship, though 
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platonic, might conflict with marriage. How, for instance, should the narrator, the 
woman’s husband, perceive his wife’s friendship with the other man? Ultimately, the 
story becomes a lesson in communication, but there shall remain some gray area. 
Carver (2015) does not expand greatly on the friendship between Robert and the 
storyteller’s wife. One knows, however, that the friends have shared highly personal 
experiences, though remotely, by telephone and by audiocassette. For the wife, it is her 
attempted suicide and ultimate divorce from her first husband, her childhood sweetheart. 
Her suicide attempt, she claims, is the result of loneliness: “She sent tapes from Moody 
AFB, McGuire, McConnell, and finally Travis, near Sacramento, where one night she got 
to feeling lonely and cut off from people she kept losing in the moving-around life” 
(Carver 2015, 103). She is a married woman feeling isolated. Neither the marriage nor 
the distance friend is quite enough. It is similar to Goethe’s Werther whose friend 
William is only present through written correspondence. For the sense of closeness and 
the need to feel a foundation, the woman has apparently been quick to remarry someone 
who offers physical proximity and perhaps a greater sense of a common mission than her 
military officer could give.  
The narrator, however, remains a tough nut to crack. Robert, the male friend, 
seems to want to eliminate the barrier that exists between the husband and him. He is 
motivated, and one can only speculate, by the wish to retain the wife’s friendship, and to 
do so he must forge one with her husband. In the process, Robert succeeds in unlocking 
something within the husband storyteller. When the narrator’s wife asks him to be kind to 
her friend, he responds that he has no blind friends, and she retorts:  
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“You don’t have any friends,” she said. “Period. Besides,” she said, “goddamn it, 
his wife’s just died! Don’t you understand that? The man’s lost his wife!” (Carver 
2015, 104) 
 
It is inferred that to the wife, marriage and friendship are different. The second inference, 
however, is that the husband does not know what friendship is. Robert moves the 
storyteller towards a friendship experience. 
 Carver provides some insight into the way media alter perspectives when he seats 
his narrator and Robert in front of a television. The storyteller does not know what to do 
with a blind man. The two wind up smoking marijuana, a first time occurrence for 
Robert, while the wife is upstairs changing into her robe. Robert wishes to please. When 
the wife falls asleep, it is up to the bard to entertain Robert. He is disappointed that his 
wife has fallen asleep, but Robert takes the communication initiative when the narrator 
asks whether Robert would like to go to his room and go to sleep:  
“Not yet,” he said. “No, I’ll stay up with you, bub. If that’s all right. I’ll stay up 
until you’re ready to turn in. We haven’t had a chance to talk. Know what I mean? 
I feel like me and her monopolized the evening.” (Carver 2015, 109) 
 
The narrator then admits to being glad for the company, for he normally smokes 
marijuana and stays up as late as he can after his wife has gone to bed. It is here that the 
narrator expresses his loneliness. He is a man with a wife but no friends. He has fearful 
dreams. Perhaps he is a character like Sartre’s Roquentin (1939), one who cannot easily 
find meaning or purpose.  
 Things get a bit awkward as the two men listen and the narrator watches a 
program about The Middle Ages and the cathedrals. The narrator feels obliged to explain 
what he is seeing to Robert but cannot find the words to describe the cathedrals and 
finally arrives at a conclusion:  
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“In those olden days, when they built cathedrals, men wanted to be close to God. 
In those olden days, God was an important part of everyone’s life. You could tell 
this from their cathedral-building. I’m sorry, I said, “but it looks like that’s the 
best I can do for you.” (Carver 2015, 110) 
 
From the narrator’s attempt to describe what he is seeing on television, one can 
glean that ordinarily the narrator does not pay such close attention to what he is seeing 
and does not retain much unless there can be some active participation. Poe (2011) writes 
that it is simply easier to watch television:  
We listen and watch more often, for longer, and more pleasurably than we talk 
and read. Further proof is of this native preference is the fact that the choice is 
largely independent of content. When faced with reading a good book or watching 
an awful TV show, most people will watch an awful TV show. (Poe 2011, 199) 
 
 However, the two men are not experiencing an awful TV show, and Robert has a 
way to get more out of the viewing. A drawbridge is lowered, as the two men begin 
working on a cathedral together, taking action as friends, when Robert asks the narrator 
to draw a cathedral for him while he rests his hand on the narrator’s hand. It enables him 
to imagine the cathedral, but it is also a new communication for the storyteller. One 
might be reminded of Gilgamesh and Enkidu holding hands and strolling through Uruk. 
The contact between the storyteller and Robert is both tactile and oral. Robert is 
encouraging. The narrator keeps drawing even after the TV station goes off the air. When 
the wife wakes up and asks what they are doing, sitting on the floor, Robert answers: 
“We’re drawing a cathedral.” He continues, “Me and him are working on it” (Carver 
2015, 112). It is working on a friendship and knowledge of each other. Eventually, the 
narrator closes his eyes to draw, but only after he has put people in the cathedral: “What’s 
a cathedral without people?” asks Robert (Ibid.). It is, perhaps, symbolic of someone 
joining together with someone else to reach into one’s humanity and maybe into one’s 
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soul as the two men draw together. The narrator does not open his eyes, for he would 
prefer to keep the image in his mind. He has discovered, with the help of Robert, 
something within himself. From the standpoint of communication, it is the type of 
exchange that might occur before print media, when two friends had to express their 
visions by recounting the story and by drawing the story in the sand in such a way that 
the other person could create the image in his or her mind. 
 The action of friendship is an important piece to the story, but there is also some 
important symbolism in regards to marriage and friendship. When the wife falls asleep, 
she is sitting between the two men on the couch, the friend on one side and the husband 
on the other. The husband notices that his wife’s robe is open, and he can see her “juicy 
thigh” (Carver 2015, 108). The friend, however, cannot see it. He is blind to the woman’s 
sexuality. The classical-Christian friendship excludes any carnal possibilities. The 
husband is quite conscious of his wife’s body. The message could be that a person cannot 
be both friend and spouse at the same time, or that the ideal relationship would be that the 
spouse be both friend and lover.  
 Carver presents some of the questions that one should examine if he or she were 
to pursue the media-friendship connection. One does wonder whether audiovisual media 
poses a threat to the classical friendship cathedral:  
Plato feared that if people were afforded the opportunity to see whatever they 
wanted, then they, like Leontius, would lose control of themselves…by the mid-
twentieth century, audiovisual media made it possible for anyone to see almost 
anything. The consequences were just as Plato predicted, for people did after a 
fashion lose control of themselves. (Poe 2011, 153) 
 
“The mosaic form of the TV image…commands immediate participation in depth and 
admits of no delays” (McLuhan 1964, 283). Filmmakers and screen writers, nevertheless, 
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continue to provide fictional friendships that embrace the classical paradigm. Television 
viewers can watch reruns of Star Trek (NBC 1966-1969) and find the famous friends 
Kirk and his alien friend Spock successfully traversing the universe. Before them rode the 
Lone Ranger and his faithful Cacambo, Tonto in The Lone Ranger (ABC 1949-1957). 
Luke Skywalker and Hans Solo of the film Star Wars become great friends (1977). There 
is a seemingly endless parade of super friends based on the classical-Christian model. 
One can only conclude that such a friendship is still wanted, for the film and television 
industry are geared to giving people what they want:  
According to one estimate, in excess of 9.6 billion movie tickets are sold each 
year…According to an estimate in the CIA World Factbook, there were over 2.5 
billion radios and 1.4 billion televisions in the world in 1997, the last date for 
which data are available. (Poe 2011, 158-159) 
 
 The contemporary era of the internet coupled with artificial intelligence and 
robotics might be the scariest age yet and the greatest threat to the superior friendship. 
There are already films about falling in love with artificial beings. Dekard, in the film 
Blade Runner (1982), falls in love with the “replicant” Rachel. In Ex Machina (2015), the 
sentient “female” robot the protagonist has been selected to test fascinates him. Data, the 
android in Star Trek: The Next Generation (CBS 1987-1994), has and is a great friend. In 
the episode “The Measure of a Man” (Season 2, Episode 9), Data is on trial, and Captain 
Picard defends Data’s rights as a sentient being who should be entitled to choose for 
himself and with full human rights. Data’s friend, Goerdi, is, interestingly enough, blind 
like Carver’s Robert in “Cathedral,” and he is deeply affected at the prospect of that his 
friend might be classified as property, like a slave, and lost to him. Is friendship possible 
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with a machine? How, as they evolve, will technology, particular communication media, 
make people think about friendship? 
What we are considering here…are the psychic and social consequences of the 
design or patterns as they amplify or accelerate existing processes. For the 
“message” of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern 
that it introduces into human affairs. (McLuhan 1964, 24) 
 
 When this project began, it was hoped that it would be an organic contribution to 
the friendship discourse and that it might yield something new to the discussion. It should 
instead be regarded as additive, for all of the explored territories in this expedition had 
good cartographers who designed useful maps. This attempt at synthesis reads, 
unfortunately, somewhat like a summary of outstanding friendships that follow a trail 
map. This explorer may have spent too much time admiring the classical-Christian 
friendship, its inventors and its facilitators. It is hoped, however, that it can serve as a 
resource for those who wish to see how well the old friendship paradigm can operate 
within the tsunami that is the internet and its evolving artificial intelligence.  
 One should remember that the wonderful friendships spotlighted in this work are 
all fictional and rooted deeply in legend and mythology. These stories and poems 
represent friendship ideals, and it is debatable whether they are attainable. Many readers 
might wonder whether they have experienced such extraordinary friendships. Perhaps, 
however, these friendship narratives exist to serve as beacons for excellent friendships, 
and elements of these friendships are within reach. Tolstoy (1938) helpfully explains the 
pursuit of such ideals:  
Or, un idéal n’en est vraiment un que lorsque sa realization n’est possible à 
atteindre que dans l’infini et que, par suite, la possibilité de s’en approcher est 
infinie. Si un idéal pouvait être attaint et si, de plus, nous pouvions nous 
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représetner sa réalization, il cesserait d’être un idéal…Tout le sens de la vie 
humaine est enfermé qui tend vers cet [an] idéal. (Tolstoy 1938, 152) 
 
To paraphrase somewhat, if one can reach an ideal, it is no longer an ideal, yet it can 
always be something approachable and one is always striving to get as close as possible 
to it. The best kind of friendship, according to Aelred (2010), is the closest thing human 
that there is to a concept of God (126.134). 
It is not unwise, furthermore, to turn to the creators of fiction, the artists, for 
answers: “The artist is always engaged in writing a detailed history of the future because 
he is the only person aware of the nature of the present” (Lewis, Wyndham; qtd. in 
McLuhan 1964, 70). The classical-Christian friendship still operates. It has transcended 
time and weathered the media challenges. It might be useful to read and watch what the 
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